THE PHILEBUS:

A

DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE CHIEF GOOD OF MAN.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE PHILEBUS.

THE deſign of this dialogue is to diſcover what is the chief good of man; and in order to effect this in the moſt perfect manner, it is divided into twelve parts. In the firſt part, therefore, Plato propoſes the ſubject of diſcuſſion, viz. what the good of man is, and whether wiſdom or pleaſure is more conducive to the attainment of this good. In the ſecond part, he explains the condition of a voluptuous life, and alſo of a life according to wiſdom, that it may be ſeen which of the two moſt contributes to felicity, and alſo whether ſome third ſtate of life will appear, which is better than either of theſe; and that, if this ſhould be the caſe, it may be ſeen whether pleaſure or wiſdom is more allied to the perfection of this life. In the third part, he ſhows how this diſcuſſion ſhould be conducted, and that diviſion and definition ſhould precede demonſtration. In the fourth, he deſcribes the conditions of the good, and ſhows that neither wiſdom nor pleaſure is the chief good of man. In the fifth part, he inveſtigates the genus of pleaſure, and alſo of wiſdom, and unfolds thoſe two great genera of things *bound* and *the infinite*, principles the next in dignity to the ineffable cauſe of all; from which two he exhibits that which is mixt, and preſages the cauſe of the mixture. In the ſixth part, becauſe through thoſe genera certain ſparks of knowledge are enkindled, he enters on the compariſon between pleaſure and wiſdom. In the ſeventh, he more largely explains the cauſe of the mixture, and continues the compariſon more clearly In the eighth part, the principles and genera being now unfolded, he inveſtigates the

the differences; inquires, in what pleaſure and pain conſiſt, which among theſe are properly produced from paſſion, and how many parts they contain. In the ninth part, he inveſtigates, in what ſcience properly conſiſts, and, having divided it, ſhows that a certain third life preſides over wiſdom, and wiſdom over pleaſure. In the tenth part, it appears how pleaſure and wiſdom are mingled together, and that our good conſiſts in a compoſition of this kind. In the eleventh part, he inquires what it is in that compoſition from the dominion of which felicity is produced; in which part both our good and good itſelf become conſpicuous. And, in the twelfth and laſt part, all the kinds of good which are purſuable as ends are enumerated in order, according to the relative value of each of them to man.

"The ſubject of this dialogue," ſays Mr. Sydenham, "is introduced by ſtating the different opinions of Socrates and Philebus concerning the nature of that good wherein the happineſs of man is to be found; opinions which, it ſeems, they had juſt before ſeverally avowed. Philebus, a man ſtrongly prepoſſeſſed with the doctrine of Ariſtippus, had aſſerted that this good was pleaſure, meaning pleaſurable ſenſation, or pleaſure felt through the outward ſenſes. On the other hand Socrates had ſuppoſed the ſovereign good of man to be placed in mind, and in the energies of mind on mental ſubjects. Philebus, in ſupport of his own aſſertion, had been haranguing for a long time together, after the manner of the ſophiſts, until he found his ſpirits and imagination, or perhaps his ſtock of plauſible arguments, quite exhauſted. He had, therefore, deſired his friend Protarchus, a young gentleman who appears to have been a follower of Gorgias, to take up the controverſy, and carry it on in his ſtead and behalf. Protarchus had conſented, and had engaged himſelf ſo to do. Immediately on this engagement, at this very point of time the preſent dialogue commences: accordingly it is carried on chiefly between Socrates and Protarchus. But as Philebus is the principal perſon whoſe opinion combats againſt that of Socrates, and as no higher character is given to Protarchus than that of acceſſary, or ſecond to Philebus, in this argumentative combat, the dialogue now before us, very properly and conſiſtently with the rule which Plato ſeems to have laid down to himſelf in naming his dialogues, has the name given to it of Philebus."

This admirable dialogue is replete with ſome of the moſt important dogmas

of the Platonic theology, as will appear from our notes upon it; and by thoſe who are capable of knowing wholes from parts it may be collected from what is here ſaid, that intellect has not the ſame order with the firſt cauſe of all. For, if our intellect is the image of the firſt intellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined according to this alone, it neceſſarily follows that the cauſe of good is eſtabliſhed above intellectual perfection. *The good*, therefore, or the ineffable principle of things, has a ſuper-intellectual ſubſiſtence, agreeably to what is aſſerted in the Sixth Book of the Republic.

I ſhall only add, as is well obſerved by Mr. Sydenham, that the apparent form of this dialogue is *dramatic*; the genius of it, *didactic*; and the reaſoning, for the moſt part *analytical*.

THE PHILEBUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, PROTARCHUS, PHILEBUS.

SCENE.—The LYCEUM.

SOCRATES.

CONSIDER[1] now, Protarchus, what the doctrine of Philebus is, which you are taking upon yourſelf to ſecond and ſupport; and what things ſaid by me you are going to controvert, if they ſhould be found ſuch as are not agreeable to your mind. Will you permit me to ſtate, in a ſummary way, the difference between my poſitions and thoſe of Philebus?

PROT. By all means.

SOC. Philebus then ſays, that the good of all animals is joy, and pleaſure, and delight[2], and whatever elſe is congenial to them, and harmonizes with all other things of the ſame kind. And what I contend for is, that thoſe things are not the beſt; but that to be wiſe, and to underſtand[3], and to

[1] The beginning of this dialogue ſuppoſes that much converſation had paſſed, immediately before, between Socrates and Philebus.—S.

[2] This part of the ſentence, to give it a literal tranſlation, runs thus: *that it is good for all animals to rejoice, and* (to feel) *pleaſure and delight*, &c.—But in tranſlating it we choſe to give it that meaning which is rightly preſumed by Socrates to be agreeable to the ſentiments of Philebus; for otherwiſe there would be no oppoſition between the opinion of Philebus and his own.—S.

[3] How is intellect, ſays Olympiodorus, ſpoken of with relation to pleaſure? For, in the firſt place, appetite (*orexis*) rather is divided in oppoſition to knowledge; but appetite and pleaſure are not the ſame. And, in the next place, there is a certain pleaſure in knowledge. To this we may reply,

remember, and whatever is of kin to them, right opinions, and true reaſonings, are better things than pleaſure, and more eligible to all beings univerſally, that is, to ſuch as are capable of receiving the participation of them; and that to all beings which have that capacity, the actual partaking of them is of all things the moſt advantageous, not only to thoſe beings which are, but to thoſe alſo which are to come. Do we not, O Philebus, you and I, ſeverally lay down ſome ſuch hypotheſes as theſe?

PHIL. Exactly ſuch, O Socrates!

reply, that there is a pleaſure in knowledge, in conſequence of its participation of appetite. For to be pleaſantly affected when we apprehend the object of knowledge, ariſes from the aſſumption of appetite. But to the other queſtion we may reply, that the inveſtigative is analogous to the orectic power: for inveſtigation, being as it were a gnoſtic orexis (appetite), is a way to a certain end; juſt as orexis haſtens to a certain thing. But the poſſeſſion of the object of appetite is analogous to knowledge, which is the poſſeſſion of truth.

Again, the vital and the orectic are not the ſame. For life is alſo predicated of knowledge; ſince knowledge moves, and that which knows is moved, which is eſpecially the peculiarity of life. But that which knows is moved when it inveſtigates, not when it has arrived at the end, which knowledge ſignifies.

Again, good is predicated both of knowledge and orexis: for knowledge is beneficial, and is the cauſe of union with the object of knowledge. But the good of orexis is, as it were, practic, and we wiſh not to know, but to be paſſive to it, and we embrace it more nearly, but do not endure to have it at a diſtance. But we can endure the object of knowledge, though at a diſtance; for we wiſh to know and not to be it. What, however, ſhall we ſay the orectic is? For it is not common good; ſince this alſo pertains to knowledge. Nor is it ſomething unknown: for orexis ſubſiſts together with knowledge. It is, therefore, a certain good which is known. Hence, it moves from itſelf the perceiver. But this is the beautiful; ſince orexis, conſidered according to its common acceptation, is nothing elſe than love; though love is a ſtrenuous orexis. For the more and the leſs produce no alteration according to ſpecies; but the ſtrenuous is intenſeneſs alone. Further ſtill, the pleaſant is the attendant of orexis; but the pleaſant is apparent beauty. For apparent good is benignant and lovely to all animals. But may not the beautiful be thus related to the good, according to indication? For, in the firſt place, the good is above idea; but things which are in forms are more allied to us. For the good is the formal object of orexis; but the beautiful is the formal object of love; juſt as being is the formal object of knowledge. Orexis, however, differs in ſpecies from love. For, if orexis is aſſumed in common, it is extended to one common good. But, if the ends are ſeparated, the powers alſo which haſten towards them muſt be ſeparated. For the contact which, according to its idiom, is called friendſhip, φιλια, and which makes a union with good, is one thing, and the power which harmonizes with this muſt be called deſire, εφεσις; but the power which, according to indigence, urges the multitude is another; and a thing of this kind is denominated love, ερως, and haſtens to the beautiful.—T.

Soc. And will you, Protarchus, take up the controverſy, as I have juſt now ſtated it?

Prot. Of neceſſity [1] I muſt. For Philebus, the champion of our ſide, is tired and gives out.

Soc. Now it is right and proper for us to diſcover, by all means poſſible, the full force and meaning of both thoſe hypotheſes; and not to give over till we have determined the controverſy between them.

Prot. I agree with you, it is.

Soc. Let us agree in this too, beſides.

Prot. In what?

Soc. That we ſhould, each of us [2], endeavour to ſet forth what ſtate and what affection [3] of the ſoul is able, according to our different hypotheſes, to procure for every man a happy life. Is it not our buſineſs ſo to do?

Prot.

[1] Neceſſity is threefold: for it is either ſelf-perfect, aſſociating with *the good*; or material, with which indigence and imbecility aſſociate; or it is as that which is referred to an end, as navigation with a view to gain. Thus Proclus.—T.

[2] The Greek of this ſentence, in all the editions of Plato, is αυτων εκατερος. But all the tranſlators interpret, as if they read in the MSS. ημων εκατερος: a reading which is clearly agreeable to the ſenſe of the paſſage, and makes it eaſier to be underſtood. In the printed reading the word αυτων muſt refer to λογων, which is more remote, and has been rather implied than expreſſed; αυτων εκατερος will then mean *the argument of each*; but to ſay, *the argument ſhould endeavour*, is in a ſtyle too figurative and bold to be uſed by any proſaic writer.—S.

[3] In the Greek,—εξιν και διαθεσιν.—All the differences between εξις and διαθεσις are accurately ſhown by Ariſtotle in his Categories, cap. viii. and in his Metaphyſics, lib. iv. ſec. 19. In the ſentence now before us, the difference between them is this: διαθεσις ψυχης, *an affection of the ſoul*, is the ſoul's preſent but tranſient ſtate; εξις ψυχης, *a ſtate of the ſoul*, is the ſoul's permanent affection. Thus we ſay of a man, that he is in a joyous ſtate of mind, when the joy with which he is affected is of ſome ſtanding, and is likely to continue: but of a man in whoſe ſoul joy is juſt now ariſen, we ſay, that he is ſeized (that is, affected ſuddenly) with joy. And thus again we ſay, that the mind is in a thoughtful ſtate, when it has been for ſome time actually thinking, and is not eaſy to be diverted from thinking on: but when a thought ariſes ſuddenly within us, in an unthinking ſtate of mind, and amidſt the wanderings of fancy, we ſay that a thought ſtrikes us, that is, ſuddenly affects our mind. It muſt not however be concealed, that εξις and διαθεσις, which we have here tranſlated by the words *ſtate* and *affection*, uſually mean *habit* and *diſpoſition*. But the affinity between this their uſual meaning, and that which they have in the paſſage now before us, will appear, from conſidering, that, as the ſoul acquires certain habits of acting, through frequently-repeated acts of the ſame kind,—ſo ſhe is fixed in ſome certain ſtate, through frequent impreſſions made on her where ſhe is paſſive, or through frequent energies of her own where ſhe is active;

PROT. Certainly it is.

SOC. Well then: You ſay that it is that of rejoicing; we, that it is that of underſtanding and thinking rightly.

PROT. True.

SOC. But what if there ſhould appear ſome other, preferable to both of theſe, but more nearly of kin to pleaſure? ſhould we not in this caſe be both of us confuted, and obliged to yield the preference to a life which gives the ſtable poſſeſſion of thoſe very things wherein you place human happineſs? However, at the ſame time it muſt be agreed, that a life of pleaſure would be found more eligible than a life of knowledge or intellection.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. But if that better ſtate of the ſoul ſhould appear to be more nearly allied to knowledge, in that caſe, knowledge would be found to have the advantage over pleaſure, and pleaſure muſt give place. Do ye not agree with me, that theſe things are ſo? or how otherwiſe ſay ye that they are?

PROT. To me, I muſt confeſs, they ſeem to be as you repreſent them.

SOC. But to Philebus how ſeem they? What ſay you, Philebus?

PHIL. To me pleaſure ſeems, and will always ſeem, to be the ſuperior, whatever it be compared with. And you, Protarchus, will be at length convinced of it yourſelf.

PROT. After having reſigned to me the management of the debate, you can no longer be the maſter of what ſhould be yielded to Socrates, and what ſhould not.

PHIL. You are in the right. But, however, I have diſcharged my duty; and I here call the Goddeſs herſelf to witneſs it.

PROT. We too are witneſſes of the ſame; and can teſtify your making of the aſſertion which you have juſt made. But now, as to that examination, O Socrates! which is to follow after what you and I have agreed in, whether Philebus be willing to conſent, or however he may be diſpoſed, let us try to go through with it, and bring it to a concluſion.

active; a ſtate, to which thoſe impreſſions from without, and thoſe energies within, gradually lead her;—and alſo that, in like manner as ſome certain previous diſpoſition of the ſoul is neceſſary to every ſingle act which is voluntary, ſo is it alſo neceſſary to the receiving of every impreſſion from without, and to the performing of every energy within.—S.

SOC.

Soc. By all means, let us; beginning with that very Goddeſs who, according to him, is called Venus, but whoſe true name is Pleaſure [1].

Prot. Perfectly right.

Soc. The fear [2] which I have always in me concerning the proper names of the Gods, is no ordinary kind of fear; but ſurpaſſes the greateſt dread. Hence, in the preſent caſe, with regard to Venus, whatever name be agreeable to the Goddeſs, by that would I chooſe to call her. But as to pleaſure [3], how various a thing it is, I well know. And with this, as I juſt now ſaid, ought we to begin, by conſidering and inquiring into the nature of pleaſure firſt. For we hear it called, indeed, by one ſingle name, as if it were one ſimple thing: it aſſumes, however, all ſorts of forms, even ſuch as

[1] Why is Pleaſure, ſays Olympiodorus, a Goddeſs, according to Philebus? May we not ſay, As that which is the object of deſire, and as an end? But why is Venus a Goddeſs? Shall we ſay, As lovely? Perhaps they are Goddeſſes, becauſe they are both concerned in the procreations of animals, the one as a preſiding power, the other as a paſſion. Why, too, is Pleaſure not conſidered as a Goddeſs by any of the antients*? Becauſe, ſays Proclus, it neither is a precedaneous good, nor immediately beautiful, nor has a middle ſubſiſtence, and different from both theſe. We muſt ſay, however, that Pleaſure, according to Jamblichus, is a Goddeſs, and is recognized in temples by Proclus the Laodicean.

Again, no one of the antients ſays that Venus is Pleaſure. What then is the reaſon of this? May we not ſay, that it is becauſe Venus has a copulative power, and that a certain pleaſure follows copulation? And alſo, that this pleaſure is accompanied with much of the deformed? Venus, however, is beautiful, not only that Venus which is divine, but that alſo which belongs to nature. And in theology, the idiom of *Venus* is different from that of Ευφροσυνη, *Delight*.—T.

[2] Why does Socrates, ſays Olympiodorus, ſo much venerate the names of the Gods? Shall we ſay, Becauſe formerly things adapted were conſecrated to appropriate natures, and becauſe it is unbecoming to move things immovable? or, that names are adapted to the nature of the Gods, according to what is ſaid in the Cratylus? or, that theſe names are vocal images of the Gods, according to Democritus? But how does a worthy man fear? Either very properly the divine wrath; or this fear is a veneration, but not a certain paſſion attended with dread. I ſhall only obſerve, in addition to what is ſaid by Olympiodorus, that this paſſage, among a multitude of others, proves, beyond all poſſibility of contradiction, that Socrates believed in the exiſtence of divine beings, the immediate progeny of the ineffable cauſe of all, or, in other words, was a polytheiſt.—T.

[3] Pleaſure ſubſiſts together with motion; for it is the attendant of it. But the motion of intellect is an immutable energy; that of ſoul, a mutable energy; and that of an animal, a paſſive energy. But that of a plant is paſſion only.—T.

* Viz. by none of the Greek theologiſts.

are the moſt unlike one to another. For obſerve: we ſay that the intemperate man has pleaſure; and that the temperate man has pleaſure alſo,—pleaſure in being what he is, that is, temperate. Again: we ſay that pleaſure attends on folly, and on the man who is full of fooliſh opinions and fooliſh hopes; that pleaſure attends alſo on the man who thinks wiſely,—pleaſure in that very mental energy, his thinking wiſely. Now any perſon who would affirm theſe pleaſures to be of ſimilar kind, would be juſtly deemed to want underſtanding.

PROT. The pleaſures which you mention, O Socrates, are indeed produced by contrary cauſes; but in the pleaſures themſelves there is no contrariety. For how ſhould pleaſure not be ſimilar to pleaſure, itſelf to itſelf, the moſt ſimilar of all things[1]?

SOC. Juſt ſo, colour too, my friend, differs not from colour in this reſpect, that it is colour, all. And yet, we all of us know that black, beſides being different from white, happens to be alſo its direct contrary. So figure, too, is all one with figure, after the ſame manner, in the general. But as to the parts of that one general thing, ſome are directly contrary to others; and between the reſt there happens to be a kind of infinite diverſity. And many other things we ſhall find to be of this nature. Believe not then this poſition, that things the moſt contrary are all of them one. And I ſuſpect that we ſhall alſo find ſome pleaſures quite contrary to other pleaſures.

PROT. It may be ſo. But how will that hurt my ſide of the queſtion?

SOC. In that *you* call them, diſſimilar as they are, by another name; (ſhall we ſay?) for all *pleaſant* things you call *good*. Now that all pleaſant things are pleaſant, admits of no diſpute. But though many of them are evil, and many indeed good, as I readily acknowledge, yet all of them you call good; and at the ſame time you confeſs them to be diſſimilar in their natures, when a man forces you to this confeſſion. What then is that, the ſame in every

[1] This was the very language, or manner of expreſſion, uſed by a ſect of philoſophers called Cyrenaïcs, from Cyrene, the native city of Ariſtippus, their maſter. For the Cyrenaïcs held, ſays Laërtius, μη διαφερειν ἡδονην ἡδονης, *that pleaſure differs not from pleaſure*. Whence it appears probable, that Philebus derived his notions and expreſſions on this point from ſome of the diſciples of Ariſtippus, if not from Ariſtippus himſelf. For this philoſopher, after he had for ſome time converſed with Socrates, for the ſake of whoſe converſation he came to Athens, departed thence, and went to Ægina; where he profeſſed the teaching of philoſophy, and where he reſided till after the death of Socrates.—S.

pleaſure,

pleaſure, in the evil pleaſures equally with the good, from which you give to all pleaſures the denomination of good?

PROT. What is that, O Socrates, which you ſay? Do you imagine that any perſon, after having aſſerted that pleaſure is the good, will admit your ſuppoſition? or will ſuffer it to paſs uncontradicted, that only ſome pleaſures are good, but that other pleaſures are evil?

SOC. However, you will acknowledge that pleaſures are unlike one to another, and ſome even contrary to others?

PROT. By no means; ſo far as they are pleaſures, every one of them.

SOC. We are now brought back again to the ſame poſition, O Protarchus! There is no difference between pleaſure and pleaſure; all pleaſures are alike, we muſt ſay: and the ſimilar inſtances, juſt now produced, in colours and in figures, have had, it ſeems, no effect upon us. But we ſhall try, and talk after the manner of the meaneſt arguers, and mere novices in dialectic.

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. I mean, that if I, to imitate you, and diſpute with you in your own way, ſhould dare to aſſert that two things, the moſt unlike, are of all things the moſt like to each other, I ſhould ſay nothing more than what you ſay: ſo that both of us would appear to be rawer diſputants than we ought to be; and the ſubject of our diſpute would thus ſlip out of our hands, and get away. Let us reſume it, therefore, once more: and, perhaps, by returning to ſimilitudes[1], we may be induced to make ſome conceſſions each of us to the other.

[1] The ſenſe and the reaſoning require a ſmall alteration to be here made in the Greek copies of Plato, by reading, inſtead of τας ὁμοιας,—τας ὁμοιοτητας, *ſimilitudes*, or rather τα ὁμοια, *ſimiles*.—Similes of the kind here meant are by Ariſtotle, in his Art of Rhetoric, lib. ii. cap. 20. edit. Du Vall, juſtly ſtyled τα Σωκρατικα, *Socratic*, becauſe frequently employed by Socrates. They are not ſuch as thoſe for which the imagination of a poet ſkims over all nature, to illuſtrate ſome things by ſuperficial reſemblances to them in other things: neither are they ſuch as the memory of an orator ranſacks all hiſtory for, to prove the certainty of ſome doubtful fact by examples on record, which agree with it in a few circumſtances: but they are ſuch as the reaſon of an accompliſhed maſter of dialectic chooſes out from ſubjects near at hand, to prove the truth of ſome uncertain or controverted poſition, by the analogy it bears to ſome other truth which is obvious, and clear, and will be readily admitted. Such a ſimile, bearing the plaineſt and moſt ſtriking analogy with what is to be proved, is actually produced, immediately after this preface to it, by Socrates. But not a word is there in what follows concerning ſimilar pleaſures; and τας ὁμοιας, *alike* or *ſimilar*, cannot be joined with, or belong to, any preceding noun, beſide ἡδονας. As to the word *returning*, in the preſent ſentence, it refers to thoſe ſimiles produced before of colour and of figure.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Say how.

SOC. Suppoſe me to be the party queſtioned; and ſuppoſe yourſelf, Protarchus, to interrogate me.

PROT. Concerning what?

POL. Concerning prudence, and ſcience, and intelligence, and all the reſt of thoſe things which in the beginning of our converſation I ſaid were good, when I was aſked what ſort of a thing good was; muſt I not acknowledge theſe to be attended with the ſame circumſtance which attends thoſe other things celebrated by you?

PROT. What circumſtance?

SOC. The ſciences, viewed all of them together, will ſeem to both of us not only many, and of diverſe kinds, but diſſimilar too, ſome to others. Now if beſides there ſhould appear a contrariety [1] in any way, between ſome of them and others, ſhould I deſerve to be diſputed with any longer, if, fearful of admitting contrariety between the ſciences, I were to aſſert that no one ſcience was diſſimilar to any other ſcience? For then the matter in debate between us, as if it were a mere fable, being deſtroyed, would vaniſh: while we ſaved ourſelves by an illogical retreat. But ſuch an event ought not to happen, except this part of it,—the ſaving of ourſelves. And now the equality, which appears thus far between your hypotheſis and mine, I am well enough pleaſed with. The pleaſures happen to be found many and diſſimilar; many alſo and diverſe are the ſciences. The difference, however, between your good and mine, O Protarchus, let us not conceal: but let us dare to lay it fairly and openly before us both; that we may diſcover, (if thoſe who are cloſely examined will make any diſcovery,) whether pleaſure or wiſdom ought to be pronounced the chief good of man, or whether any third thing, different from either: ſince it is not, as I preſume, with this view that we contend, that my hypotheſis, or that yours, may prevail over its antagoniſt; but that which hath the truth on its ſide, we are both of us to contend for and ſupport.

PROT. This is certainly our duty.

[1] *Contrariety* in the ſciences is nothing more than *diverſity*. For one ſcience is not in oppoſition to, or hoſtile to, another; ſince ſecondary are ſubſervient to prior ſciences, and from them derive their proper principles.—T.

Soc. But this point further we ſhould, both of us together, ſettle on the ſureſt ground.

Prot. What point do you mean?

Soc. That which puzzles and perplexes all perſons who chooſe to make it the ſubject of their converſation: nay, ſometimes ſome others, who have no ſuch intention, are led to it unawares in converſation upon other ſubjects.

Prot. Expreſs what you mean in plainer terms.

Soc. I mean that which fell in our way but juſt now, the nature of which is ſo full of wonders. For that many are one [1], and that one is many, is wonderful to have it ſaid; and either of thoſe poſitions is eaſy to be controverted.

Prot. Do you mean ſuch poſitions as this,—that I Protarchus, who am by nature one perſon, am alſo many? and ſuch as theſe others,—that myſelf, and other perſons the reverſe of me,—the great alſo and the little, the heavy and the light, are one and the ſame? with a thouſand poſitions more which might be made of like kind?

Soc. The wonders, O Protarchus, which you have now ſpoken of, relating to the one and many, have been hackneyed in the mouths of the vulgar; but by the common agreement, as it were, of all men, they are now laid aſide, and are never to be mentioned: for they are conſidered as childiſh and eaſy objections, and great impediments alſo to diſcourſe. It is now alſo agreed, never to introduce into converſation, as an inſtance of one and many, the members or parts into which any ſingle thing may be conſidered as diviſible. Becauſe, when a reſpondent has once admitted and avowed, that all theſe [*members or parts*] are that *one* thing, which is thus at the ſame time *many*, he is refuted and laughed at by his queſtioner, for having been driven to aſſert ſuch monſtrous abſurdities as theſe,—that a ſingle one is an infinite multitude, and an infinite multitude only one.

Prot. What other things, then, not hackneyed among the vulgar, nor as yet univerſally agreed on, do you mean, O Socrates, relating to this point?

Soc. I mean, young man, when a thing is propoſed to be conſidered, which is one, but is not of the number or nature of things generated and pe-

[1] See the Parmenides.—T.

riſhable,

riſhable. For as to the ones of this latter ſort, it is agreed, as I juſt now ſaid, to reject them, as unworthy of a ſerious confutation. The ones which I mean are ſuch as man, ox, beauty, good. When theſe *henads* [1], or ſuch as theſe, are propoſed for ſubjects of debate, much ſerious attention is given them; and when they come to be divided, any one of them into many, much doubt and controverſy ariſes.

PROT. Upon what points?

SOC. In the firſt place, whether ſuch monads ſhould be deemed to have true being. In the next place, how it is that theſe monads, every one of them being always the ſame, and never generated, nor ever to be deſtroyed, have, notwithſtanding, one and the ſame ſtability common to them all [2]. And laſtly, Whether we ſhould ſuppoſe every ſuch monad to be diſperſed and ſpread abroad amongſt an infinity of things generated or produced, and thus, from being one, to become many; or whether we ſhould ſuppoſe it to remain entire, itſelf by itſelf [3], ſeparate and apart from that multitude. But, of all ſuppoſitions, this might appear the moſt impoſſible, that one and the ſame

[1] Plato, ſays Olympiodorus, calls the ſummits of forms *monads* and *henads*. He calls them *henads*, with reference to the appropriate multitude of which they are the leaders: but *monads*, with reference to the ſupereſſential. Or we may ſay, that there are twofold ſummits of forms, the one *eſſential*, and the other *characterized by unity*, as it is ſaid in the Parmenides.—See the Notes on the firſt hypotheſis of the Parmenides. From hence the ignorance of Cudworth is apparent, who, in his Intellectual Syſtem, p. 555, conſiders the doctrine of *henads* derived from the firſt one, or *the one itſelf*, as a fiction of the latter Platoniſts.—T.

[2] This ſecond queſtion ſuppoſes the firſt queſtion decided in favour of the true being of the monads. For, if univerſals are held to be only names, invented to denote unreal fancies or factitious notions, it is trifling and idle to inquire whence they derive ſtability; this being an affection, or property, of real beings only,—unleſs it be as merely nominal, notional, or fantaſtic, as thoſe things are to which it is attributed.—The ſentence now before us in the Greek is printed thus: πως αυ ταυτας, μιαν εκαστην ουσαν αει την αυτην, και μητε γενεσιν μητε ολεθρον προσδεχομενην, ὁμως ειναι βεβαιοτητα μιαν ταυτην. The Greek text muſt here be faulty; and, to make good ſenſe of it, it is neceſſary to make a ſmall alteration or two,—by reading εχειν inſtead of ειναι, and και αυτην inſtead of ταυτην. In tranſlating this paſſage, we have preſumed it ought to be ſo read; and the meaning, intended to be conveyed by it, we ſuppoſe to be this:—"it muſt needs ſeem ſtrange, that diſtinct beings, not generated, ſome of them by others, but all equally eternal, without intercommunity or interchange between them, ſhould, nevertheleſs, have one and the ſame nature, that of *monad* or *unity*, and one and the ſame property of their being, that of *ſtability*."—S.

[3] In the Greek we here read—αυτην αὐτης χωρις. But it is preſumed that we ought to read—αυτην εφ' αὑτης χωρις.—S.

thing ſhould be in a ſingle one, and in many, at the ſame time. Theſe points, O Protarchus, which regard ſuch inſtances as I have mentioned, and not ſuch as were mentioned by you, theſe are they, which, for want of being rightly ſettled, create all the difficulties and doubts we meet with in diſcourſe; but when once they are ſettled rightly, they clear the way with eaſe.

PROT. Then, it ſeems, we are to labour theſe points firſt.

SOC. I ſhould think we ought.

PROT. And that we conſent to it, you may take for granted, all of us here. Philebus, indeed, it is beſt perhaps, at preſent, not to diſcompoſe by aſking him queſtions, now that he is quiet.

SOC. Very well; but in what way ſhall we begin the diſcuſſion of theſe points in ſo wide a field of controverſy? Shall we begin thus?

PROT. How?

SOC. We ſay, in ſpeaking of theſe monads, (each of which is one, but, on a logical examination of it, appears to be diviſible into many,) that they run throughout every ſentence in our diſcourſe, every where and always; and that, as their being ſhall never have an end, ſo neither does it firſt begin in the preſent age. Now this perpetual attendant upon all ſpeech proceeds, as it ſeems to me, from ſomething immortal and undecaying within ourſelves. And hence it is, that the youth every where, when they have thus had a taſte of it, are overjoyed at their having thus found a treaſure of wiſdom. Tranſported, therefore, with the delight it gives them, they apply it to every ſubject of diſcourſe: ſometimes they collect particulars from all quarters, and roll them into one; then they unroll them again, and part them aſunder. After having in this way puzzled themſelves in the firſt place, they queſtion and puzzle the perſon next at hand, whether he be their equal in age, or younger than themſelves, or older, ſparing neither father nor mother, nor any one elſe who will attend to them, ſcarcely other animals more than man: it is certain they would not exempt any who ſpeak a foreign language only, could they but find ſomewhere an interpreter.

PROT. Do you not ſee, O Socrates, how numerous we are, and that all of us are young? and are you not afraid that, if you rail at us, we ſhall all join Philebus, and attack you jointly? However (for we apprehend your meaning), if you can by any means or contrivance eaſily rid of us of theſe perplexities,

perplexities, which hinder the progreſs of our inquiry, and can deviſe ſome better way of managing the argument, do you but give your mind to the proſecution of it, and we ſhall do our utmoſt to follow and attend you. For the preſent debate is of no trifling concern, Socrates.

Soc. Indeed it is not, O boys! as Philebus called you. No better way then is there, nor can there be, than that, which I am always a great lover of; but often before now it has ſlipped away from my ſight, and has left me, as it were, in a deſert, at a loſs whither to turn me.

Prot. Let us but know what way you mean.

Soc. To point out the way is not very difficult; but to travel in it, is the moſt difficult of all things. For all ſuch human inventions as depend on art are, in this way, diſcovered and laid open. Conſider then the way which I am ſpeaking of.

Prot. Do but tell it us then.

Soc. A gift [1] of the Gods to men, as it appears to me, by a certain Prometheus [2] hurled from the Gods along with a fire the moſt luminous. From the

[1] This gift is the *dialectic* of Plato, of which we have given an ample account in the Introduction to, and Notes on, the Parmenides. I ſhall only obſerve at preſent, that this vertex of the ſciences conſiſts of four parts, viz. *diviſion*, *definition*, *demonſtration*, and *analyſis*. Of theſe, the *diviſive* art, ſays Olympiodorus, is connate with the progreſſion of things; but the *analytic* with their converſion. And the *definitive* and *demonſtrative* arts, which have a middle ſituation, are ſimilar to the hypoſtaſis, or ſubſiſting nature of things. The *definitive*, however, is analogous to that hypoſtaſis which ſubſiſts from itſelf; but the *demonſtrative* to that which is ſuſpended from its cauſe.—T.

[2] Prometheus, ſays Olympiodorus, does not produce good, as unfolding into light, but as a Titan. For he employs a providential care upon rational eſſences which proceed to the extremity, juſt as Epimetheus provides for irrational natures. For irrational natures proceed to a care of things ſubordinate, and, having proceeded, diſtribute the whole of divine Providence. Again, the fire which Prometheus ſtole, and gave to men, is every anagogic eſſence and perfection, diſtributed through him to the laſt of things. Hence it is ſaid to have been *ſtolen*, becauſe an *anagogic* eſſence is *deduced*; but through him, becauſe it is alone deduced Titanically,—but other Gods give ſubſiſtence to a form of this kind.

Again, that every generated nature is one and many, is nothing wonderful; for theſe natures are partible, and participate of many habitudes; but how is this the caſe with every intelligible eſſence? In the firſt place, we may ſay that each is a monad, and alſo a number, according to the ſeries of the monad; as, for inſtance, the beautiful, and things beautiful. In the ſecond place, that the monad is both that which it is, and all other things according to commixtion. In the third place,

the men of antient times, men better than we are, and dwelling nigher to the Gods, this tradition of it hath deſcended to us,—that thoſe beings ſaid to be for ever derive their eſſence from one and many; and therefore have in themſelves bound and infinity connatural to them: that, being in the midſt of things ſo conſtituted as they are, we ought to ſuppoſe and to ſearch for ſome one idea in every thing around us; for that, ſince it is there, we ſhall, on ſearching, be ſure to find it: that, after we have found it, we are next to look for two, if two only are next; otherwiſe three, or ſome other number: again, that every one of this number we are to examine in like manner: until at length a man not only perceives, that the one, with which he began, is one, and many, and infinite, but diſcovers alſo how many it contains: for, that a man never ſhould proceed to the idea of infinite, and apply it immediately to any number, before he has fully diſcovered all the definite number which lies between the infinite and the one: but that, having completed this

place, it both conſiſts from the genera of being and one idiom. In the fourth place, the idiom is multiplied together with the many; but there is a certain impartible ſummit in all the many. In the fifth place, this ſummit is an united form, but there is alſo ſomething in it above form. And, in the ſixth place, this ſummit is at the ſame time the united, but not *the one*. Further ſtill, as all things are from one and many, it is neceſſary that theſe two principles ſhould be arranged prior to all things; the former being the cauſe to all things of unity, and the latter of multitude. They muſt likewiſe evidently be poſterior to the firſt cauſe; for that is *at once* the cauſe of all things.

Again, in the extremities of things infinite multitude is beheld, but in the ſummit a monad preſubſiſts, according to every form. But infinite multitude would not be generated, unleſs in the monad which generates it an infinite power was preaſſumed. Nor would every individual in infinites be bounded, unleſs bound proceeded to the laſt of things. Progreſſion ſubſiſts through all appropriate media, from the monad to infinite multitude. And, in the firſt place, this is ſeen in multitude capable of being participated. For progreſſion is not immediately from *the one* to the infinite, but to two and three, and the following numbers. And, in the next place, the progreſſion of bodies is of this kind, for it has no vacuum together with its variety. In the third place, the generative power of the monad being both one and many, at once generates all things according to the whole of itſelf; things ſecondary being always conſequent to ſuch as are prior.

Further ſtill, ſays Olympiodorus, the diviſive method proceeds together with the progreſſion of forms, not cutting off the continuity of ſubjection, nor introducing a vacuum, but proceeding through all the media, from the one to the infinite. The buſineſs of the diviſive method is firſt to place *the one* every where before the many. Secondly, to place the finite before infinite multitude. Thirdly, always to define according to quantity, the leſſer before the greater number. Fourthly, to omit no number of things which give completion to progreſſion. Fifthly, to ſelect numbers

this diſcovery, we ſhould then finiſh our ſearch; and diſmiſſing into infinity every one of all thoſe numbers, we ſhould bid farewell to them. The Gods, as I before ſaid, have given us to conſider things in this way, and in this way to learn them, and teach them one to another. But the wiſe men of theſe days take any monad whatever, and divide it into many with more conciſeneſs than they ought, and with more prolixity too, ſince they never come to an end: for immediately after the monad they introduce infinity, overlooking all the intermediate numbers; the expreſs mention of which, or the omiſſion of them, diſtinguiſhes ſuch dialectical and fair debates as ours, from ſuch as are contentious and ſophiſtical.

PROT. Part of what you ſay, Socrates, I ſeem to apprehend tolerably well: but the meaning of ſome things which you have now ſaid, I ſhould be glad to hear you expreſs in plainer terms.

numbers adapted to reſpective forms; the triadic, for inſtance, or the hebdomadic, to Minerva, and in a ſimilar manner in all the reſt. For different numbers proceed according to different forms; as alſo of the Gods, there are different numbers according to different Divinities. For of monads themſelves, one progreſſion is monadic, as that of the monad; another dyadic, as that of the dyad; and in a ſimilar manner with the reſt: ſo that there is not a diviſion of all things into two. Sixthly, to divide through forms, but not through form and negation, according to the opinion of Ariſtotle: for no number is produced from form and negation. Seventhly, to produce every monad into diviſion in its proper order, whether it be in that of bound, or in that of infinity: for each is every where. Ninthly, to produce things oppoſitely divided, according to antitheſis, whether certain media are diſcovered, or not. Tenthly, not to leave the media in the extent (εν τῳ πλατει). Eleventhly, to aſcribe different numbers appropriately to different orders, as the number twelve to ſupermundane natures, and the number ſeven to intellectuals. Twelfthly, to ſee where the leſſer numbers are more excellent, and where they are ſubordinate, and in a ſimilar manner with reſpect to the greater. For the mundane decad is ſubordinate to the ſupermundane duodecad; but the intellectual hebdomad is ſuperior to it.

Again, the analytic art is ſubordinate to the diviſive: for the latter is from a cauſe, but the former from a ſign; and the latter from on high ſurveys things more ſubordinate, but the former beholds downwards things on high; and the latter ſtops at nothing ſenſible, but the former at firſt ſtands in need of ſenſe. Thus, the latter giving ſubſiſtence and producing, nearly makes the whole of the proceeding eſſence; but the former converting, confers on that which has proceeded a departure from the ſubordinate, and an adherence to the more excellent nature. On which account progreſſion is more eſſential than converſion, and is therefore more excellent. So that proceſſion is ſuperior to converſion, and the eſſential to the anagogic. In the deſcent of the ſoul, however, ſince progreſſion is here an apoſtacy from better natures, aſcent which correſponds to converſion is better than progreſſion or deſcent.—T.

SOC.

Soc. The whole of what I have ſaid, Protarchus, is evident in letters. In theſe, therefore, which have been taught you from your childhood, you may eaſily apprehend my meaning.

Prot. How in letters?

Soc. Voice, that iſſues out of the human mouth, may be conſidered as one general thing, admitting of an infinite number of articulations, not only in all men taken together, but alſo in every individual man.

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Now we are not made knowing in ſpeech, or ſound articulate, through the knowledge either of the infinity or of the oneneſs of its nature: but to know how many, and what, are the parts into which it is naturally divided,—this it is which makes any of us a grammarian, or ſkilled in grammar.

Prot. Moſt certainly.

Soc. And further, that by which a man comes to be ſkilled in muſic is this very thing.

Prot. How ſo?

Soc. Muſical ſound[1], which is the ſubject matter of this art, may be conſidered in itſelf as one general thing.

Prot. Without diſpute.

[1] In the Greek, the term uſed here, as well as juſt before, (where this tranſlation hath the word *voice*,) is φωνη. It there ſignified *articulated* vocal ſound, or *ſpeech*: it here ſignifies *muſical* ſound of the voice, or *vocal muſic*. We ſee then that φωνη, *human voice*, is by Plato ſuppoſed to be a common genus, diviſible into thoſe two ſorts or ſpecies. It is expreſsly ſo laid down by Nicomachus, (Harmonic. Enchirid. pag. 3, edit. Amſt.) in theſe words:—Της ανθρωπινης φωνης οι απο του Πυθαγορικου διδασκαλειου δυο εφασκον, ως ενος γενους, ειδη υπαρχειν· και το μεν συνεχες ιδιως ωνομαζον· το δε διαστηματικον. *Such* [writers concerning muſic] *as came out of the Pythagorean ſchool ſay, that of human voice* [in general], *as of one genus, there are two ſpecies. One of theſe two they properly named continuous, the other diſcrete.* Theſe two technical terms he afterward explains, by ſhowing us that the *continuous* is that voice which we utter in diſcourſing and in reading; (and therefore, by Ariſtoxenus and by Euclid termed φωνη λογικη·) and that the *diſcrete* is the voice iſſued out of our mouths in ſinging; (and thence termed φωνη μελωδικη·) for, in this latter caſe, every ſingle ſound is diſtinguiſhed by a certain or meaſured tone of the voice. The ſame diviſion of φωνη is laid down, and a ſimilar account of it is given, by Ariſtoxenus in Harmonic. Element. pag. 8 & 9, edit. Amſt.—S.

Soc.

Soc. And let us ſuppoſe two kinds of it, the grave and the acute, and a third kind between thoſe two, the homotonous, or how otherwiſe [1]?

Prot. Muſical ſound in general is ſo to be diſtinguiſhed.

Soc. But with the knowledge of this diſtinction only, you would not yet be ſkilled in muſic; though without knowing it you would be, as to muſic, quite worthleſs.

Prot. Undoubtedly.

Soc. But, my friend, when you have learnt the intervals [2] between all muſical ſounds, from the more acute to the more grave, how many they are in number, and into what ſorts they are diſtinguiſhed; when you have alſo learnt the bounds [3] of theſe intervals, and how many ſyſtems [4] are compoſed

[1] Homotony of ſound is made when a ſtring of ſome ſtringed inſtrument of muſic, having the ſame degree of tenſion with a ſimilar ſtring of ſome other, yields, in conjunction with it, the ſame muſical tone; or when two different voices utter at the ſame time muſical ſounds, neither of which is more acute, or more grave, than the other. In both caſes, the ſameneſs of the ſound is alſo termed ὁμοφωνια: for φωνη, *voice*, is (metaphorically) attributed to all muſical inſtruments; (ſee Nicomachus, pag. 5 and 6.) as, on the other hand, tone is (by an eaſy metaphor) attributed to the human voice, modulated by the will in the trachea, or aſpera arteria: for this natural wind-inſtrument, in Engliſh aptly named the wind-pipe, while it tranſmits the air breathed out from the lungs, receives any degree of tenſion it is capable of, at the pleaſure of the mind. In like manner, a repetition of the ſame tone from a ſingle human voice, as well as from a ſingle monochord, is termed a monotony.—S.

[2] An interval is the diſtance [or difference κατα τοπον, with regard to place] between any two muſical ſounds, (between that which is acute relatively to the other, and that other which is relatively a grave,) however near together they may be, or however remote from each other, on any ſcale of muſic. In proportion to the nearneſs or remoteneſs of theſe two ſounds, the interval between them is, in mathematical language, ſaid to be ſmall or great; that is, it is ſhort or long. So that different muſical intervals, like all other different diſtances from place to place, eſſentially differ one from another in magnitude or length. And on this eſſential difference are founded all the other diverſities of the intervals.

[3] The bounds of each interval are thoſe two muſical ſounds, from either of which there is made an immediate ſtep or tranſition to the other. Of all muſical ſounds the three principal were: ὑπατη *the moſt grave*, νητη *the moſt acute*, and μεση *the middle* between thoſe other two, on the moſt antient ſcale of muſic; which conſiſted of only ſeven ſounds, produced by ſtriking on the ſame number of ſtrings, all of different lengths. We account thoſe three juſt now mentioned the principal, becauſe the firſt and eaſieſt diviſion of any quantity, whether it be continuous or diſcrete, is into two equal parts, or halves: the moſt diſtinguiſhable points or bounds of it, therefore, however it be afterwards ſubdivided, are the two extremes and the middle. Accordingly

poſed out of them; (which our predeceſſors having diſcovered, delivered down to us, who come after them, by the name of harmonies [1]; and having diſcovered

ingly Plato, in his 4th book De Republicâ, edit. Cantab. pag. 314, ſpeaking of the νεατη, the ὑπατη, and the μεση, the higheſt, the loweſt, and the middle ſound in muſic, calls them ὁρους τρεις ἁρμονιας, the *three bounds of harmony*; and likens to them the three moſt evidently diſtinguiſhed parts of the ſoul,—the rational part, the higheſt; the concupiſcible, the loweſt; and the iraſcible, between them both.—S.

[4] A ſyſtem is a compoſition of three or more muſical ſounds; or (what amounts to the ſame thing) it is an extent, comprehending two or more intervals. Of theſe ſyſtems the general diverſities are laid down by Ariſtides, pag. 15 & ſeq. But in his definition of a ſyſtem (as it is printed) an important error deſerves notice. For we there read—πλειονων ἢ δυοιν, *more than two*: inſtead of which we ought to read—δυοιν ἢ πλειονων, *two or more*; or elſe—πλειονων ἢ ἑνος, *more than one*: which laſt are the very words uſed by Ariſtoxenus, Euclid, and Gaudentius, in their definitions of a ſyſtem. The error probably aroſe from ſome manuſcript copy of Ariſtides happening to be not eaſily legible in this place. The tranſcriber of it, therefore, we ſuppoſe, conſulted Baccheius; who in his definition of a ſyſtem uſeth the words—πλειονων ἢ δυοιν. Theſe words are right indeed in Baccheius, becauſe they are by him applied to φθογγων, muſical ſounds, agreeably to our firſt definition; but they would be wrong in Ariſtides, where he is ſpeaking, not of φθογγων, but of διαστηματων, the intervals of thoſe ſounds, agreeably to our ſecond definition. On the many diverſities and variations to be made in ſo large a field of ſyſtems, are founded thoſe many different forms, figures, or modes of harmony, or ſorts of tunes, (the Greek writers call them εἰδη, μορφαι, σχηματα, τροποι, and τονοι ἁρμονιας,) the general kinds of which, according to Ariſtides, pag. 25, are theſe—the Doric, the Phrygian, and the Lydian. If this be true, all the other modes are to be conſidered as ſubordinate to theſe three; and indeed they ſeem, ſome of them, to be intenſions, others to be remiſſions, and others to be mixtures, of thoſe the more moderate and ſimple.—S.

[1] The word ἁρμονια, *harmony*, was uſed in different ſenſes by the old Grecian writers. We learn from Nicomachus, that the moſt antient writers on muſic gave the name of harmony to that moſt perfect conſonance, the diapaſon. Ariſtoxenus and Euclid mean, by the term harmony, that kind of melody which is called enharmonic. Plato and Ariſtotle, when they ſpeak of harmony in the ſingular number, without the addition of an epithet denoting the ſort, mean by that term the idea which is commonly now-a-days expreſſed by the term muſic; probably, becauſe it was the firſt diſcovered of thoſe ſciences, as well as the firſt invented of thoſe arts, which were antiently comprehended together in one general idea, expreſſed in one word, and termed muſic. But when the ſame great philoſophers ſpeak of harmonies in the plural number, they mean thoſe different forms or modes of harmony whoſe ſpecific differences depend on the different ſyſtems, or on the different order of thoſe ſyſtems of which they are ſeverally compoſed. To the term harmony in this latter ſenſe only, (as it ſignifies a mode of harmony,) agrees the following definition of it, given us by Theo, and, long after him, by Pſellus:—

diſcovered other ſuch affections [1] in the motions of the body, and in words [2], meaſuring theſe by numbers, they have taught us to call them rhythms [3] and metres; bidding us to infer from hence, that every *one-and-many* ought to be ſearched into and examined in the ſame way;) when you have learnt all thoſe things, and comprehend them in this ample manner, with all their ſeveral diverſities and diſtinctions, then are you become ſkilled in muſic. And by conſidering in the ſame way the nature of any other kind of being, when you thus fully comprehend it, you are become in that reſpect intelligent and wiſe. But the infinite multitude of individuals, their infinite variety, and the infinite changes incident to each, keep you *infinitely far off* from intelligence and wiſdom: and as they make you to be behind other men in every path of knowledge, they make you inconſiderable, and of no

Pſellus:—Ἁρμονια εστι συστηματων συνταξις· *A harmony* (not harmony in general) *is a compoſition* (or an ordering together) *of ſyſtems*. On this definition Bouillaud, in his Notes to Theo, pag. 250, judiciouſly obſerves,—*Vocat hic harmoniam quos alii appellant* τροπους *ſeu* τονους. On this ſubject we ſhall only obſerve further, that the ſyntheſis of harmony, preſented to us by Plato, in the whole paſſage now before us, beginning from ſimple φθογγοι, or muſical ſounds, (which are the elements or primary conſtituent parts of harmony,) is exactly the ſame, and proceeds in the ſame order, with that ſyntheſis which is taught by all the antient Greek writers on muſic: one proof among many, this, of Plato's knowledge in the theory of muſic. Agreeably to which obſervation, Plutarch, in his Treatiſe περι Μουσικης, informs us, that Plato applied his mind cloſely to the ſcience of muſic; having attended the Lectures of Draco the Athenian, and thoſe of Metellus of Agrigentum. Or if we ſuppoſe that Plato, in this part of the preſent dialogue, did no more than faithfully record the doctrine of Socrates, our ſuppoſition is very juſtifiable; for Socrates in his old age ſtudied muſic under Connus.—S.

[1] That is, ſuch relations and proportions, (or, to make uſe of muſical terms,) ſuch ſteps and tranſitions, intervals and bounds, ſyſtems and compoſitions, in the motions of the body, and in words, as are analogous to the affections of muſical ſounds, called by thoſe very names. The Greek word, which we have rendered into Engliſh by the word *affections*, in the paſſage of Plato now before us is παθη, and, tranſlated literally, ſignifies *paſſions*. For, whatever ſituation, condition, or circumſtance, any being or thing is placed in by ſome other,—or by its relation to ſome other,—in whatever way it is acted on, or affected by, that other,—ſuch ſituation, &c. of the being or thing ſo placed, ſo acted on, or ſo affected, was by the Greek philoſophers termed a παθος, a *paſſion* of ſuch being; becauſe in that reſpect the being is paſſive.—S. I ſhall only obſerve, in addition to what Mr. Sydenham has ſaid, that the word *paſſion* always ſignifies, both with Plato and Ariſtotle, *a participated property* of any being.—T.

[2] In the printed Greek of this paſſage we read only,—ενντε ταις κινησεσιν αυ του σωματος—immediately after which,—ενντε ῥημασιν,—ought to follow, but is omitted.—S.

[3] Rhythm, in general, is an order of homogeneous motions meaſured by time.

account, not to be numbered amongſt the knowing in any ſubject; becauſe you never conſider any thing thoroughly, and are unable to give a true account of it, never looking at the definite number which it contains.

PROT. Excellently well, O Philebus, as it appears to me, has Socrates ſpoken in what he has now ſaid.

PHIL. It appears ſo too to me myſelf. But how does all this ſpeech of his concern our controverſy? What was the deſign or drift of it?

SOC. A very pertinent queſtion, O Protarchus, this, propoſed to us by Philebus.

PROT. Indeed it is: and by all means give it an anſwer.

SOC. That will I do, as ſoon as I have gone through the little yet remaining of the ſubject on which I have been ſpeaking. For, as the man who applies himſelf to the conſideration of any kind of things whatever ought not, as I have ſaid, to throw his eye at once upon the infinite, but upon ſome definite number in the firſt place; ſo, on the other hand, when a man is obliged to ſet out from the infinite, he ought not to mount up immediately to the one, but to ſome certain number, in each of whoſe ones a certain multitude is contained; and thus gradually riſing from a greater to a leſs number, to end in one. As an inſtance of what I have now ſaid, let us reſume the conſideration of letters.

PROT. In what way?

SOC. Whoever it was, whether ſome God, or ſome divine man, (the Egyptian reports ſay that his name was Theuth [1],) who firſt contemplated the infinite nature of the human voice, he obſerved, that amongſt the infinity of the ſounds it uttered the vowel ſounds [2] were more than one, they were many. Again, other utterances he obſerved, which were not indeed vowels [3], but

[1] See the Notes on the Phædrus, vol. iii.—T.

[2] That is, ſounds purely vocal; whence the letters by which they are diſtinguiſhed are called vowels; in the utterance of which ſounds the voice ſolely is employed, whilſt the other organs of ſpeech remain inactive.—S.

[3] In the Greek of this paſſage, as it is printed by Aldus and by Stephens, we here read—φωνης μεν ου, φθογγου δε μετεχοντα τινος·—a reading which may be tolerably well ſupported by what ſoon follows. But the margin of the firſt Baſil edition of Plato has ſuggeſted to us a reading, in which appears a diſtinction more obvious and plain than there is between φωνη and φθογγος, *voice* and *ſound of the voice*. For, in that margin, we are directed to read the word ὄντα (found, perhaps, in

but partook, however, of ſome kind of vocal ſound [1]; and that of theſe alſo there was a certain number [2]. A third ſort of letters alſo he ſet apart, thoſe which are now called mutes by us [3]. After this he diſtinguiſhed every one of theſe letters which are without any vocal ſound, whether perfect or imperfect [4]: the vowels alſo, and thoſe of middle ſort, every one of them, he diſtinguiſhed

in ſome manuſcript copy of Plato) immediately after the word φωνης, and before the words μεν ου, in this ſentence. Now theſe two words φωνης οντα, put together, very little differ from φωνηεντα, a word which gives to this part of the ſentence a meaning quite agreeable to the tenor of the whole of it, and to the language of all grammarians.—S.

[1] Theſe were by the old grammarians called ἡμιφωνα, *ſemi-vowels*; becauſe, in their very formation by the organs of ſpeech, they are, of neceſſity, ſo far accompanied by the voice, as to give a half-vocal ſound, without the open aid of any vowel.—S.

[2] The Greek grammarians enumerate eight of theſe ſemi-vowels.—S.

[3] Socrates, by expreſſing himſelf in this manner, concerning the general name of this third ſort of letters, as if it were then newly given them at Athens, ſeems to diſapprove it. Perhaps the antient term συμφωνα, *conſonants*,—a term applied by the new grammarians to the ἡμιφωνα, *ſemi-vowels*, as well as to the αφωνα, *mutes*,—was, in his judgment, properly applicable to thoſe letters only which yield of themſelves no ſound at all. For mutes, as they are called, cannot be pronounced even imperfectly and obſcurely, as ſemi-vowels can, without the concurrence of ſome vowel, ſome ſound perfectly vocal.—S.

[4] In the Greek,—αφθογγα και αφωνα·—evidently meaning ſuch as are neither vowels nor ſemi-vowels. It ſhould ſeem, therefore, that by φωνη Plato meant a perfect and clear vocal ſound, ſuch as we utter in pronouncing a vowel ſingly; and that by φθογγος he meant that imperfect and obſcure ſound of the voice made in the forming and pronouncing of a ſemi-vowel, unaided by a vowel. Now if this be true, then may the printed reading of that paſſage, to which belongs note 3 in the preceding page, be juſtified. Ariſtotle, however, who treats of this ſubject in his Poetics, cap. 20, recognizes not any ſuch diſtinction between φωνη and φθογγος: for he attributes φωνη ακουστη, *a vocal ſound*, ſuch as may be heard, to the ſemi-vowels no leſs than to the vowels; and ſtates the difference between theſe two ſorts of letters thus:—The voice in uttering the vowels proceeds ανευ προσβολης, that is, it *makes no alliſion* againſt any parts of the mouth, thoſe upper organs of ſpeech, ſo as to be impeded in its free and full exit: but the expreſſing of the ſemi-vowels is μετα προσβολης, the voice in uttering them *makes ſuch alliſion*, and meets with ſome degree of *reſiſtance*: by the alliſion it is, indeed, articulated; but by the reſiſtance, the paſſages through the mouth being ſtraitened, it becomes weaker, and is diminiſhed,—except it be in ſome ſyllable; for here a vowel will never fail to aſſiſt in the delivery, by giving the voice a free paſſage into the air. Now Ariſtotle is indiſputably right in attributing to a ſemi-vowel, by itſelf, φωνην, *vocem*, a vocal ſound: but his learned commentator Victorius is equally right in giving to this vocal ſound the epithets *obſcura*, *tenuis*, & *exilis*; ſince it is but half of the full and whole vowel-ſound: and Plato may fairly be allowed to diſtinguiſh the half-ſound by a particular name, and

diſtinguiſhed in the ſame manner: and when he had diſcovered how many letters there were of each ſort, to every one, and to all of them together, he gave the name of element. But perceiving that none of us could underſtand any one of them by itſelf alone, without learning them all, he conſidered that this connection, or common bond between them, was one; and that all theſe letters made in a manner but one thing: and as he perceived that there was one art in all theſe, he called it, from its ſubject matter, the art of letters.

PHIL. This which Socrates now ſays, O Protarchus, I underſtand ſtill more plainly than what he ſaid juſt before; and am at no loſs to apprehend what relation each of the ſubjects about which he has ſpoken has to the other. But as to that article in which his argument on the firſt of thoſe ſubjects appeared to me to be defective, I am at a loſs ſtill.

SOC. To know what thoſe inſtances are to the purpoſe; is not this your meaning?

PHIL. Juſt ſo. This very thing it is that Protarchus and myſelf are all this while in ſearch of.

SOC. In ſearch ſtill, do you ſay, when you are juſt now arrived at it?

PHIL. How ſo?

SOC. Was not the point originally in diſpute between us this: Whether wiſdom or pleaſure was the more eligible?

PHIL. Certainly it was.

SOC. And do we not admit that each of them is one thing?

PHIL. Without doubt.

SOC. Now then muſt come this queſtion, ariſing naturally from what was ſaid a little before the mention of muſic and grammar,—In what way (or by what diviſion) are wiſdom and pleaſure, each of them, one and many? or how is it, that neither of them breaks into infinite multitude directly; but that each contains ſome certain number before it paſs into infinity?

PROT. Upon no trivial queſtion, O Philebus, on a ſudden has Socrates, after having led us a large round-about way, I know not how, thrown us. And now conſider, which of us two ſhall anſwer to the queſtion he has pro-

to call it φθογγός. But we know not how to agree with him, if he ſays that a ſemi-vowel does not partake of the vowel-ſound; becauſe the half of any thing whatever ſeems to partake, to be a part, or to have a ſhare of its whole. For this reaſon it is that we incline to that emendation of the printed Greek text propoſed in note 3 in page 484.—S.

poſed.

poſed. It would be ridiculous in me, who have undertaken the ſupport of your argument, to make an abſolute revolt on account of my diſability in regard to the preſent queſtion; and ſo to remit over again to you the taſk of giving an anſwer to it: but I think it would be much more ridiculous for both of us to fail. Conſider, then, what we ſhall do in this caſe, where Socrates ſeems to interrogate us concerning the ſpecies of pleaſure;—whether it is diviſible into different ſpecies, or not; and, if it be, what is the number of theſe ſpecies, and how they differ in their nature: and the like queſtions he ſeems to put to us concerning knowledge and intelligence.

Soc. Your conjecture is perfectly right, O ſon of Callias! and, if we are not able to anſwer to theſe queſtions upon every monad, as to its likeneſs, ſameneſs, and contrariety,—unleſs, I ſay, we can do this,—the inſtances juſt now produced have ſhown, that none of us, in any matter we had to handle, would ever be of any worth at all.

Prot. The caſe, O Socrates, ſeems indeed to be not very different from your repreſentation of it. Well, it is certainly a fine thing to know all things, for a wiſe and prudent perſon: but I think the beſt thing next to that is for a man not to be ignorant of himſelf. With what deſign I have now ſaid this, I ſhall proceed to tell you. This converſation, O Socrates, you have granted to us all, and have given yourſelf up to us, for the purpoſe of inveſtigating what is the beſt of human goods. For, when Philebus had ſaid that it conſiſted in pleaſure, and delight, and joy, and all things of the like nature, you oppoſed him on this point, and ſaid, it conſiſted not in theſe things, but in thoſe which we often repeat the mention of; and we are right in ſo doing, that the opinions on each ſide, being always freſh in our memories, may the more eaſily be examined. You then, it ſeems, ſay, what I ſhall be right in again repeating, that intellect, ſcience, art, and whatever is allied to them, are better things than Pleaſure with her allies; and therefore, that the poſſeſſion, not of theſe, but of thoſe greater goods, ought to be the object of our aim. Now theſe poſitions being laid down ſeverally on each ſide, as ſubject-matters of our debate, we in a jocoſe way threatened, that we would not ſuffer you to go home quietly before it was brought to a fair determination. You complied, and promiſed us to contribute all you could towards the accompliſhment of that end. We inſiſt therefore that, as children

children ſay, you muſt not take away again what is fairly given. But, in the preſent inquiry, forbear proceeding in your uſual way.

Soc. What way do you mean?

Prot. Bringing us into ſtraits and embarraſſments; propounding queſtions to which we ſhould not be able on the ſudden to give a proper anſwer. For we are not to imagine that our preſent inquiry is brought to a concluſion, merely becauſe all of us are at a loſs what to anſwer. If, therefore, we are unable to extricate ourſelves from theſe difficulties, you muſt help us out; for ſo you promiſed. Conſider, then, what to do on this occaſion; whether to diſtinguiſh pleaſure and knowledge, each of them, into their proper ſpecies; or whether to paſs it by, if you chooſe to take a different way, and can find ſome other means of deciding the matter now controverted between us.

Soc. No harm then need I be afraid of any longer to myſelf, ſince you have ſaid this[1]. For your leaving to my own choice what ways and means to make uſe of, frees me from all apprehenſions on my own private account. But, to make it ſtill eaſier to me, ſome God, I think, has brought things to my remembrance.

Prot. How do you mean? What things?

Soc. Having formerly heard, either in a dream[2], or broad awake, certain ſayings, I have them now again preſent to my mind;—ſayings concerning pleaſure and knowledge, that neither of them is of itſelf good, but ſome third thing, different from both of thoſe, and better than either. Now if this ſhould diſcover itſelf to us clearly, pleaſure is then to be diſmiſſed from any pretenſions to the victory. For we ſhould then no longer expect to find that pleaſure and good are the ſame thing: or how ſay you?

Prot. Juſt ſo.

Soc. We ſhall have no occaſion then, for diſtinguiſhing the

[1] Alluding to thoſe jocular threats employed by the young gentlemen, then in the Lycæum, and gathered around Socrates, to engage him in this dialectic inquiry.—S.

[2] Olympiodorus here juſtly obſerves, that we poſſeſs the reaſons of things as in a dream, with reſpect to a ſeparate life ſupernally perfected; but as in a vigilant ſtate with reſpect to the exertion of them through ſenſe. Perhaps however, ſays he, it is better to conſider the vigilant ſtate with reſpect to the diſtinct evolution, but the dreaming ſtate, with reſpect to the indiſtinct ſubſiſtence of knowledge.—T.

ſeveral

ſeveral ſpecies of pleaſure. And in the progreſs of our inquiry it will appear more evidently ſtill that I am in the right.

PROT. Having begun ſo happily, proceed, and finiſh with the ſame ſucceſs.

SOC. Let us, firſt, agree upon a few little points beſide.

PROT. What are thoſe?

SOC. In what condition or ſtate of being is *the good?* Muſt it of neceſſity be perfect[1]? or may it want perfection?

PROT. Of all things, O Socrates, it is the moſt perfect.

SOC. Well; and is it alſo ſufficient?

PROT. Without doubt: and in this reſpect it excells all other things.

SOC. But further: This alſo, I preſume, is of all things the moſt neceſſary to ſay of it, that every being to whom it is known, hunts after, and deſires it, as chooſing the poſſeſſion of it above all things; and, indeed, caring for no other things, except ſuch as are conſtantly attended with the enjoyment of good.

PROT. There is no poſſibility of contradicting this.

SOC. Now, then, let us conſider and judge of the life of pleaſure and the life of knowledge: and to do this the better, let us view them each apart from the other.

[1] *The deſirable*, ſays Olympiodorus, proceeds from the intelligible father*; *the ſufficient* from power; and *the perfect* from the paternal intellect. In reality, however, perfection is the third from eſſence: for the middle is life. But if this be true, it is evident that *the end* is different from *perfection*; for the latter is the laſt; but the former the firſt, to which eſſence, life, and intellect, and therefore all things converge. So that in every form, in a ſimilar manner, *the end* will be the ſummit, and that which connectedly contains the whole; but *perfection* will be the third, ſubſiſting after eſſence and life: for it is neceſſary that a thing ſhould be, and ſhould live, that it may become perfect.

Again, *the perfect* is ſpread under *the ſufficient*, in the ſame manner as *the full* under *the ſuper-full*, and *the ſufficient* under *the deſirable*. For things when full excite to deſire. The *firſt end*, likewiſe, is above *the deſirable*, *the ſufficient*, and *the perfect*. For that is ſimple and ineffable; and hence Socrates does not ſay that it is compoſed from the elements; but that theſe elements poſſeſs indefinitely a portion of *the good*. It is better, however, to call the coordinated common contraction (συναιρεμα) of the three a portion of the good, though this is anonymous. For *the good* is all things, and not only theſe three; nor is it alone the end, but is truly all things prior to all. Beſides, the end which is now the object of conſideration is knowable, ſo that there will be another end more common than this.—T.

* That is, from the ſummit of the intelligible order.—See the Parmenides.

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. Thus: Let us ſuppoſe a life of pleaſure, unaccompanied by intelligence; and, on the other hand, a life of intelligence, unaccompanied by pleaſure. For, if either of them be good, it muſt be complete and ſufficient, in want of no aid from any other quarter. But, if either of them ſhould appear to be indigent of aught, or inſufficient, we are no longer to imagine this to be that real and true good we are in ſearch of.

PROT. In ſuch a caſe, how could we?

SOC. Shall we then examine their pretenſions thus ſeparately, making your own mind the judge?

PROT. With all my heart.

SOC. Anſwer then to my queſtions.

PROT. Propoſe them.

SOC. Would you, Protarchus, accept the offer, were it made you, to live all your life with a ſenſe and feeling of pleaſures the moſt exquiſite?

PROT. Undoubtedly. Why not?

SOC. Suppoſe you were in full poſſeſſion of this, would you not think that ſomething beſide was ſtill wanting to you?

PROT. I certainly ſhould not.

SOC. Conſider now, whether you would not be in want of wiſdom, and intelligence, and reaſoning, and ſuch other things as are the ſiſters of theſe; at leaſt whether you would not want to *ſee* ſomething.

PROT. Why ſhould I, when I had in a manner all things, in having continual joy?

SOC. Living thus then continually all your life, would the moſt exquiſite pleaſures give you any joy?

PROT. Why not?

SOC. Having neither intellect, nor memory, nor ſcience, nor opinion,—in the firſt place of this very thing, your poſſeſſion of joy, you muſt of neceſſity be ignorant, and unable to ſay whether you then had any joy, or not, being void of all juſt diſcernment or knowledge of things preſent.

PROT. I muſt.

SOC. Being alſo void of memory, it would be impoſſible for you to remember that you ever had any joy; or to preſerve even the leaſt memorial of a joy then preſent: wanting alſo right opinion, you could not ſo much

as think you had any joy, though in the midſt of it: unable alſo to reaſon or draw conſequences, you could not poſſibly conclude that ever you ſhould have any joy to come. Thus you would live the life, not of a man, but of a ſea-ſponge, or of an oyſter. Are theſe things ſo? or ought we to think otherwiſe concerning them?

PROT. A life of mere pleaſure muſt be ſuch as you have deſcribed it.

SOC. Do we think, then, that ſuch a life is eligible?

PROT. The deſcription of it, O Socrates, has ſilenced me entirely for the preſent.

SOC. Nay; let us not ſhrink ſo ſoon from purſuing our inquiries; but proceed to the conſideration of that other life, the life of intellect.

PROT. What kind of life is that?

SOC. Let us conſider, whether any of us would chooſe to live with wiſdom, and intellect, and ſcience, and a perfect memory of all things; but without partaking of pleaſure, whether great or ſmall; and, on the other hand, without partaking of pain; wholly exempt from all feelings of either kind.

PROT. To me, O Socrates, neither of theſe lives appears eligible; and I think never would appear ſo to any other man.

SOC. What think you of a middle life, where both of them are mixed together—a life compoſed of the other two?

PROT. Compoſed of pleaſure do you mean, on the one hand, and of intellect and wiſdom on the other hand?

SOC. Juſt ſo: ſuch a life do I mean.

PROT. Every man would certainly prefer ſuch a kind of life to either of the other two.

SOC. Perceive we now what the reſult is of our diſcourſing thus far on the ſubject now before us?

PROT. Perfectly well; it is this: that three lives have been propoſed for our conſideration, and that neither of the two firſt-mentioned appears ſufficient or eligible for any one, neither for man, nor any other animal.

SOC. Is it not evident, then, with regard to the point in controverſy, that neither of thoſe two lives can give the poſſeſſion of the good? for, whichever of them had ſuch a power, that life would be ſufficient, perfect, and eligible

alſo to all thoſe animals[1] who are capable of living in the continual enjoyment of the good all their lives. And whoever of us ſhould give any other life the preference to that, would make his election contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, though not willingly, becauſe through ignorance, or ſome unhappy neceſſity.

PROT. What you ſay is highly probable indeed.

SOC. That we ought not to think that Goddeſs of Philebus to be the ſame thing with the good, has been ſhown, I think, ſufficiently.

PHIL. Neither is that intellect of yours, O Socrates, the good; for it will be found deficient in the ſame reſpects.

SOC. Mine perhaps, O Philebus, may; but not that intellect which is divine and true; for it is otherwiſe, I preſume, with this. However, I do not contend for the chief prize of victory, in behalf of the life of intellect againſt the middle or mixed life. But what to do with the ſecond prize, and which life to beſtow it on, is next to be conſidered. For the cauſe of that happineſs which the mixed life affords, one of us, perhaps, may aſcribe to intellect, the other of us to pleaſure. And thus, neither of theſe two would be man's ſovereign good, and yet one or other of them may perhaps be ſuppoſed the cauſe of it. Now on this point I would ſtill more earneſtly contend againſt Philebus,—that not pleaſure, but intellect, is the neareſt allied, and the moſt ſimilar to that, whatever it be, by the poſſeſſion of which the mixed life becomes eligible and good. And if this account be true, pleaſure can never be ſaid to have any juſt pretenſions either to the firſt or to the ſecond prize of excellence. Still further is ſhe from coming in for the third prize, if any credit may be given for the preſent to that intellect of mine.

PROT. Indeed, O Socrates, it ſeems to me that Pleaſure is now fallen: your reaſons have been like ſo many blows given her; under the force of which, fighting for the maſter-prize, ſhe lies vanquiſhed. But I think, how-

[1] In the Greek,—πασι φυτοις και ζωοις, *to all plants and animals*. But are plants capable of living a life of ſenſual pleaſure? or brute animals, a life of ſcience and underſtanding? We are, therefore, inclined to think, that Plato's own words were πασι τοις ζωοις· for immediately he ſubjoins an explanation of his meaning, and limits the word πασι, *all*, to ſuch only as are endued with reaſon; and that the word φευ was written in the margin of ſome manuſcript, oppoſite to the words πασι τοις, by a reader, aſtoniſhed at the boldneſs of the expreſſion πασι τοις ζωοις, and not ſufficiently attentive to the qualifying words ſubjoined.—S.

ever, that we muſt ſay it was prudent in Intellect not to contend for that prize; for ſhe would otherwiſe have met with the ſame fate. Now if Pleaſure ſhould alſo loſe the prize of ſecond value, as already ſhe has loſt the higheſt, ſhe muſt entirely fall into diſgrace with her own lovers: for even to them ſhe would no longer appear to merit ſuch honour as they paid to her before.

Soc. Well then; is it not the better way to diſmiſs her now directly, and not give her pain, by inſpecting into her too nicely, and diſcovering all her imperfections?

Prot. What you now ſay goes for nothing, Socrates.

Soc. Do you mean, becauſe I ſuppoſed an impoſſible thing when I ſuppoſed that pain might be given to pleaſure?

Prot. Not on that account only, but becauſe you are ſenſible that none of us will give you a diſcharge before you have brought theſe arguments to a concluſion.

Soc. Ah! the copious matter of argument, O Protarchus, ſtill behind! and ſcarcely is any part of it very manageable on the preſent occaſion [1]. For, whoever ſtands forth as the champion of Intellect to win the ſecond prize for her, muſt, as it appears to me, take another way of combating, and has need of other weapons different from thoſe reaſons I before made uſe of: ſome, however, of the ſame may, perhaps, be of uſe again. Muſt we then proceed in that manner?

Prot. By all means.

Soc. But let us begin cautiouſly, and endeavour to lay down right principles.

Prot. What principles do you mean?

Soc. All things which are now in the univerſe let us divide into two ſorts, or rather, if you pleaſe, into three.

[1] Aldus's edition of Plato, by omitting the word οὐδὲ in this ſentence, gives a quite contrary turn to it. Stephens, in his edition, has inſerted the οὐδὲ: and this reading we have preferred to the former; becauſe it makes much better ſenſe, and is agreeable alſo to Ficinus's tranſlation from the Medicean manuſcript. It is ſtrange that Grynæus, who undertook to reviſe that tranſlation, ſhould depart from it here, where it is evidently right, to follow the erroneous reading in the Aldine edition. Cornarius, Serranus, Bembo, and Grou, were not ſo miſled.—S.

Prot.

PROT. You ſhould tell us what difference between things it is, with reſpect to which you make that diviſion.

SOC. Some things which have been already mentioned let us reaſſume.

PROT. What things?

SOC. God, we ſaid, has exhibited[1] *the infinite*, and alſo *the bound* of beings.

PROT. Very true.

Soc.

[1] Proclus, in Platon. Theol. p. 132, obſerves, that Plato here, according to the theology of his country, eſtabliſhes two principles after *the one*. And, according to Philolaus, the nature of beings is connected from things *bounded* and things *infinite*. If beings, therefore, ſubſiſt from *bound* and *the infinite*, it is evident that theſe two muſt be prior to beings, or, in other words, muſt be ſupereſſential. Hence, as *bound* and *the infinite* are ſupereſſential, Socrates with great propriety ſays that "God has *exhibited* them." For their proceſſion from the higheſt God is ineffable, and they may be rather ſaid to be *arcane manifeſtations* from him than his *productions*. Mr. Sydenham, from being unacquainted with the ſublime theology of the Greeks, has totally miſtaken the profound meaning of this paſſage in his tranſlation, which is as follows:—"The Gods, we ſaid, have ſhown us the infinite of things, and alſo their bound." For the original is τον θεον ελεγομεν που, το μεν απειρον δειξαι των ονταν, το δε περας.

Should it be aſked, ſays Olympiodorus, how the two elements *bound* and *infinity* are better than that which is mixed, ſince theſe two elements are the principles of being; we reply, that theſe principles muſt be conſidered as total orders more ſimple than that which is mixt; and that ſecondary principles proceed from theſe two, in the firſt mixt, which are ſubordinate to the mixt, in the ſame manner as elements are every where ſubordinate to that which is compoſed from them.

Again, neither is perfect ſeparation in the ſecond* order: for the fabrication of form firſt pertains to intellect; and the firſt intellect is pure intellect. Hence, Jamblichus ſays that the monads of forms ſubſiſt in this, meaning by monads that which is unſeparated in every form. On this account it is intellectual as in intellectuals, and is the cauſe of formal eſſence, juſt as the ſecond is the cauſe of life, and the third of the fabrication of form in intellectuals.

Again, the egg, the paternal intellect, occult number; and, in ſhort, that which is the third from *bound*, reſpectively ſignify the third God, according to theologiſts, and conſequently each is the ſame as that which is mixt from bound and infinity.

Further ſtill, the one principle which gives ſubſiſtence to, and is the end of, all things, contains the final as ſuperior to the producing; for hypoſtaſis is through the ends. But the firſt principle is both theſe according to *the one*: and the two principles *bound* and *infinity* diſtribute theſe; *bound* ſubſiſting according to the final, and *infinity* according to the producing cauſe.

* The reader muſt remember that the intelligible order conſiſts of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, and that each of theſe receives a triadic diviſion.—See the Notes on the Parmenides.

Again,

Soc. Let us take theſe for two of the ſpecies of things; and for a third let us take that, which is compoſed of thoſe two mixed together. But I deſerve, methinks, to be laughed at for pretending thus to diſtinguiſh things, and to enumerate their ſeveral ſpecies.

Prot. Why ſo, my good friend?

Soc. A fourth kind appears to have been omitted by me.

Prot. Say, What?

Soc. Of that commixture, the combination of the former two, conſider the cauſe: and beſide thoſe three ſpecies, ſet me down this cauſe[1] for a fourth.

Prot. Will you not want a fifth ſpecies too, for a cauſe of diſunion and ſeparation?

Soc. Perhaps I may; but not, I believe, at preſent. However, ſhould there be occaſion for it, you will pardon me, if I go in purſuit of a fifth life.

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Of theſe four ſpecies, then, in the firſt place dividing the three, and perceiving that two of theſe, when both are divided, and their diviſions ſeparated, are, each of them, many;—then, gathering together the many of each, and uniting them again, let us endeavour to underſtand in what manner each of them is, at the ſame time, one and many.

Prot. Would you but expreſs your meaning more plainly, I might, perhaps, apprehend it.

Soc. I mean, then, by the two, which I propoſe to be now conſidered, the ſame which I mentioned at the firſt; one of them *the infinite*, and the other *bound*. That *the infinite* is, in ſome manner, many, I will attempt to ſhow: and let *bound* wait a while.

Prot. It ſhall.

Again, Socrates eſtabliſhing that which is mixt as a certain cauſe of union, the cauſe of ſeparation is alſo inveſtigated. This cauſe, however, will be the *difference* which ſubſiſts after the intelligible, as we learn from the Parmenides. For the intelligible is united alone. But it would be better to make *the one* the cauſe of all things; *bound* the cauſe of union; *infinite* of ſeparation; and *the mixt* that which participates of both. Obſerve, too, that the more and the leſs are every where, but in intelligibles according to a ſuperior and inferior degree of power.—T.

[1] That is, the ineffable principle of things.—T.

Soc.

Soc. Give me now your attention. It is, I confeſs, a difficult and doubtful thing, that, which I would have you to conſider. Conſider it, however. Firſt, with regard to hotter and colder, in things, ſee if you can think of any bound. Or would not the more and the leſs, reſiding in the kinds themſelves of things, hinder, ſo long as they reſide there, an end from being fixed to them? For, if ever they receive an end, to an end alſo are their very beings then brought.

Prot. Moſt certainly true.

Soc. And in ſpeaking of either the colder or the hotter of any two things, we conſtantly attribute to them the more and the leſs.

Prot. And very much ſo.

Soc. Reaſon then conſtantly ſuggeſts to us that the *colder* and the *hotter* have no end: and being thus without any end, they are altogether boundleſs.

Prot. I am ſtrongly inclined to agree with you, Socrates in this point.

Soc. Well have you anſwered, my friend Protarchus; and well have you reminded me, that the *ſtrongly*, which you mentioned, and the *faintly*, have the ſame power as the *more* and the *leſs*. For, wherever they reſide, they ſuffer not any thing to be juſt *ſo much*; but infuſing either the more *intenſe* or the more *remiſs* into every action, they always produce in it either the *more* or the *leſs*; while the juſt *ſo much* flies away and vaniſhes from before them. For, as it was juſt now obſerved, were they not to drive away the juſt *ſo much*, or did they permit *this*, and the *moderate*, to enter into the regions of the *more* and the *leſs*, or of the *intenſe* and the *remiſs*, theſe very beings muſt quit their own places: becauſe, if they admitted the juſt *ſo much*, the *hotter* and the *colder* would be gone. For the *hotter*, and in like manner the *colder*, is always advancing forward, and never abides in the ſame ſpot: but the juſt *ſo much* ſtops, and ſtays, having finiſhed its progreſs. Now, according to this reaſoning, the *hotter* muſt be *boundleſs*; and ſo muſt alſo be the *colder*.

Prot. So it appears indeed, Socrates. But, as you rightly ſaid, it is not eaſy to apprehend theſe things. Queſtions, however, relating to them, again and again repeated, might perhaps ſhow that the queſtioner and the reſpondent were tolerably well agreed in their minds concerning them.

Soc. You ſay well: and we ſhould try ſo to do. But at preſent, to avoid lengthening

lengthening out this argument, by enumerating every infinite, conſider, whether we may take this for the characteriſtic mark of the nature of all infinites.

PROT. What mark do you mean?

SOC. Whatever things appear to us to be increaſing or diminiſhing, or to admit of intenſeneſs and remiſſion, or the too much, and all other ſuch attributes, we ought to refer all theſe to the genus of the infinite; collecting, as it were, all of them in one, agreeably to what was before ſaid; that whatever things were divided and ſeparated we ought to aſſemble together and combine, as well as we are able, affixing to all of them the mark of ſome one nature;—if you remember.

PROT. I remember it well.

SOC. Every thing, then, which rejects all ſuch attributes, and admits only ſuch as are quite the contrary,—in the firſt place, the equal and equality, and, after the equal, the double, and every other relation which one number bears to another, and one meaſure to another,—all theſe things, I ſay, in ſumming up, and referring them to bound, think you not that we ſhould do right? or how ſay you?

PROT. Perfectly right, O Socrates.

SOC. Well: but the third thing made up, and conſiſting of the other two, what characteriſtic ſhall we aſſign to this?

PROT. You, as I preſume, will ſhow it to me.

SOC. Divinity indeed may; if any of the Gods will hearken to my prayers.

PROT. Pray, then, and *ſurvey*.

SOC. I ſurvey: and ſome God, O Protarchus, is now, methinks, become favourable to us.

PROT. How do you mean? and by what ſign do you know it?

SOC. I will tell you in plain words: but do you follow them cloſely.

PROT. Only ſpeak.

SOC. We mentioned juſt now the hotter and the colder; did we not?

PROT. We did.

SOC. To theſe then add the drier and the moiſter; the more numerous and the fewer; the ſwifter and the ſlower; the larger and the ſmaller; and whatever things beſide, in our late account of them, we ranked under one head,—that which admits of the nature of the more and the leſs.

PROT. You mean the infinite.

SOC. I do: and mingle together with this that which we ſpoke of next afterward,—the race of bound.

PROT. What race do you mean?

SOC. Thoſe things which we did not (as we ought to have done) aſſemble together under one head, in the ſame manner as we aſſembled together the race of the infinite. But you will now, perhaps, do what was then omitted. And when both the ſorts are aſſembled, and viewed together, the race of bound will then become manifeſt.

PROT. What things do you ſpeak of? and how are they to be aſſembled?

SOC. I ſpeak of that nature in which are compriſed the equal and the double; and whatever elſe puts an end to conteſt between contrary things; and, introducing number, makes them to be commenſurate one with another, and to harmonize together.

PROT. I apprehend your meaning to be, that, from the commixture of thoſe two, a certain progeny will ariſe between them in every one of their tribes.

SOC. You apprehend me rightly.

PROT. Relate then the progeny of theſe commixtures.

SOC. In *diſeaſes*, does not the right commixture of thoſe two produce the *recovery of health?*

PROT. Entirely ſo.

SOC. And in the acute and the grave, in the ſwift alſo and the ſlow, which are all of them infinite, does not the other ſort, received among them, and begetting bounds, conſtitute the perfection of all the Muſe's art?

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. And in weather exceſſively either cold or hot, does not the entrance of that other kind take off the exceſs, the vehement, and the infinite,—generating in their ſtead, not only the moderate and the meaſured, but ſymmetry alſo, and correſpondence between their meaſures?

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. And do not propitious ſeaſons, and all their fair productions, ariſe to us from hence, from the mixture of things which are infinite with things which have a bound?

PROT. Doubtleſs.

Soc. A thouſand other things I forbear to mention; as, for inſtance, ſtrength and beauty, the attendants upon health of body; and in the ſoul other excellencies, very many and very noble. For Venus herſelf, O good Philebus! obſerving lawleſs luſt, and all manner of vice every where reigning, the love of pleaſure being in all men boundleſs, and their deſires of it inſatiable, ſhe herſelf eſtabliſhed a law and an order, ſetting bounds to pleaſure and deſire. This you ſaid was to leſſen and to impair pleaſure; but I maintain, that, on the contrary, it preſerved pleaſure from decay. And you, Protarchus! what think you of it?

Prot. For my part, I am entirely of your mind, Socrates.

Soc. I have ſhown you then thoſe three kinds, if you apprehend my meaning.

Prot. Partly, I ſuppoſe, I do. By one of thoſe three, I ſuppoſe, you mean the infinite; by another, the ſecond ſort, you mean that which in all beings is the bound; but what you mean by the third ſort, I have no ſtrong apprehenſion of.

Soc. Becauſe the care of that third ſort, my friend, has amazed you with its multitude. And yet, the infinite alſo appeared to contain many tribes: but as they were all of them ſtamped with the character of more and leſs, they were ſeen clearly to be one.

Prot. True.

Soc. Then, as to bound; that neither contained many, nor found we any difficulty in admitting the nature of it to be one.

Prot. How could we?

Soc. It was not at all poſſible, indeed. Of thoſe two ſorts, then, all the progeny,—all the things produced into being through thoſe meaſures, which are effected in the immoderate, when bounds are ſet to the infinite,—in ſumming up all theſe things together, and comprehending them in one, underſtand me to mean, by the third ſort, this one.

Prot, I underſtand you.

Soc. Now, beſides theſe three, we are further to conſider, what that kind is which we ſaid was the fourth. And as we are to conſider it jointly, ſee whether you think it neceſſary, that all things which are produced into being ſhould have ſome cauſe of their production.

Prot. I think it is: for, without a cauſe, how ſhould they be produced?

Soc. The nature then of the efficient differs from the cauſe in nothing but in name: ſo that the efficient and the cauſe may be rightly deemed one.

Prot. Rightly.

Soc. So, likewiſe, the thing effected, and the thing produced into being, we ſhall find to differ in the ſame manner, in nothing but in name, or how?

Prot Juſt ſo.

Soc. In the nature of things, does not the efficient lead the way? and does not the effect follow after it into being?

Prot. Certainly.

Soc. Cauſe, therefore, is not the ſame thing with that which is ſubſervient to cauſe in the producing of its effect, but a thing different.

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Did not the things which are produced into being, and the things out of which they are all of them produced, exhibit to us the three genera?

Prot. Clearly.

Soc. That, then, which is the artificer of all theſe, the cauſe of them, let us call the fourth cauſe; as it is fully ſhown to be different from thoſe other three.

Prot. Be it ſo.

Soc. But the four ſorts having been now deſcribed, every one of them diſtinctly, we ſhould do well, for memory's ſake, to enumerate them in order.

Prot. No doubt of it.

Soc. The firſt then I call infinite; the ſecond bound; the third eſſence[1] mixt and generated from theſe: and in ſaying[2] that the cauſe of this mixture and this production is the fourth, ſhould I ſay aught amiſs?

Prot. Certainly not.

Soc. Well now: what is next? How proceeds our argument? and with what deſign came we along this way? Was it not this? We were inquiring

[1] As eſſence, therefore, is plainly aſſerted by Socrates to be mixt and generated from bound and infinity, it is evident that *bound* and *infinity* are ſupereſſential. For cauſe is every where ſuperior to its effect.—T.

[2] The edition of Plato by Aldus, and that by Stephens, in this place erroneouſly give us to read λεγω, inſtead of the evidently right reading, which is λεγων, exhibited in the Baſil editions.—S.

who

who had a right to the ſecond prize of victory; whether Pleaſure had, or Wiſdom: was it not ſo?

PROT. It was.

SOC. Now then, ſince we have thus divided theſe genera, may we not happily form a more finiſhed judgment concerning both the very beſt and the ſecond-beſt of thoſe things which originally were the ſubjects of diſpute between us?

PROT. Perhaps we may.

SOC. We made no difficulty, I think, of ſetting down for conqueror, the mixt life, the life of pleaſure and wiſdom together. Was it not ſo?

PROT. It was.

SOC. We perceive then of what ſort the mixt life is, and to which kind it is to be referred.

PROT. Evidently.

SOC. And I think we ſhall agree, that it is part of the third ſort. For the mixt life is not to be referred ſolely to any one of the infinites, mixed with ſome one only of the bounds: it is a life of all ſuch things together as are infinite in their own nature, but are under the reſtraint of bound. So that the mixt life, this winner of the prize, may be rightly ſaid to be a part of the third ſort.

PROT. Moſt rightly.

SOC. It is well. But that life of yours, O Philebus, a life of pleaſure ſimple and unmixed, to which of the three ſorts may we rightly ſay that it belongs? But before you pronounce, anſwer me firſt to this queſtion.

PHIL. Propoſe it then [1].

SOC. Concerning pleaſure and pain; have they in their own nature any bounds? or are they among thoſe things which admit the more and the leſs [2]?

PHIL. Pleaſure, O Socrates! to be ſure, admits the more. For it would not comprehend every good in it, if it were not by nature infinite, with re-

[1] Aldus, in his edition of Plato, gave theſe words to Protarchus; though nothing is more plain than that Plato meant them for Philebus. The Baſil editors reſtored them to the right owner: and it is ſtrange that Stephens either knew it not, or did not acknowledge it.—S.

[2] In all the editions of the Greek we here read εστι inſtead of εστον. We are ignorant of any authority for uſing ſo ſtrange an enallage; and therefore we ſuppoſe it an erroneous reading.—S.

ſpect

ſpect to the multitude which it contains, and the increaſe which it is capable of.

Soc. Nor can pain be imagined, O Philebus, to comprehend every evil. So that we muſt conſider of ſome other thing, different from the nature of the infinite, for the imparting of any good to pleaſures. It is admitted, that your life of pleaſure is the iſſue of things unbounded, and belongs, therefore, to the infinite. But to which of the ſorts before mentioned, O Protarchus and Philebus, may we refer wiſdom, and ſcience, and intellect, without being guilty of impiety? For it appears to me that we incur no trifling danger in anſwering the preſent queſtion, whatever be our anſwer, whether right or wrong.

PHIL. You magnify that God of yours, O Socrates, very highly, methinks.

Soc. So do you, my friend, that Goddeſs of yours. The queſtion, however, ought to be anſwered by us.

PROT. Socrates ſays what is right, O Philebus, and we muſt do as he ſays we ought.

PHIL. Have not you, Protarchus, taken upon yourſelf my part in the debate?

PROT. It is true that I have. But in the preſent caſe I find myſelf much at a loſs how to anſwer. I muſt therefore requeſt, O Socrates, that you yourſelf will take the office of prophet to us; leſt, by ſome miſtake, I ſhould offend the combatant[1] whom you favour, and by finging out of tune ſhould ſpoil the harmony[2].

[1] This evidently is a metaphor taken from the contentions uſual at that time between dramatic poets during the feaſts of Bacchus, for the fame of ſuperiority in their art. For the Grecians of thoſe days had an emulation to excell in the muſical entertainments of the mind, as well as in the gymnic exerciſes of the body. To inſpire them with that emulation, combats in poetry and muſic, as well as in gymnaſtic, were inſtituted by their legiſlators: and the contenders in either kind were alike termed αγωνισται, combatants. The metaphorical combatants meant by Protarchus are Mind and Pleaſure.—S.

[2] In continuing the metaphor taken from theatrical conteſts, Protarchus likens himſelf to one of the chorus in a tragedy or comedy, and Socrates to the κορυφαιος, or χορηγος, the chief or leader of the whole band. For, in the chorus ſongs, it was the office of the chief, or preſident, to lead the vocal muſic, keeping it in time and tune with the inſtrumental: and in the dialogue ſcenes, wherever the chorus bore a part, their preſident ſpoke alone for them all.—S.

Soc.

Soc. You muſt be obeyed, Protarchus. Indeed there is nothing difficult in your injunctions. But, in aſking you to which of the two abovementioned kinds intellect and ſcience were to be referred,—when I was magnifying, as Philebus ſays, the ſubject of my queſtion,—the joke, which I intended to ſoften the ſolemnity of it, confuſed your thoughts, I find, in good earneſt.

Prot. Very thoroughly ſo, I confeſs, O Socrates.

Soc. And yet it was an eaſy queſtion. For, on this point, there is a conſent and harmony among all the wiſe, dignifying thus themſelves,—that *Intellect is king of heaven and earth.* And this which they ſay is perhaps[1] well ſaid. But let us, if you are willing, conſider the nature of this genus more amply, and not in ſo conciſe a manner.

Prot. Conſider it in what manner you think beſt, without regarding the length of the inquiry: for the length will not be diſagreeable to us.

Soc. Fairly ſpoken. Let us begin, then, by propoſing this queſtion.

Prot. What?

Soc. Whether ſhall we ſay that the power of the irrational principle governs all things in the whole univerſe, fortuitouſly and at random? or ſhall we, on the contrary, agree with our anceſtors and predeceſſors, in affirming that a certain admirable intellect and wiſdom orders all things together, and governs throughout the whole?

Prot. Alike in nothing, O Socrates, are theſe two tenets. That which you mentioned juſt now is, in my opinion, impious. But, to hold that Intellect diſpoſes all things in a beautiful order, is agreeable to that view which we have of the world, of the celeſtial bodies, and of the whole circumvolution of the heavens. For my own part, I ſhould never ſpeak nor think any otherwiſe on this ſubject.

Soc. Is it then your pleaſure that we add our voices to thoſe of the antients, and openly avow that tenet to be ours; not contenting ourſelves with a bare repetition of the ſayings of others, in hopes of eſcaping danger to ourſelves; but reſolved to run all riſk together, and to ſhare in undergoing the

[1] Socrates does not ſay this as being himſelf doubtful whether Intellect is king of heaven and earth, but becauſe thoſe with whom he was converſing had not arrived at a ſcientific knowledge of this dogma.—T.

cenſures

cenſures of ſome great and formidable man, when he aſſerts that in the whole of things there is no order [1] ?

PROT. How can I do otherwiſe than join with you in this?

SOC. Attend now to the argument which comes on next to be conſidered.

PROT. Propoſe it then.

SOC. In the bodies of all animals, ſomehow, we diſcover that fire, water, and air, muſt be in their compoſition by nature; and earth, which gives ſupport to the other ingredients in their frame, we ſee plainly: as mariners ſay, when they are toſſed about in a thunder-ſtorm at ſea, and deſcry land.

PROT. True: and toſſed about indeed are we too in theſe diſcourſes; but for a port to anchor in we are entirely at a loſs.

SOC. Let us proceed then: Concerning each of thoſe elementary ingredients in our frame, underſtand this.

PROT. What?

SOC. That which there is in us of each element is ſmall and inconſiderable; no where in any part of our frame have we it at all unmixed and pure; neither has it in us a power worthy of its nature. Take one of them for a ſample, by which you may eſtimate all the reſt. Fire in ſome manner there is in us; fire [2] there is alſo in the univerſe.

PROT. Moſt certainly.

SOC. Now the fire which is in our compoſition is weak and inconſiderable: but that which is in the univerſe is admirable for the multitude of it, for the beauty which it exhibits, and for every power and virtue which belong to fire.

PROT. Perfectly true.

SOC. Well then: is the fire of the univerſe generated, fed, and ruled by the fire which we have in us? or, on the contrary, does my fire, and yours, and that of every other living thing, receive its being, ſupport, and laws, from the fire of the univerſe?

[1] That the perſon here alluded to is Critias, one of the thirty oligarchic tyrants, cannot be doubted of by thoſe who are acquainted with his character, and the injurious treatment he gave to Socrates. A conſiderable fragment of his atheiſtic poetry is extant in Sextus Empiricus, pag. 562.—S.

[2] Socrates is here ſpeaking of the difference between the *wholes* of the univerſe, and the *parts* to which theſe wholes are prior, as being their cauſe. See the Introduction to the Timæus.—T.

PROT.

PROT. This queſtion of yours does not deſerve an anſwer.

SOC. Rightly ſaid. And you would anſwer in the ſame manner, I ſuppoſe, if your opinion was aſked concerning the earthy part of every animal here, compared with the earth in the univerſe; and juſt ſo concerning the other elementary parts of animal bodies mentioned before.

PROT. What man, who made a different anſwer, would ever appear to be of ſound mind?

SOC. Scarcely would any man. But attend to what follows next. Wherever we find theſe four elements mixed together and united, do we not give to this compoſition the name of body?

PROT. We do.

SOC. Apprehend the ſame thing then with regard to this, which we call the world. This ſhould be conſidered as a body in the ſame manner, being compoſed of the ſame elements.

PROT. You are perfectly in the right.

SOC. To the whole of this great body, then, does the whole of that little body of ours owe its nouriſhment, and whatever it has received, and whatever it poſſeſſes? or is the body of the univerſe indebted to ours for all which it is and has?

PROT. There is no reaſon, O Socrates, for making a queſtion of this point, neither.

SOC. Well: what will you ſay to this point then?

PROT. What point?

SOC. Muſt we not affirm theſe bodies of ours to be animated with ſouls?

PROT. It is evident that we muſt.

SOC. But from whence, O my friend Protarchus, ſhould our bodies derive thoſe ſouls of theirs, if that great body of the univerſe, which has all the ſame elements with our bodies, but in much greater purity and perfection, was not, as well as ours, animated with a ſoul?

PROT. It is evident, O Socrates, that from no other origin could they derive them.

SOC. Since, therefore, O Protarchus, we acknowledge theſe four genera, bound, infinite, the compound of both thoſe, and the genus of cauſe, to be in all bodies; and ſince we find, that in this part of the univerſe to which we

belong there are beings of that fourth ſort,—cauſes, which produce ſouls, build up bodies for thoſe ſouls to dwell in [1], and heal thoſe bodies when diſeaſed;—cauſes, alſo, which create and frame other compoſitions, and amend them when impaired;—cauſes theſe, to every one of which we gave a particular name, betokening a particular kind of wiſdom or ſkill:—ſince, I ſay, we are perſuaded of theſe things, ſurely we can by no means think that the whole heaven, in the larger parts of which are the ſame four genera, and theſe undepraved and pure, can have any other cauſe than a nature who is full of contrivance and deſign, and in whom the moſt beautiful and noble things all unite.

PROT. It would not be at all reaſonable to think it can.

SOC. If this then be abſurd, we may the better aſſert, as a conſequence of our reaſoning, that in the univerſe there are, what we have ſeveral times repeated, *infinite* in great quantity, and *bound* ſufficient; and beſides theſe, a *cauſe*, not inconſiderable or mean, which, by *mixing* them properly together, marſhals and regulates the years, the ſeaſons, and the months,—a cauſe, which with the greateſt juſtice we may term *wiſdom* and *intellect*.

PROT. With the greateſt juſtice, indeed.

SOC. But further, wiſdom and intellect could never be without ſoul [2].

[1] In the Greek of this paſſage we read—ψυχην τε παρεχον και σωμα σκιαν εμποιουν.—Ficinus tranſlates the two laſt words of it thus:—"*dum imprimit umbram.*" But this being obſcure, an error in the Greek manuſcripts was juſtly ſuſpected by the ſubſequent tranſlators, Cornarius and Serranus; the former of whom propoſes inſtead of σκιαν to read ὑγειαν; and the latter imagines that we ſhould read σωμασκιαν as one word. Grynæus and Bembo never attempt an emendation of the printed Greek, even where it is moſt apparently erroneous. And Monſ. Grou has taken the eaſy way of not tranſlating the two laſt words. But all the difficulty vaniſhes, if, inſtead of σκιαν we read σκηνος, a *tabernacle* or *tent*; a word metaphorically uſed by the Pythagoreans to ſignify the human body, as being but a ſlight temporary dwelling for the ſoul. See Timæus the Locrian, in ſeveral paſſages; and a fragment of Ocellus the Lucanian, de Lege, in Stobæus's Eclogæ Phyſ. cap. 16. See alſo Æſchines the Socratic, pag. 128, edit. Horrei; the Greek index to which will furniſh the learned reader with examples of the ſame metaphor, uſed by ſeveral Greek writers in the ſucceeding ages.—S.

[2] That is, ſoul is conſubſiſtent with wiſdom and intellect. If this be the caſe, it is evident that when Plato in the Timæus ſpeaks of the *generation* of ſoul by the *demiurgus*, whom he there expreſsly calls *intellect*, he does not mean by *generation* a *temporal* production, but an *eternal proceſſion* from cauſe. And in the ſame manner, what he there ſays of the *generation* of the univerſe is to be underſtood. Hence, thoſe are to be derided who aſſert that the world, according to Plato, was produced in time.—T.

PROT.

PROT. By no means.

SOC. You will affirm, then, that in the nature of Jupiter there is a kingly ſoul and a kingly intellect, through the power of cauſe[1]; and that in the other Gods there are other beautiful things, whatever they are, by which their Deities love to be diſtinguiſhed, and from which they delight in taking their reſpective denominations.

PROT. Certainly I ſhall.

SOC. The diſcourſe we have now had together on this ſubject, O Protarchus, think it not idle, and to no purpoſe. For it ſupports that doctrine of our anceſtors, that the univerſe is for ever governed by intellect.

PROT. Indeed it does.

SOC. And beſides, it has furniſhed us with an anſwer to my queſtion,—to what genus intellect is to be referred; in making it appear that intellect is allied to that which we ſaid was the cauſe of all things, one of our four genera. For now at length you plainly have our anſwer.

PROT. I have; and a very full and ſufficient anſwer it is: but I was not aware what you were about.

SOC. A man's attention to ſerious ſtudies, O Protarchus, is ſometimes, you know, relaxed by amuſements.

PROT. Politely ſaid.

SOC. And thus, my friend, to what genus intellect belongs, and what power it is poſſeſſed of, has been now ſhown tolerably well for the preſent.

PROT. It has, indeed.

SOC. And to what genus alſo belongs pleaſure, appeared before.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Concerning theſe two, then, let us remember theſe concluſions,—that intellect is allied to cauſe, and is nearly of this genus; and that pleaſure is infinite in her own nature, and belongs to that genus which, of itſelf, neither has nor ever will have in it either a beginning, or a middle, or an end.

PROT. We ſhall not fail to remember them both.

[1] That is to ſay, a kingly ſoul, and a kingly intellect, ſubſiſt in Jupiter, the artificer of the univerſe according to cauſe. For Jupiter, as a Deity, is a ſupereſſential unity, in which all things have a cauſal ſubſiſtence.—T.

Soc. Now we ought to conſider next, in which genus either of thoſe two things, intelligence and pleaſure, is found to have a ſeat; and in what ſtate or condition thoſe beings muſt be in whom either of them is produced, at the time of its production. And firſt in the caſe of pleaſure: for, as we inquired to which genus ſhe belonged, before we conſidered of which ſort was intellect; ſo, with regard to the points alſo now propoſed, ſhe is the firſt to be examined[1]. But, ſeparately from the conſideration of pain, we ſhould never be able fully to explore the nature of pleaſure.

Prot. Well: if we are to proceed in this way, let us then in this way proceed[2].

Soc. Are you of the ſame opinion with me concerning their riſe and production?

Prot. What opinion is that?

Soc. Pain and pleaſure appear to me, both of them, to ariſe, according to nature, in that which is a common genus.

Prot. Remind us, friend Socrates, which of the genera mentioned before is meant by the term common.

Soc. What you deſire, O wonderful man! ſhall be done, to the beſt of my ability.

Prot. Fairly ſaid.

Soc. By this common genus, then, we are to underſtand that which, in recounting the four ſorts, we reckoned as third.

Prot. That which you mentioned next after both the infinite and bound: that in which you ranked health, and alſo, as I think, harmony.

Soc. Perfectly right. Now give me all poſſible attention.

Prot. Only ſpeak.

Soc. I ſay, then, that whenever the harmony in the frame of any animal is broken, a breach is then made in its conſtitution, and at the ſame time riſe is given to pains.

[1] Cornarius and Stephens, both of them, perceived the Greek of this ſentence to be erroneous. But the emendations propoſed by them appear inſufficient. Ficinus's tranſlation from the Florentine MS. helps to reſtore the right reading thus:—Δει δη,—ιδειν ημας· και πρωτον περι την ηδονην, ωσπερ—ουτω και ταυτα προτερον [ſc. δει ιδειν].—S.

[2] In the edition of Plato by Aldus, and in that alſo by Stephens, this ſentence, by a ſtrange miſtake, is printed as if it were ſpoken by Socrates.—S.

Prot.

PROT. You ſay what is highly probable.

SOC. But when the harmony is reſtored, and the breach is healed, we ſhould ſay that then pleaſure is produced: if points of ſo great importance may be diſpatched at once in ſo few words.

PROT. In my opinion, O Socrates, you ſay what is very true: but let us try if we can ſhow theſe truths in a light ſtill clearer.

SOC. Are not ſuch things as ordinarily happen, and are manifeſt to us all, the moſt eaſy to be underſtood?

PROT. What things do you mean?

SOC. Want of food makes a breach in the animal ſyſtem, and at the ſame time gives the pain of hunger.

PROT. True.

SOC. And food, in filling up the breach again, gives a pleaſure.

PROT. Right.

SOC. Want of drink alſo, interrupting the circulation of the blood and humours, brings on us corruption, together with the pain of thirſt; but the virtue of a liquid, in moiſtening and repleniſhing the parts dried up, yields a pleaſure. In like manner, preternatural ſuffocating heat, in diſſolving the texture of the parts, gives a painful ſenſation: but a cooling again, a refreſhment agreeable to nature, affects us with a ſenſe of pleaſure.

PROT. Moſt certainly.

SOC. And the concretion of the animal humours through cold, contrary to their nature, occaſions pain: but a return to their priſtine ſtate of fluidity, and a reſtoring of the natural circulation, produce pleaſure. See, then, whether you think this general account of the matter not amiſs, concerning that ſort of being which I ſaid was compoſed of infinite and bound,—that, when by nature any beings of that ſort become animated with ſoul, their paſſage into corruption, or a total diſſolution, is accompanied with pain; and their entrance into exiſtence, the aſſembling of all thoſe particles which compoſe the nature of ſuch a being, is attended with a ſenſe of pleaſure.

PROT. I admit your account of this whole matter; for, as it appears to me, it bears on it the ſtamp of truth.

SOC. Theſe ſenſations, then, which affect the ſoul by means only of the body, let us conſider as one ſpecies of pain and pleaſure.

PROT. Be it ſo.

SOC. Conſider now the feelings of the ſoul herſelf, in the expectation of ſuch

ſuch a pain or of ſuch a pleaſure,—antecedent to the pleaſure expected, an agreeable feeling of hope and alacrity,—antecedent to the pain expected, the uneaſineſs of fear.

PROT. This is, indeed, a different ſpecies of pleaſure and pain, independent of the body, and produced in the ſoul herſelf through expectation.

SOC. You apprehend the matter rightly. Now the conſideration of theſe feelings of pain and pleaſure, which immediately affect the ſoul herſelf, (and ſeem to be produced in her, each of them, unmixed and genuine,) will, as I imagine, clear up that doubt concerning pleaſure,—whether the whole kind be eligible, or whether a particular ſpecies of it be the proper object of our choice. And in the latter caſe, pleaſure and pain (in general), like heat and cold, and all other things of this ſort, will deſerve ſometimes to be embraced, and at other times to be rejected; as not being good in themſelves, but admitting the nature of good to be ſuperadded to them only at ſome times, and ſome of them only.

PROT. You are perfectly in the right. It muſt be in ſome ſuch way as this that we ought to inveſtigate the things we are in purſuit of.

SOC. If, then, what we agreed in be true,—that animal bodies feel pain, when any thing befalls them tending to their deſtruction,—pleaſure, when they are uſing the means of their preſervation,—let us now conſider what ſtate or condition every animal is in, when it is neither ſuffering aught that tends to its deſtruction, nor is engaged in any action, or in the midſt of any circumſtances, tending to its preſervation. Give your earneſt attention to this point, and ſay, whether it is entirely neceſſary, or not, that every animal at that time ſhould feel neither pain nor pleaſure, in any degree, great or ſmall.

PROT. It is quite neceſſary.

SOC. Beſides the condition then of an animal delighted, and beſides the oppoſite condition of it under uneaſineſs, is not this a different, a third, ſtate or condition of an animal?

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. Be careful then to remember this judgment of ours. For on the remembering of it, or not, greatly will depend our judgment concerning the nature of pleaſure. But, to go through with this point, let us, if you pleaſe, add a ſhort ſentence more.

PROT. Say what.

SOC.

Soc. You know, nothing hinders a man who prefers the life of wiſdom from living all his life in that ſtate.

Prot. In the ſtate, do you mean, of neither pleaſure nor uneaſineſs?

Soc. I do: for, when we compared together the different lives, it was ſuppoſed, that whoever ſhould chooſe the life of intellect and wiſdom was not to have pleaſure either in a great or in a ſmall degree.

Prot. That was the ſuppoſition.

Soc. He muſt live, therefore, ſuch a life[1]. And perhaps it is by no means abſurd, to deem that life to be of all lives the moſt Godlike.

Prot. It is not indeed probable, that the Gods feel either the pleaſurable ſenſation, or its oppoſite.

Soc. Highly, indeed, is it improbable. For neither of them is conſiſtent with the divine nature. But we ſhall conſider further of this point afterwards, if it ſhould appear to be of any ſervice to our argument; and ſhall apply it to the purpoſe of winning the ſecond prize for intellect, though we ſhould not be able to make uſe of it ſo as to win for her the firſt.

Prot. Very juſtly ſaid.

Soc. Now that ſpecies of pleaſure which we ſaid is proper to the ſoul herſelf, is all produced in her by means of memory.

Prot. How ſo?

Soc. But, before we conſider of this point, I think we ſhould premiſe ſome account of memory,—what it is: and ſtill prior to an account of memory, ſome mention too, methinks, ought to be made of ſenſe, if we are to have this ſubject appear tolerably plain to us[2].

Prot. Explain your meaning.

Soc. Of thoſe things which are incident to our bodies in every part, coming from all quarters around us, and affecting us in various ways,—ſome

[1] In the Greek, the firſt words of this ſentence of Socrates, and the firſt word alſo of the next ſentence, ſpoken by Protarchus, ought for the future to be printed thus—Ὄυκουν and not Οὐκοῦν.—The wrong accentuation of theſe paſſages in all the editions ſeems owing to the error of Ficinus, who miſtook both the ſentences for interrogations: and the miſtakes are continued by Grynæus. Serranus's tranſlation is guilty of the ſame miſtakes: but in thoſe of Cornarius, Bembo, and Grou, they are corrected.—S.

[2] The Greek of this paſſage, it is preſumed, ought to be read thus—εἰπερ μελλει ταχυθ' ἡμιν κ. τ. λ.—S.

ſpend all their force upon the body, without penetrating to the ſoul, leaving this entirely untouched and free; others extend their power through the ſoul as well as through the body; and ſome of this latter ſort excite a vehement agitation in them both, jointly and ſeverally. Do you admit this?

PROT. Be it admitted.

SOC. If we ſhould ſay of thoſe things, the power of which is confined to the body, and reaches not the ſoul, that the ſoul is deprived of knowing them; but of other things which befall us, and have a power to pervade both the body and the ſoul, that of theſe the ſoul hath the knowledge; ſhould we not thus ſay what is moſt true?

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. But when I ſay that the ſoul is deprived of knowing the former ſort, do not ſuppoſe my meaning to be, that oblivion happens to her in this caſe. For oblivion is the departure of memory. But of the accidents now ſpoken of the ſoul never had a memory. And of that which neither is nor ever was, it is abſurd to ſay that any loſs can happen to us. Is it not?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Only then alter the terms.

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. Inſtead of ſaying that the ſoul is deprived of knowing what the body ſuffers, when ſhe is not affected by any motions produced in the body by thoſe ordinary occurrences,—what we termed a privation of knowledge, let us now term inſenſibility.

PROT. I apprehend your meaning.

SOC. But when the ſoul and the body are affected, both of them in common, by any of thoſe occurrences, and in common alſo are moved or agitated [1],—in giving to this motion the name of ſenſation, you would not ſpeak improperly.

[1] In the Greek of this paſſage, inſtead of γιγνομενον, the participle ſingular, agreeing with σωμα, we ought to read γιγνομενα, the plural, agreeing with the two preceding ſubſtantives, ψυχην and σωμα, coupled together; according to a rule, the ſame in the grammars of the Greek and Latin languages. For the words of this ſentence, placed in the order of their grammatical conſtruction, are theſe,—Τῳ κοινῃ κινεισθαι την ψυχην και το σωμα, κοινῃ γιγνομενα εν ἑνι παθει,—ταυτην την κινησιν κ. τ. λ. If Stephens had perceived this, he would not have adopted Cornarius's alteration of the text.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Now then do we not apprehend what it is which is commonly called ſenſe or ſenſation?

PROT. What ſhould hinder us?

SOC. And of memory [1], if one ſhould ſay that it was the retaining of ſenſations, it would not be ill defined, in my opinion.

PROT. I think ſo too.

SOC. Do we not hold, that memory differs from remembrance?

PROT. Perhaps it does.

SOC. Do they not differ in this reſpect?

PROT. In what reſpect?

SOC. When the ſoul alone, unaided by the body, recovers and reſumes within herſelf as much as poſſible the ſtate which heretofore ſhe was in, when ſhe was affected jointly with the body, we ſay that the ſoul then remembers. Do we not?

PROT. Certainly we do.

SOC. So we do alſo, when the ſoul, after having loſt the memory of ſomething which ſhe had ſenſibly perceived, or of ſomething which ſhe had learnt, recalls and recollects the memory of it again, herſelf within herſelf: and all this we term remembrance, and a recovery of things ſlipt out of our memory [2].

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Now the end for the ſake of which we have been conſidering theſe faculties of the ſoul is this.

PROT. For the ſake of what?

SOC. That we may apprehend [3], as well and as clearly as we are able, what is the pleaſure of the ſoul abſtracted from the body, and at the ſame

[1] Memory, ſays Olympiodorus, is triple, viz. irrational, rational, and intellectual. Each of theſe likewiſe is twofold, viz. phantaſtic, ſenſitive; dianoëtic, doxaſtic; eſſential, divine.—T.

[2] In the printed Greek we here read—αναμνησεις και μνημας.—So that *memory* and *remembrance* are now confounded together; and the difference but juſt before made between them is annulled. It is therefore apprehended, that we ought to read—αναμνησεις και μνημης ανακτησεις.—S.

[3] All the editions of Plato give us here to read—Ἱνα μη—λαθοιμεν κ. τ. λ. From this ſentence, thus abſurdly printed, Cornarius, in his marginal lemmas, extracted the following curious precept,—"Voluptas & cupiditas animæ, abſque corpore, vitanda." *Pleaſure and deſire in the ſoul herſelf, abſtracted from the body, are loth to be avoided.* The French tranſlator has judiciouſly rejected the negative particle in this ſentence.—S.

time may apprehend alſo what is deſire. For the nature of both theſe things ſeems to be diſcovered in ſome meaſure by ſhowing the nature of memory and of remembrance.

PROT. Let us then, O Socrates, now explain how ſuch a diſcovery follows from perceiving the nature of theſe faculties of ours.

SOC. In treating of the riſe of pleaſure, and of the various forms which ſhe aſſumes, it will be neceſſary for us, I believe, to conſider a great variety of things. But, before we enter on ſo copious a ſubject, we ſhould now, I think, in the firſt place, conſider the nature and origin of deſire.

PROT. Let us then: for we muſt not loſe any thing.

SOC. Nay, Protarchus! we ſhall loſe one thing, when we ſhall have found the objects of our inquiry; we ſhall loſe our uncertainty about them.

PROT. You are right in your repartee. Proceed we then to what is next.

SOC. Was it not juſt now ſaid, that hunger, and thirſt, and many other things of like kind, were certain deſires?

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. What is it, then, which is the ſame in all theſe things,—that, with reſpect to which we give to all of them, notwithſtanding the great difference between them, one and the ſame appellation?

PROT. By Jupiter, Socrates! it is, perhaps, not eaſy to ſay: it ought, however, to be declared.

SOC. Let us reſume the mention of that with which we began the conſideration of this ſubject.

PROT. Of what in particular?

SOC. Do we not often ſpeak of being thirſty?

PROT. We do.

SOC. And do we not mean by it ſome kind of emptineſs?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Is not thirſt a deſire?

PROT. It is.

SOC. A deſire of drink is it?

PROT. Of drink.

SOC. Of being repleniſhed by drink: is it not[1]?

[1] A future editor of Plato may conſider, in the Greek of this ſentence, whether διὰ ſhould no be inſerted before the word ποματος.—S.

PROT.

PROT. I ſuppoſe it is.

SOC. Whoever of us then is emptied, deſires, it ſeems, a condition the reverſe of what has befallen him. For whereas he is emptied, he longs to be filled again.

PROT. Moſt evidently ſo.

SOC. Well now: is it poſſible that a man, who at the firſt[1] is empty, ſhould apprehend, either by ſenſe or by memory, what it is to be full,—a condition, in which he neither is at the time, nor ever was heretofore.

PROT. How can he?

SOC. We are agreed, that the man who deſires has a deſire of ſomething.

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. Now it is not the condition in which he is that he deſires. For he ſuffers thirſt, that is, an emptineſs: but he deſires to be full.

PROT. True.

SOC. Something, therefore, belonging to the man who is thirſty muſt apprehend in ſome manner what it is to be full.

PROT. It muſt, of neceſſity.

SOC. But it is impoſſible that this ſhould be his body: for his body is ſuppoſed to ſuffer emptineſs.

PROT. Right.

SOC. It remains, therefore, that his ſoul apprehends what it is to be full, by means of her memory.

PROT. Plainly ſo.

SOC. For, indeed, by what other means could his ſoul have ſuch an apprehenſion?

PROT. Hardly by any other.

SOC. Perceive we now, what conſequence follows from this reaſoning of ours?

PROT. What conſequence?

SOC. It proves that deſire doth not ariſe in the body.

PROT. How ſo?

SOC. Becauſe it ſhows that the aim and endeavour of every animal is to

[1] That is, at the beginning of his ſenſitive life.—S.

be in a condition oppoſite to the feelings with which the body is at that time affected.

PROT. It certainly ſhows this.

SOC. And the inclination by which it moves toward this oppoſite condition, ſhows the remembrance of a condition oppoſite to thoſe preſent feelings and affections.

PROT. Clearly.

SOC. Our reaſoning, then, in proving that memory leads us toward the objects of our deſire, ſhows at the ſame time what is the general inclination and deſire of the ſoul; and what is the moving principle in every animal.

PROT. Perfectly right.

SOC. Our concluſion, therefore, will by no means admit of an opinion that the body ſuffers hunger, or thirſt, or is affected with any other ſuch deſire.

PROT. Moſt true.

SOC. Let us obſerve this alſo further, regarding theſe very ſubjects now under conſideration. Our reaſoning ſeems to me as if it meant to exhibit in thoſe very things a certain kind of life.

PROT. What things do you mean? and what kind of life do you ſpeak of?

SOC. I mean the being filled, and the being emptied, and all other things tending either to the preſervation of animal life, or to the deſtruction of it; and whatever things ordinarily give pain,—yet, coming in a change from things contrary, are ſometimes grateful.

PROT. True.

SOC. But what when a man is in the midſt of theſe contrary conditions, and is partaking of them both?

PROT. How do you mean in the midſt?

SOC. When he is afflicted with an anxious ſenſe of his preſent bad condition, but at the ſame time has a remembrance of paſt delights; he may enjoy an intermiſſion of his pain, without having as yet the cauſe of it removed[1]; now

[1] Thus have we rendered into Engliſh the Greek of this ſentence as it is printed. But we are much inclined to adopt the emendation *και παυεται μεν*, propoſed by Stephens in the margin of his edition:

now do we affirm, or do we deny, that he is at that time in the midſt of two contrary conditions?

PROT. It muſt be affirmed.

SOC. Is he afflicted or delighted wholly?

PROT. By Jupiter, he is in a manner afflicted doubly: in his body, from his preſent condition; in his ſoul, from a tedious expectation, longing for relief.

SOC. How is it, O Protarchus, that you ſuppoſe his affliction to be doubled? Is not a man whoſe ſtomach is empty ſometimes in a ſtate of hopefulneſs, with aſſurance of having it filled? and on the contrary, is he not at other times in a condition quite hopeleſs?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Do you not think that, when he is in hopes of being filled, he is delighted with the remembrance of fulneſs? and yet that, being empty at the ſame time, he is in pain?

PROT. He muſt be ſo.

SOC. In ſuch a ſtate, therefore, man and other animals are at the ſame time afflicted and delighted.

PROT. It ſeems ſo to be.

SOC. But what think you when a man is empty, and hopeleſs of obtaining fulneſs? muſt he not, in ſuch a condition, ſuffer double pain? with a view to which particular condition it was, that juſt now you ſuppoſed the memory of paſt delight, in all caſes, to double the preſent pain.

PROT. Moſt true, Socrates.

SOC. Now of this inquiry into theſe feelings of ours we ſhall make this uſe.

PROT. What uſe?

SOC. Shall we ſay that all theſe pains and pleaſures are true? or that they are all falſe? or that ſome of them are true, and others falſe?

PROT. How ſhould pleaſures or pains, O Socrates, be falſe?

edition: only changing *καὶ* into *ἢ*. If our learned readers are of the ſame opinion, and think with us, that two different caſes are here ſtated by Socrates; in both of which there is a mixture of anxiety and delight, but not a mixture of the ſame kind; then, inſtead of—*he may enjoy*, the tranſlation ſhould be—*or when he enjoys*, &c.—S.

SOC.

Soc. How is it then, O Protarchus, that fears may be either true or falſe? that expectations may be true, or not? Or, of opinions, how is it that ſome are true, and others falſe?

PROT. Opinions, I admit, may be of either kind: but I cannot grant you this of thoſe other feelings.

Soc. How ſay you? We are in danger of ſtarting a diſquiſition of no ſmall importance.

PROT. That is true.

Soc. But whether it has any relation to the ſubjects which have preceded, this, O ſon of an illuſtrious father[1]! ought to be conſidered.

PROT. Perhaps, indeed, it ought.

Soc. Tell me then: for, as to myſelf, I am continually in a ſtate of wonderment about theſe very difficulties now propoſed.

PROT. What difficulties do you mean?

Soc. Falſe pleaſures are not true; nor true pleaſures falſe[2].

PROT.

[1] We cannot conceive to what purpoſe this compliment to Protarchus is here introduced, unleſs it be by way of a ſimile; to repreſent the dignity and excellence of the matters before diſcuſſed; and, by reminding Protarchus of his illuſtrious birth, to ſignify to him,—that, as he ought not to degenerate from his anceſtors, ſo neither ought any new matters to be brought upon the carpet, if, in their weight and value, they fall ſhort of thoſe which have preceded. Perhaps alſo an intimation is thus given by Plato to his readers, that one of the ſubjects of inquiry juſt now mentioned by Socrates,—that concerning *opinions*,—immediately related to that other concerning *pleaſures*, as to their truth or falſehood. In the Greek of this paſſage, it is probable that the printed reading κεινου του ανδρος is erroneous; and that Plato wrote κλειτου ανδρος; but that, in after ages, a reader of ſome manuſcript copy of this dialogue, where inſtead of κλειτου was written κλεινου, (and Heſychius interprets κλεινὸς by the more uſual terms ενδοξος, ονομαστος,) on collating it with another MS. copy, where he found κλειτου written, wrote του in the margin of the former copy, oppoſite to the ſyllable νου, with which, perhaps, a new line began; that afterwards a tranſcriber of this copy received του into the text of his own tranſcript, juſt before ανδρος, ſuppoſing it to be a word caſually omitted in the former copy; and that, laſt of all, when κλειτου του ατδρος was diſcovered to be a ſoleciſm in the Greek ſyntaxis, κλεινου, a word very uncommon, was eaſily changed into κεινου, and the conſtruction was thus puriſied.—S.

[2] In the Greek we read only,—ψευδεις, αι δ' αληθεις ουκ εισιν ἡδοναι. All the tranſlators of Plato into other languages juſtly ſuppoſe this ſentence to be imperfect in the beginning of it: but in their way of ſupplying the words omitted, it is nothing more than a repetition of the queſtion propoſed before, without any new additional matter. Socrates, in fact, is now entering on a proof of the diſtinction between the true pleaſures and the falſe: and we preſume, that he here builds

PROT. How is it poſſible they ſhould?

SOC. Neither in a dream, then, nor awake, is it poſſible, as you hold, not even if a man is out of his ſenſes through madneſs, or has loſt the ſoundneſs of his judgment any other way, is it poſſible for him ever to imagine that he feels delight, when he is by no means ſenſibly delighted; or to imagine that he feels pain, when actually the man feels none.

PROT. All of us, O Socrates, conſtantly ſuppoſe theſe facts to be as you have now ſtated them.

SOC. But is it a right ſuppoſition? or ſhould we examine whether it is right, or not?

PROT. We ought to examine it, I muſt own.

SOC. Let us then explain a little more clearly what was juſt now ſaid concerning pleaſure and opinion. Do we not hold the reality of our having an opinion?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. And the reality of our having pleaſure?

PROT. To be ſure.

SOC. Further: it is ſomething, that which is the object of our opinion.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. And ſomething alſo that is with which whatever feels a pleaſure is delighted.

PROT. Moſt certainly.

SOC. In the having, then, of an opinion, whether we are right or wrong in entertaining that opinion, the reality of our having it abides ſtill.

PROT. How can a man loſe an opinion whilſt he has it?

SOC. In the enjoying alſo of any pleaſure, whether we do right or wrong to enjoy it, it is certain that the reality of the enjoyment ſtill remains.

PROT. To be ſure, theſe things are ſo.

SOC. On what account is it, then, that we are uſed to call ſome opinions true, and others falſe; yet to pleaſures only we allow the attribute of true;

his proof on that prime axiom on which is founded all demonſtration, viz. "Things cannot be what they are, and yet different from what they are, at the ſame time."—In the paſſage, therefore, now before us, it ſeems probable that the ſentence, to be made agreeable to the ſenſe of it, is to be completed thus;—Αληθεις αι μεν ψευδεις, ψευδεις αι δ' αληθεις, ουκ εισιν ηδοναι. The error of omitting the firſt words is eaſy to be accounted for.—S.

notwith-

notwithſtanding that pleaſure and opinion, both of them, equally admit reality in the having of them?

PROT. This ought to be conſidered.

SOC. Is it that falſehood and truth are incident to opinion? ſo that, by the ſupervening of one or other of theſe, opinion becomes ſomething beſide what in itſelf it is; and every opinion is thus made to have the quality of being either falſe or true. Do you ſay that this ought to be conſidered?

PROT. I do.

SOC. And beſide this: ſuppoſing that opinions univerſally do admit of attributes and qualities; whether only pleaſure and pain are what they are in themſelves ſimply, and never admit any quality to ariſe in them; ought we not to ſettle this point alſo by agreement between us?

PROT. It is evident that we ought.

SOC. But it is eaſy enough to perceive, that theſe alſo admit the acceſſion of ſome qualities. For of pleaſures and pains we agreed awhile ſince, that ſome are great, others little; and that each ſort admits of vehemence and of intenſion.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. And if either to any pleaſure, or to any opinion, there be added the quality of evil, ſhall we not affirm the opinion thus to become evil, and the pleaſure evil in the ſame manner?

PROT. Without doubt, O Socrates.

SOC. And what, if rectitude, or the oppoſite to rectitude, accede to any of them, ſhall we not ſay, that the *opinion* is *right*, if rectitude be in it? and ſhall we not aſcribe the ſame quality to *pleaſure*, on the ſame ſuppoſition?

PROT. Of neceſſity we muſt.

SOC. And if the object of our *opinion* be miſtaken by us, muſt we not in ſuch a caſe acknowledge that our *opinion* is *erroneous*, and not right; and that we are not right ourſelves in entertaining ſuch an opinion?

PROT. Certainly we muſt.

SOC. But what, if we diſcover ourſelves to be miſtaken in the object of our *grief* or of our *pleaſure*, ſhall we give to this *grief*, or to this *pleaſure*, the epithet of *right*, or *good*, or any other which is fair and honourable?

PROT. We certainly cannot, where a miſtake is in the pleaſure.

SOC.

Soc. And ſurely pleaſure is apt to ariſe in us oftentimes, accompanied, not with a *right* opinion, but with an opinion which is *falſe*.

Prot. Indiſputably ſo. And the opinion, O Socrates, then and in that caſe, we ſhould ſay was a falſe opinion. But to the *pleaſure* itſelf no man would ever give the appellation of *falſe*.

Soc. You are very ready, O Protarchus, at ſupporting the plea made uſe of by Pleaſure on this occaſion.

Prot. Not at all ſo. I only repeat what I have heard.

Soc. Do we make no difference, my friend, between ſuch a pleaſure as comes accompanied with right opinion or with ſcience, and that kind of pleaſure which often ariſes in every one of us at the ſame time with falſe opinion or ignorance[1]?

Prot. It is probable, I own, that no little difference is between them.

Soc. Let us now come to the conſideration of what the difference is.

Prot. Proceed in whatever way you think proper.

Soc. I ſhall take this way then.

Prot. What way?

Soc. Some of our opinions are falſe, and others of them are true: this is agreed.

Prot. It is.

Soc. Pleaſure and pain, as it was juſt now ſaid, oftentimes attend on either of them indifferently; on opinions, I mean, either true or falſe.

Prot. Certainly ſo.

Soc. Is it not from memory and from ſenſe that opinion is produced in us, and that room is given for a diverſity of opinions on every ſubject?

Prot. Moſt undoubtedly.

Soc. I aſk you, then, whether or no, as to theſe things, we deem ourſelves to be of neceſſity affected thus?

Prot. How?

Soc. Oftentimes, when a man looks at ſomething which he diſcovers at a

[1] Stephens's edition of Plato agrees with all the prior editions in giving us to read ανοιας in this place: but that learned printer, in his latter annotations, pag. 75, juſtly obſerves, that inſtead of ανοιας we ought to read αγνοιας. That emendation was made before Stephens by Cornarius, in his Eclogæ, pag. 333. Ignorance is here oppoſed to knowledge, as falſe opinion is oppoſed to true. The Mediceaan manuſcript exhibits the right reading, as appears from the Latin of Ficinus.—S.

great diſtance, but does not diſcern very clearly, will you admit that he may have an inclination to judge of what he ſees?

PROT. I do admit the caſe.

SOC. Upon this, would not the man queſtion himſelf in this manner?

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. What is that which appears as if it was ſtanding under ſome tree by the cliff there? Do you not ſuppoſe that he would ſpeak thoſe words to himſelf, looking at ſome ſuch appearances before him, as I have mentioned?

PROT. No doubt of it.

SOC. Hereupon, might not this man then, making a conjecture, ſay to himſelf, by way of anſwer,—It is a man?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. But walking on, perhaps he might diſcern it to be but the work of ſome ſhepherds, and would ſay again to himſelf,—It is only a ſtatue.

PROT. Moſt certainly he would.

SOC. And if he had any companion with him, he would ſpeak out aloud what he had firſt ſpoken within himſelf, and repeat the very ſame words to his companion: ſo that what we lately termed an opinion would thus become a ſpeech.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. But if he were alone, this very thing would be a thought ſtill within him; and he might walk on, keeping the ſame thought in his mind, a conſiderable way.

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Well now: does this matter appear to you in the ſame light as it does to me?

PROT. How is that?

SOC. The ſoul in that caſe ſeems to me to reſemble ſome book.

PROT. How ſo?

SOC. The memory, coinciding with the ſenſes, together with thoſe paſſions of the ſoul which attend this memory and the preſent ſenſation, ſeem to me as if they concurred in writing ſentences at that time within our ſouls. And when the ſcribe writes what is true, true opinions and true ſentences are by him produced within us: but when our ſcribe writes what is falſe, then what we think, and what we ſay to ourſelves, is contrary to the truth.

PROT.

PROT. I heartily agree to your account of this matter, and acknowledge thoſe joint ſcribes within the ſoul.

SOC. Acknowledge alſo another workman within us, operating at that time.

PROT. What is he?

SOC. An engraver, who follows after the ſcribe; engraving within the ſoul images of thoſe thoughts, ſentences, and ſayings.

PROT. How and when is this done?

SOC. It is, when that which a man thinks and ſays to himſelf, concerning the object of his ſight, or of any other outward ſenſe, he ſeparates from the ſenſation which he has of it; and views ſomehow within himſelf the image of that thought, and of that ſaying. Or is there no ſuch thing as this ever produced within us?

PROT. Nothing is more certain.

SOC. The images of true thoughts and true ſentences, are they not true? and the images of thoſe which are falſe, are they not themſelves alſo falſe?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Now if we have pronounced thus far rightly, let us proceed to the conſideration of one point further.

PROT. What is that?

SOC. Whether all the operations of this kind, ſuch as are naturally performed within our ſouls, regard only things preſent and things paſt, but not things to come; or whether any of them have a reference to theſe alſo.

PROT. Difference of time makes no difference in theſe matters.

SOC. Did we not ſay before, that pleaſures and pains of the ſoul, by herſelf, ariſe in us prior to thoſe pleaſures and pains which affect the body? ſo as that we feel antecedent joy and grief in the proſpect of things to come hereafter.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. Thoſe writings, then, and thoſe engravings, which, as we held juſt now, are performed within us, do they reſpect the paſt and the preſent time only? and have they no concernment with the future?

PROT. About the future very much are they concerned, and chiefly.

SOC. In ſaying this, do you mean that all theſe things are expectations of the future; and that we are, all of us, throughout life, full of expectations?

PROT. The very thing I mean.

Soc. Now, then, ſince we are thus far agreed, anſwer to this further queſtion.

PROT. What is it?

Soc. A man who is juſt, and pious, and entirely good, is he not beloved by Divinity?

PROT. Undoubtedly.

Soc. And what of the unjuſt and entirely bad man? is not the reverſe of it true of him?

PROT. How can it be otherwiſe?

Soc. Now every man, as we ſaid juſt now, is full of a multitude of expectations.

PROT. True.

Soc. Sayings there are, written within every one of us, to which we give the name of expectations.

PROT. There are.

Soc. And phantaſies alſo, engraven in us. Thus, for inſtance, a man often ſees in imagination plenty of money flowing into him, and by thoſe means many pleaſures ſurrounding him; and views himſelf, engraven within himſelf, as highly delighted.

PROT. That often is the caſe.

Soc. Of theſe engravings, ſhall we ſay that good men, becauſe of the divine favour, have generally thoſe which are true; and bad men, generally thoſe of the contrary ſort? or ſhall we deny it?

PROT. It cannot be denied.

Soc. Bad men, then, have pleaſures engraven within them alſo; but theſe are of the falſe ſort.

PROT. No doubt of it.

Soc. Wicked men, therefore, delight moſtly in falſe pleaſures; the good, in pleaſures which are true.

PROT. It muſt of neceſſity be ſo.

Soc. According to this account, there are, in the ſouls of men, ſuch pleaſures as are falſe; though in a moſt ridiculous manner they imitate, and would fain paſs for, true pleaſures: pains alſo there are with the like qualities.

PROT.

PROT. Such pleaſures and ſuch pains there are.

SOC. May not a man who indulges fancy at random, and embraces opinions of any kind whatever, always really [1] think and believe ſome things to be, which neither are nor ever were, and ſometimes ſuch as never will be?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. And they are the falſe ſemblances and ſeemings of theſe unreal things, which produce in him thoſe falſe opinions, and occaſion him to think thus falſely. Are they not?

PROT. They are.

SOC. Well then: ſhould we not ſay of the pains and pleaſures felt by thoſe bad men, that their condition correſponds with the caſe of falſe opinions?

PROT. How do you mean?

SOC. May not a man who courts and embraces pleaſure at random, pleaſure in general, of any kind whatever, may not ſuch a man always really feel delight from things which are not, and ſometimes from things which never were,—often too, and perhaps the moſt frequently, from things which will never be?

PROT. This muſt of neceſſity be granted.

SOC. Should not the ſame be ſaid of fears and deſires, and all things of the like ſort, that theſe alſo are ſometimes falſe?

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. Well now: can we ſay of opinions, that they are bad, or that they are good, any otherwiſe than as they prove to be falſe, or prove to be true [2]?

PROT. No otherwiſe.

SOC. And I ſhould think, that pleaſures too we apprehend not to be bad on any other account, than as they are falſe.

PROT. Quite the contrary, O Socrates. For hardly would any man put to the account of falſehood any of the evils brought on by pain and pleaſure; ſince many and great evils accede to them from other quarters.

[1] In the Greek of this ſentence, before the word αει, we ought to read ὀντως inſtead of οὐτως. This appears from a ſentence ſoon after, concerning a man *really delighted* with the thoughts of *things unreal*. Both the ſentences refer to what was ſaid before, where the ſame word is uſed in the ſame ſenſe as it is here.—S.

[2] It is obſerved by Cornarius, that after the word ψευδεις, in the Greek of this ſentence, all the printed editions omit the words και αληθεις: the ſenſe evidently demands them; and they are not wanting in the Medicean MS., as appears from Ficinus's Latin tranſlation.—S.

SOC.

Soc. Pleaſures which are evil, through the evil they occaſion, we ſhall ſpeak of by and by, if we ſhall continue to think it requiſite: but we are now to ſpeak of a multitude of pleaſures felt by us, and frequently ariſing in us,—pleaſures which are falſe in yet another way. And this other way of conſidering pleaſure we ſhall have occaſion, perhaps, to make uſe of in forming a right judgment of the ſeveral ſorts of it.

PROT. By all means let us ſpeak of theſe, if any ſuch pleaſures there are.

Soc. And there are ſuch, O Protarchus, in my opinion. But as long as this opinion lies by us unexamined, it is impoſſible for it to become certain or inconteſtable.

PROT. Fairly ſaid.

Soc. Now, therefore, let us advance to this other argument, like champions to the combat.

PROT. Come we on then.

Soc. We ſaid, if we remember, a little while ſince, that as long as the wants of the body, which are called deſires in us, remain unſatisfied, the body all that time will be affected diſtinctly, and in a different manner from the ſoul.

PROT. We remember that it was ſo held.

Soc. In ſuch a caſe, that within us, which deſired, would be the ſoul, deſiring to have her body in a ſtate contrary to its preſent condition; and that which felt uneaſineſs or pain from the condition it was in, would be the body.

PROT. Things would be thus with us.

Soc. Now compute theſe things together, and conſider the amount.

PROT. Say what.

Soc. In ſuch a caſe, it comes out that pains and pleaſures are placed together, each by the other's ſide; and that together, each by the other's ſide, ariſe in us a feeling of emptineſs, and a deſire of its contrary, fulneſs: for ſo it has juſt now appeared.

PROT. It is indeed apparent.

Soc. Has not this alſo been ſaid? and does it not remain with us a point ſettled between us by agreement?

PROT. What?

Soc. That pain and pleaſure, both of them, admit of the more and of the leſs; and that they both are of the infinites.

PROT.

PROT. It was ſo ſaid and agreed.

SOC. Is there not, then, ſome way in which we may judge of pain and pleaſure rightly?

PROT. What way, and how do you mean?

SOC. In judging of them, are we not wont, in every caſe, readily to try them by theſe marks,—which of them is the greater, and which is the leſs,—which of them hath the nature of its kind the moſt,—and which is more intenſe than the other,—in comparing either a pain with a pleaſure, or one pain with another pain, or one pleaſure with another pleaſure?

PROT. Such compariſons are often made: and from theſe compariſons we are wont to form our judgment and our choice.

SOC. Well now: in the caſe of magnitudes, does not the diſtance of viſible objects, ſome of which are ſeen remote, and others near, render their real magnitudes uncertain, obſcuring the truth of things, and producing falſe opinions? and does not the ſame thing hold true with regard to pains and pleaſures? is not the ſame effect produced by the ſame means in this caſe alſo?

PROT. Much more feelingly, O Socrates.

SOC. But in this caſe it happens contrary to what was in the caſe mentioned a little before.

PROT. What happens, ſay you?

SOC. In that caſe, the true and the falſe opinions entertained by us impart to the pains and pleaſures which attend them, their own qualities of truth and falſehood.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But, in the caſe which I am now ſpeaking of, the pains and pleaſures being viewed afar off and near, continually changing [their aſpects with their diſtances], and being ſet in compariſon together, [it happens that] the pleaſures [at hand] compared with the [remote] pains, appear greater and more intenſe [than they really are], and [that] the pains, compared with the pleaſures, [have an appearance] quite the contrary.

PROT. Such appearances muſt of neceſſity ariſe by theſe means.

SOC. As far, therefore, as the pains and pleaſures appear leſs or greater than they really are, if from the reality you ſeparate this appearance of what neither of them is, and take it by itſelf thus ſeparated, you will not ſay that

it is a right appearance; nor will you venture to aſſert, that this additional part of pain and pleaſure is right and true.

PROT. By no means.

SOC. After theſe diſcoveries, let us look if we can meet with pleaſures and pains ſtill falſer, and more remote from truth, than thoſe already mentioned, which are not only in appearance what they are called, but are felt alſo by the ſoul.

PROT. What pleaſures and pains do you ſpeak of?

SOC. We have more than once ſaid, that when the frame of any animal is on its way to diſſolution, through mixtures and ſeparations, repletions and evacuations, the increaſe of ſome, and the diminution of other parts of it, that in ſuch a condition of its body, pains, aches, and oppreſſions, with many other uneaſy feelings, to which are given various names, are wont to ariſe in us.

PROT. True: this obſervation has been again and again repeated.

SOC. And that, when all things in our bodily frame return to their natural and ſound ſtate, together with this recovery, we receive ſome pleaſure from within ourſelves.

PROT. Right.

SOC. But how is it when none of theſe changes are operating in our bodies?

PROT. At what times, O Socrates, may this be?

SOC. The queſtion, O Protarchus, which you have now put to me is nothing to the purpoſe.

PROT. Why not?

SOC. Becauſe it will not hinder me from putting again my queſtion to you.

PROT. Repeat it then.

SOC. I ſhall put it thus: If at any time none of thoſe things were paſſing within us, what condition ſhould we of neceſſity be in, as to pleaſure and pain, at ſuch a time?

PROT. When no motion was in the body either way, do you mean?

SOC. Exactly ſo.

PROT. It is plain, O Socrates, that we ſhould feel neither any pleaſure nor any pain at ſuch a time.

SOC.

Soc. Perfectly well anſwered. But now in your queſtion I ſuppoſe you meant this,—that ſome or other of thoſe things were of neceſſity paſſing within us continually at all times; agreeably to this ſaying of the wiſe,—"that all things are in perpetual flow, going upward and downward."

Prot. So they tell us: and this ſaying of theirs is, methinks, worthy of regard.

Soc. Undoubtedly it is: for it is ſaid by men who are worthy, themſelves, to be regarded. But this ſubject, which we have thus lighted on, I would willingly decline. Now I have it in my thoughts to avoid it this way; but you muſt accompany me.

Prot. What way?

Soc. Be it ſo, then, let us ſay to theſe wiſe men: but you, Protarchus, anſwer me to this queſtion: Do animals feel all the alterations which they continually undergo? or, whilſt we are growing, or ſuffering in any part of our bodies any other change, are we ſenſible of theſe internal motions? Is not quite the contrary true? for almoſt every thing of this kind paſſing within us paſſes without our knowledge.

Prot. Certainly ſo.

Soc. It was, therefore, not right in us to ſay, as we did juſt now, that all the alterations which happen to our bodies, and all the motions within them, produce either pains or pleaſures.

Prot. Certainly not right.

Soc. And it would be better, and leſs liable to cenſure, to lay down this poſition.

Prot. What poſition?

Soc. That great changes within give us pains and pleaſures; but that ſuch as are inconſiderable, or only moderate, produce neither pleaſures nor pains.

Prot. This is more juſtly ſaid than the other ſentence, indeed, Socrates.

Soc. If, then, theſe things are ſo, we meet with the life mentioned before recurring to us here again.

Prot. What life?

Soc. That which is exempt from all ſenſations, both of pain and pleaſure.

Prot. Very true.

Soc. Hence, we find there are three kinds of life propoſed to our conſider-

ation: one of them full of pleaſure, another full of pain; the third neutral, and free from both. Or how otherwiſe would you determine upon theſe points?

PROT. No otherwiſe I, for my part: for three different kinds of life appear to me in what has been ſaid.

SOC. To have no pain, therefore, cannot be the ſame thing as to have pleaſure.

PROT. Certainly it cannot.

SOC. But whenever you hear a man ſay, that it is the moſt pleaſurable of all things to live all one's life free from pain, what do you take to be his thought and meaning?

PROT. He means and thinks, as I take it, that it is a pleaſure not to have any pain.

SOC. Well now: let there be any three things whatever: to inſtance in things of honourable name, let us ſuppoſe one of them to be gold, another to be ſilver, and the third to be neither gold nor ſilver.

PROT. We ſhall ſuppoſe ſo.

SOC. That which is neither, is it poſſible for it any way to become either gold or ſilver?

PROT. By no means.

SOC. The middle life, therefore, if it were ſaid to be pleaſurable, or if it were ſaid to be painful, would not be ſpoken of in either way, rightly and agreeably to the true nature of things; nor would any perſon who entertains either of thoſe opinions concerning it think rightly.

PROT. Certainly not.

SOC. And yet, my friend, we find that there are perſons who actually ſpeak and think thus amiſs.

PROT. It is very evident.

SOC. Do theſe perſons really feel pleaſure [1] whenever they are free from pain?

[1] We have ventured to ſuppoſe an error in the Greek of this paſſage; and that we ought to read χαιρουσιν ουτοι, inſtead of the printed words—χαιρειν οιονται. For, without ſuch an alteration, Socrates in his next ſentence (where theſe very words—χαιρειν οιονται—appear again, and where they are very proper) is guilty of mere tautology; and his argumentation proceeds not the leaſt ſtep, but halts during that whole ſentence.—S.

PROT.

PROT. So they ſay.

Soc. They muſt imagine, then, that they are pleaſed; for otherwiſe they would not ſay ſo.

PROT. They do, it ſeems, imagine it.

Soc. They have a wrong opinion then of pleaſure; if it be true that pleaſure, and freedom from pain, have each a diſtinct nature, different from that of the other.

PROT. Different, indeed, we have concluded them to be.

Soc. And are we willing to abide by our late concluſion, that the ſubjects ſtill under examination are three diſtinct things? or do we chooſe to ſay that they are only two? Do we now ſay that pain is man's evil, and that deliverance from pain is man's good, and is that to which is given the appellation of pleaſure?

PROT. How come we, O Socrates, to propoſe this point to be reconſidered by us now? for I do not apprehend your drift.

Soc. In fact, O Protarchus, you do not apprehend who are the direct enemies to Philebus.

PROT. To whom do you give that character?

Soc. To perſons who are ſaid to have a profound knowledge of nature: theſe perſons ſay that pleaſures have no reality at all.

PROT. What do they mean?

Soc. They ſay that all thoſe things which Philebus and his party call pleaſures are but deliverances from pain.

PROT. Is it your advice, then, O Socrates, that we ſhould hearken to theſe perſons? or how otherwiſe?

Soc. Not ſo: but to conſider them as a kind of diviners, who divine not according to any rules of art; but, from the auſterity of a certain genius in them not ignoble, have conceived an averſion to the power of Pleaſure, and deem nothing in her to be ſolid; but all her attractive charms to be mere illuſions, and not [true] pleaſure. It is thus that we ſhould regard theſe perſons, eſpecially if we conſider their other harſh maxims. You ſhall in the next place hear what pleaſures ſeem to me to be true pleaſures: ſo that, from both the accounts compared together, we may find out the nature of Pleaſure, and form our judgment of her comparative value.

PROT. Rightly ſaid.

Soc. Let us then follow after them, as our allies, wherever their auſterity ſhall lead us. For I ſuppoſe they would begin their argument with ſome general principle, and propound to us ſome ſuch queſtion as this,—whether, if we had a mind to know the nature of any particular quality of things, for inſtance, the nature of the hard, whether or no we ſhould not comprehend it better by examining the hardeſt things, than we ſhould by ſcrutinizing a various multitude of the leſs hard. Now, Protarchus, you muſt make an anſwer to theſe auſtere perſons, as if you were making it to me.

Prot. By all means: and I make this anſwer to them,—that to examine ſuch bodies as exceed all others in hardneſs is the better way.

Soc. In like manner, then, if we had a mind to know the nature of pleaſure in general, we are not to conſider the multitude of little or mean pleaſures, but thoſe only which are called extreme and exquiſite.

Prot. Every man would grant you the truth of this your preſent argument.

Soc. The pleaſures which are always within our reach, thoſe which we often call the greateſt, do they not belong to the body?

Prot. There is no doubt of it.

Soc. Are the [bodily] pleaſures which are produced in thoſe perſons who labour under diſeaſes, greater than the pleaſures [of the ſame kind] felt by thoſe who are in health? Now let us take care not to err, by making too precipitate an anſwer.

Prot. What danger is there of erring?

Soc. Perhaps we might pronounce in favour of thoſe who are in health.

Prot. Probably we ſhould.

Soc. But what? are not thoſe pleaſures the moſt exceſſive which are preceded by the ſtrongeſt deſires?

Prot. This cannot be denied.

Soc. The afflicted with fevers, or with diſeaſes of kin to fevers, are they not more thirſty than other perſons? do they not more ſhake with cold? and ſuffer they not in a greater degree other evils which the body is ſubject to? Do they not feel their wants more preſſing? and feel they not greater pleaſures when they have thoſe wants ſupplied [1]? Or ſhall we deny all this to be true?

[1] In all the editions of the Greek we here read αποπληρουμενων· but certainly we ought to read απολαμβανουσι.—S.

Prot.

PROT. Your repreſentation of thoſe caſes clearly is right.

SOC. Well then: ſhould we not be clearly right in ſaying, that whoever would know what pleaſures are the greateſt muſt not go to the healthy, but to the ſick, to look for them? Be careful now not to imagine the meaning of my queſtion to be this,—whether the ſick enjoy pleaſures more, in number, than the healthy: but conſider me as inquiring into high degrees of pleaſure; and by what means, and in what ſubjects, the vehemence or extreme of it always is produced. For we are to find out, we ſay, what the nature is of pleaſure, and what thoſe perſons mean by pleaſure who pretend that no ſuch thing as pleaſure has any being at all.

PROT. Tolerably well do I apprehend your argument.

SOC. And poſſibly, O Protarchus, you will equally well ſhow the truth of it. For, tell me; in a life of boundleſs luxury ſee you not greater pleaſures (I do not mean more in number, but more intenſe and vehement,) than thoſe in the life of temperance? Give your mind to the queſtion firſt, and then anſwer.

PROT. I apprehend what you ſay: and the great ſuperiority of the pleaſures enjoyed in a luxurious life I eaſily diſcern. For ſober and temperate perſons are on all occaſions under the reſtraint of that maxim, now become a proverb, which adviſes them to avoid the too much of any thing; to which advice they are obedient. But an exceſs of pleaſure, even to madneſs, poſſeſſing the ſouls of the unwiſe and intemperate, as it makes them frantic, it makes them conſpicuous, and famed for being men of pleaſure.

SOC. Well ſaid. If this, then, be the caſe, it is evident that the greateſt pleaſures, as well as the greateſt pains, are produced in a morbid and vicious diſpoſition of the ſoul or of the body; and not when they are in their ſound and right ſtate.

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. Ought we not then to inſtance in ſome of theſe pleaſures, and to conſider what circumſtances attend them on account of which it is that they are ſtyled the greateſt?

PROT. That muſt be done.

SOC. Conſider now what circumſtance attends the pleaſures which are produced in certain maladies.

PROT. In what maladies?

Soc. In thoſe of the baſe or indecent kind;—pleaſures, to which the perſons whom we termed auſtere have an utter averſion.

Prot. What pleaſures do you mean?

Soc. Thoſe which are felt in curing the itch, for inſtance, by friction; and in other maladies of like kind, ſuch as need no other medicine.

Now the ſenſation thence ariſing in us, in the name of the Gods, what ſhall we ſay of it? Pleaſure is it? or ſhall we term it pain?

Prot. A mixt ſort of ſenſation, O Socrates, ſeems to ariſe from this malady, partaking of both pain and pleaſure.

Soc. It was not, however, for the ſake of Philebus that I brought this laſt ſubject into our diſcourſe: it was becauſe we ſhould never be able to determine the point now before us, unleſs we had taken a view of theſe mixt pleaſures, and of others alſo which depend on theſe. Let us proceed, therefore, to conſider ſuch as have an affinity with them.

Prot. Such, do you mean, as partake of pleaſure and pain by means of their commixture?

Soc. That is my very meaning. Of theſe mixt feelings, then, ſome belong to the body; and in the body are theſe generated. Others are of the ſoul; and theſe have in the ſoul their reſidence. We ſhall find alſo pleaſures mingled with pains, where the ſoul and the body have, each of them, a ſhare. Now theſe mixtures [though compoſed of contraries] are, in ſome caſes, termed only pleaſures; in other caſes, only pains.

Prot. Expreſs yourſelf more fully.

Soc. When a man, whether in a ſound or in a decaying ſtate of his body, feels two contrary ſenſations at the ſame time; as when, chilled with cold, he is warming himſelf; or ſometimes, when overheated, he is cooling himſelf; with a view, I ſuppoſe, to his enjoying one of thoſe ſenſations, and to his deliverance from the other: in ſuch caſes, what is called the bitter-ſweet, through the difficulty met with in driving away the bitter part, cauſeth a ſtruggle within, and a fierce meeting together of oppoſite qualities and ſenſations.

Prot. It is perfectly true, what you have now ſaid.

Soc. Are not ſome of theſe mixt ſenſations compoſed of pain and pleaſure in equal proportion? and in others is not one of them predominant?

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Among thoſe, then, in which there is an overplus of pain, I reckon that of the malady termed the itch, and all other pruriencies and itchings, when nothing more than a ſlight friction or motion is applied to them, ſuch as only diſſipates what humours are at the ſurface, but reaches not the fermentation and turgeſcence of thoſe humours which lie deep within. In this condition, the diſeaſed often apply heat to the parts which pain them, and then the oppoſite extreme, through impatience, and uncertainty which way to take. Thus they excite inexpreſſible pleaſures firſt, and then the contrary, in the interior parts, compared with the pains felt in the exterior, which yet are mixed with pleaſures, according as the humours are driven outwardly or inwardly. For by violently diſperſing the morbific matter where it is collected, and by compelling it together from places where it lies diſperſed, pleaſures and pains are at once excited, and ariſe by each other's ſide.

PROT. Moſt true.

Soc. Now wherever, in any caſe of this kind, a greater quantity of pleaſure is mingled, the ſmaller quantity of pain creates but a ſlight uneaſineſs, no more than what ſerves to tickle: whilſt, on the other hand[1], the great exceſs of pleaſure ſpread throughout convulſeth the whole frame, and ſometimes cauſeth involuntary motions; operating alſo every change of colour in the countenance, every variety of poſture in the limbs, and every different degree of reſpiration;—and within the ſoul it energizes in tranſports, uttered madly in exclamations.

PROT. Entirely ſo.

Soc. Further: a man in ſuch a condition, O my friend! is apt to ſay of himſelf, and others are apt to ſay of him, that he is dying, as it were, through exceſs of pleaſure. From this time for ever after he is wholly intent on purſuing the like pleaſures; and the more ſo, the more he happens to be intemperate, and leſs under the government of prudence. Thus he calls theſe pleaſures the greateſt, and accounts him the happieſt of men who ſpends his whole time, as far as poſſible, in the enjoyment of them.

PROT. You have deſcribed all this, O Socrates, juſt as it happens to the bulk of mankind, according to their own ſenſe and opinion.

Soc. But all this, O Protarchus, relates only to ſuch pleaſures mixed with

[1] In the Greek, as it is printed, we read το δ' αυτης ηδονης: but we ſhould chooſe to read το δ' αυ της η.—S.

pains

pains as ariſe ſolely in the body, in its ſuperficial parts and interior parts alternately. And as to thoſe feelings of the ſoul which meet with a contrary condition of the body, when pleaſure in the one is mixed with pain in the other, ſo as that both are ingredients in one compoſition, we ſpake of thoſe before; ſuch as a deſire of fulneſs, under a ſenſe of emptineſs in the body; when hope adminiſters delight, while the emptineſs gives a pain. We did not, indeed, conſider them at that time as evidences of the preſent point; but we now ſay, that in all thoſe caſes (and the number of them is infinite) where the condition of the ſoul is different from that of the body, a mixture of pain and pleaſure happens to be produced.

PROT. You are, I believe, perfectly in the right.

SOC. Among the mixtures of pain and pleaſure, there is a third kind remaining, yet unmentioned.

PROT. What kind is that?

SOC. That where ſuch pleaſures and pains as we ſaid ariſe frequently in the ſoul, herſelf by herſelf, are mixed together.

PROT. In what caſes, ſay we, are theſe mixtures found?

SOC. Anger, fear, and deſire, and lamentation, love, emulation, and envy, and all other ſuch paſſions of the ſoul herſelf, do you not ſuppoſe them to give pain and uneaſineſs to the ſoul?

PROT. I do.

SOC. And ſhall we not find theſe very paſſions fraught with wondrous pleaſures? In the paſſions of reſentment and anger, do we need to be reminded of what the poet ſays[1],—that

> ——————— though reſentment raiſe
> Choler, like ſmoke, in even the prudent breaſt;
> The luſcious honey from its waxen ſeat
> Diſtills not half ſuch ſweetneſs.

And do we not remember, in lamentations and deſires, the pleaſures we have felt mingled with the pains which thoſe paſſions produce?

PROT. It is true: our paſſions do affect us in the manner you have mentioned, and no otherwiſe.

SOC. And have you not obſerved, at tragic ſpectacles preſented on the ſtage, with how much pleaſure the ſpectators ſhed tears?

[1] Homer, in the eighteenth book of his Iliad, ver. 108, &c.

PROT.

PROT. I certainly have.

SOC. But have you attended to the diſpoſition of your ſoul at the acting of a comedy? Do you know that there alſo we feel pain mixed with pleaſure?

PROT. I do not perfectly well comprehend that.

SOC. It is not perfectly eaſy, O Protarchus, at ſuch a time, to comprehend what mixed paſſions poſſeſs the ſoul in every caſe of that kind.

PROT. Not at all eaſy, I believe.

SOC. However, let us conſider what our feelings are at that time; and the more attentively, on account of their obſcurity; that we may be able to diſcover with the greater eaſe what mixture there is of pain and pleaſure in other caſes.

PROT. Say on, then.

SOC. The paſſion known by the name of envy, will you ſet it down for a ſort of pain in the ſoul, or how?

PROT. Even ſo.

SOC. And yet the man who envies another will plainly appear to be delighted with the evils which befall him.

PROT. Clearly ſo.

SOC. Now ignorance is an evil; and ſo is what we term want of ſenſe.

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. From theſe premiſes you may perceive what is the nature of ridicule and the ridiculous.

PROT. You muſt tell me what it is.

SOC. Every particular vice takes its name from ſome particular bad habit in the ſoul. But total vicioufneſs, the habit of wickedneſs in all reſpects, is the direct contrary of that habit which the Delphic inſcription adviſeth us to acquire.

PROT. That of knowing one's ſelf do you mean, O Socrates?

SOC. I do. And the contrary to this advice of the oracle would be,—not to know one's ſelf in any reſpect at all.

PROT. Certainly it would.

SOC. Try now to divide this ignorance of ourſelves into three kinds.

PROT. How, ſay you, ſhould this be done? for I am not able to do it.

SOC. Do you ſay that I ſhould make this diviſion in your ſtead?

PROT. I not only ſay it, but deſire you ſo to do.

SOC. Well then: whoever is ignorant of himſelf, muſt he not be thus ignorant, in one or other of theſe three reſpects?

PROT. What three?

SOC. Firſt, with reſpect to external poſſeſſions, in imagining himſelf wealthier than he really is.

PROT. Many perſons there are who labour under this ſort of ignorance.

SOC. Yet more numerous are they, in the next place, who imagine themſelves handſomer in their perſons, nobler in their air, or graced with ſome other corporeal advantage in a higher degree than actually they are.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. But the number is by far the greateſt, I preſume, of ſuch as are miſtaken in themſelves, with reſpect to the third kind of excellence, that which belongs to the ſoul, by fancying themſelves poſſeſſed of more virtue than in truth they have.

PROT. Nothing is more certain.

SOC. Among the virtues and excellencies of the ſoul, is not wiſdom that to which the generality of mankind lay claim with the greateſt earneſtneſs, and in regard to which they are full of contention, opinionativeneſs, and falſe notions?

PROT. Evidently ſo.

SOC. Now the man who ſhould ſay that ignorance and error, in any of theſe reſpects, were evils, would ſay what is true.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But we are to make ſtill another diviſion of this ignorance of a man's ſelf, O Protarchus, if we would diſcover the odd mixture of pain and pleaſure in that mirthful envy which is excited by comedy,—a diviſion into two ſorts.

PROT. Into what two ſorts do you mean?

SOC. To thoſe perſons who fooliſhly entertain any ſuch falſe opinion of themſelves it neceſſarily happens, as it does to all men in general, that ſtrength and power attend on ſome; while the fate of others is quite the contrary.

PROT. It muſt be ſo.

SOC. According to this difference then between them, diſtinguiſh thoſe ignorant

ignorant perſons into two ſorts. And all thoſe whoſe ſelf-ignorance is attended with weakneſs, and with a want of power to be revenged on ſuch as laugh at them, you may juſtly ſay that they are open to ridicule, and may call their characters properly ridiculous. But as to the others, who have power to take their revenge, if you ſhould ſay that theſe are to be dreaded, as being powerful and hoſtile, you would give a very right account of them. For ſuch ignorance, armed with power, is powerful to do miſchief; and not only itſelf is hoſtile and hurtful to all perſons within its reach, but ſo likewiſe are all its images and repreſentatives. But ſelf-ignorance, without ſtrength and power, is to be ranked among the things which are ridiculous, and is a proper object of ridicule.

PROT. There is much of truth in what you ſay. But I do not as yet perceive clearly what mixture there is of pain and pleaſure in our feelings on ſuch occaſions.

SOC. You are, in the firſt place, to apprehend the force of envy in theſe caſes.

PROT. Show it me then.

SOC. Is not ſorrow, on ſome occaſions, felt unjuſtly? and is it not the ſame caſe with joy and pleaſure?

PROT. No doubt can be made of it.

SOC. There is neither injuſtice, nor envy, in rejoicing at the evils which befall our enemies.

PROT. Certainly there is not.

SOC. But if at any time, when we ſee an evil happening to our friends, we feel no ſorrow,—if, on the contrary, we rejoice at it,—are we not guilty of injuſtice?

PROT. Without diſpute.

SOC. Did we not ſay that it was an evil to any perſon to be ignorant of himſelf?

PROT. We did, and juſtly too.

SOC. If there be in any of our friends a falſe conceit of their own wiſdom, or of their own beauty, or of whatever elſe we mentioned, when we divided ignorance of one's ſelf into three kinds, is not this conceit an object of ridicule, where it is attended with impotence and weakneſs; but an object

of hatred, if power and ſtrength [1] are joined with it? or do we deny, what I juſt now ſaid, that the having of ſuch a falſe opinion, if it be not hurtful to others, is an object of ridicule?

PROT. You ſaid what is entirely true.

SOC. And do we not acknowledge this falſe conceit to be an evil, as being built on ignorance?

PROT. Moſt heartily.

SOC. Whether do we feel delight or ſorrow when we laugh at it?

PROT. It is plain that we feel delight.

SOC. Did we not ſay, that whenever we feel delight from the evils which happen to our friends, it is envy which operates in us that unjuſt delight?

PROT. It muſt be envy.

SOC. Our reaſoning then ſhows, that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in a friend, mixing thus delight with envy, we mix together pleaſure and pain. For we acknowledged long ago that envy gives uneaſineſs and pain to the ſoul; and we have admitted, that laughing yields delight. Now in theſe caſes they ariſe, both of them, at the ſame time.

PROT. True.

SOC. We ſee, then, from the concluſion of our argument, that in mournful ſpectacles, and no leſs in comedies, not only as they are acted on the ſtage, but as they are preſented to us alſo in the tragedy and comedy of real life, and in a thouſand intermediate occurrences, pains and pleaſures are blended together.

PROT. It would be impoſſible, O Socrates, for a man not to acknowledge this, were he ever ſo zealous an advocate for the oppoſite ſide.

SOC. When we entered on the preſent ſubject, we propoſed to conſider anger, deſire and grief, fear and love, jealouſy and envy, and ſuch other paſſions of the ſoul; promiſing ourſelves to find in them thoſe mixed feelings which again and again we had been ſpeaking of: did we not?

PROT. We did.

SOC. Do we perceive that we have diſpatched already all which relates to grief, and envy, and anger?

[1] It is hoped that no future editor of Plato will be either ſo abſurd, or ſo careleſs, as to follow all the former editors in printing μη (inſtead of αν τ) ερρωμενα, in the Greek of this paſſage —S.

PROT.

PROT. We perceive it clearly.

SOC. But there is much yet remaining.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. For what reaſon, principally, do you ſuppoſe it was that I explained to you the mixed feeling which a comedy occaſions in us? Do you not conceive, that it was to ſhow myſelf able to explain to you with much more eaſe, the like mixture of pain and pleaſure in fear, in love, and in the other paſſions? and that after you had ſeen the truth of it in one inſtance, you might diſcharge me from the neceſſity of proceeding to the reſt, or of lengthening out the argument any further; but might receive it for a truth, without limitation or exception, that the body without the ſoul, and the ſoul without the body, and both together likewiſe, are, in many things, which affect them ſeverally or jointly, full of a ſenſe of pleaſures mingled with pains. Say, then, whether you will diſmiſs me, or make it midnight before we finiſh. But I imagine that, after I ſhall have added a few things more, I ſhall obtain from you my diſmiſſion: for I ſhall be ready to give you an account of all theſe things at large tomorrow; but at preſent am deſirous of proceeding to what remains on this ſubject; that we may come to a deciſion of the point in controverſy, as Philebus hath enjoined us.

PROT. You have well ſpoken, O Socrates; and as to what remains, go through with it in whatever way it is agreeable to yourſelf.

SOC. Well then: after the mixed pleaſures we are to proceed, by a kind of natural neceſſity, to the ſeveral pleaſures which are unmixed and pure.

PROT. Perfectly well ſaid.

SOC. The nature of theſe I ſhall endeavour to explain to you, by converting to my own uſe, with a little alteration, what is ſaid of them by others. For I do not entirely give credit to thoſe perſons who tell us, that all pleaſure conſiſts in a ceſſation from uneaſineſs and pain. But, as I ſaid before, I make uſe of theſe perſons as witneſſes, in confirmation of this truth,—that ſome things there are which ſeem to be pleaſures, but by no means are ſo in reality; and of this alſo,—that ſome other pleaſures there are, many and great in imagination, accompanied with pains, but at the ſame time with relief from greater pains, amid the diſtreſſes of the body and of the ſoul.

PROT. But what pleaſures are thoſe, O Socrates, which a man would deem rightly of, in ſuppoſing them to be true?

SOC.

Soc. The pleaſures[1] which are produced in us from ſeeing beauteous colours and beauteous figures; many pleaſures alſo of the ſmell, and many others ariſing in us from the hearing of ſounds; in a word, whatever pleaſures we feel from perceiving the preſence of any thing, whoſe abſence we are inſenſible of, or at leaſt occaſions no pain in us, all theſe are unmixed and pure.

Prot. How do you explain this general account, O Socrates?

Soc. The meaning of it, indeed, is not directly obvious: but we muſt endeavour to make it evident. I mean, then, by beauteous figures, not, as moſt men would ſuppoſe I meant, the beauty of living forms, or their ſtatues; but the ſtraight and the round, whether in ſurfaces[2], or in ſolids[3]; according to which are faſhioned the turner's works, and thoſe of the carpenter, by means of his rules and angles. For the figures which I mean, if you apprehend me, have no relative beauty, like thoſe other beauteous forms[4]; but in their own nature, ſeparately conſidered, are always abſolutely beautiful; and the beholding of them gives us certain peculiar pleaſures, not at all ſimilar to the pleaſures excited in us by any kind of motion. And as to colours, I mean ſuch as bear the like ſtamp of abſolute beauty[5], and yield alſo pleaſures of a peculiar nature. But do we apprehend theſe things? or what ſay we to them?

[1] Of pleaſures, ſays Olympiodorus, thoſe that excite a vehement agitation are ſuch as are attended with pain, but the energetic alone are ſuch as are beheld in a perfect animal when energizing. Again, of pure pleaſures, the corporeal are ſuch as the viſion of commenſurate light; thoſe pertaining to the ſoul are ſuch as reſult from the ſpeculation and apprehenſion of a certain intelligible; but thoſe which belong to both, viz. to body and ſoul, are ſuch as thoſe of health, in which the ſoul alſo rejoices; the pleaſure in this caſe beginning from the motion of the ſoul, but deſcending as far as to the body.—T.

[2] That is, rectilinear plane figures, ſuch as triangles, rectangles, and circles.—S.

[3] Such as pyramids and cubes, ſpheres, cylinders and cones.—S.

[4] The parts of every mathematical ſimple figure, whether it be right-lined or circular, are, all of them, ſimilar and commenſurable.—The beauty of figure in all animals, on the contrary, ariſes from the proportions of diſſimilar parts, meaſured, not by any common meaſure, but by the reſpective ends and uſes for which they are ſeverally deſigned by nature.—S.

[5] Such as the beautiful colours of many flowers; or as thoſe of a clear morning or evening ſky: not ſuch as the colour of a complexion, the tincture of a ſkin,—in the human ſpecies,—a colour belonging only to that ſpecies, and relatively agreeable, as it indicates health of body, and a purity of the blood and humours.—S.

Prot.

PROT. I endeavour, O Socrates, to comprehend your full meaning: but endeavour you yourſelf to explain thoroughly the whole of it.

SOC. As to ſounds, I mean ſuch as are ſmooth, clear, and canorous, conveying ſome pure and ſimple melody [1], without relation to any other ſounds, but ſingly of themſelves muſical: of ſuch I ſpeak, and of the connatural pleaſures which attend them.

PROT. That ſuch pleaſures alſo there are, I readily acknowledge.

SOC. The pleaſures felt by us from certain odours are, indeed, of a kind leſs divine than the pleaſures juſt now mentioned; but in reſpect of their being equally pure, and not, of neceſſity, mixed with pains, I rank them all under the ſame head. For in whatever pleaſures there happens to be found this quality of entire freedom from pain, all theſe I oppoſe to thoſe other pleaſures with which pain is complicated. Now, if you obſerve, we have already ſpoken of two different kinds of pleaſure.

PROT. I do obſerve.

SOC. To theſe let us now add the pleaſures taken in the mathematical ſciences; unleſs we are of opinion that ſuch pleaſures are of neceſſity preceded by a thirſt of learning them; and that, when taſted and enjoyed, they raiſe a thirſt of more and more; ſo that, from our beginning to learn them, they are all along attended with uneaſineſs.

PROT. I think that ſuch uneaſineſs is not at all neceſſary.

SOC. Well: but ſuppoſe that, having attained to full poſſeſſion of them, we happen afterwards to loſe ſome part through forgetfulneſs, do you ſee no uneaſineſs ariſing hence?

PROT. None at all from the nature of the thing itſelf: but when the knowledge is wanted to be applied to ſome uſe in human life, then a man is uneaſy at having loſt it, on account of its uſefulneſs.

SOC. And we are at preſent, my friend, actually concerned about thoſe feelings only which ariſe in us from the nature of the knowledge itſelf, without any regard to the uſefulneſs of it in computing or meaſuring.

PROT. You are right then in ſaying, that, in mathematical knowledge, a forgetfulneſs frequently befalls us, without giving us any uneaſineſs.

[1] Such is that of many ſpecies of birds, whoſe whiſtling is all monotonous. Such alſo is that of the Æolian harp, on which the vibrations are made ſolely by the air in motion.—S.

Soc. Theſe pleaſures, therefore, the pleaſures of ſcience, we muſt acknowledge to be unmixed with pains. But theſe pleaſures belong not to the vulgar multitude, being enjoyed only by a very few.

Prot. All this muſt certainly be acknowledged.

Soc. Now, then, that we have tolerably well diſtinguiſhed between the pure pleaſures and thoſe which are rightly called impure, let us further add theſe diſtinctions between them,—that the vehement pleaſures know not moderation nor meaſure; while thoſe of the gentler kind admit of meaſure, and are moderate: and that greatneſs and intenſeneſs, and the contrary qualities, the frequency alſo and the rareneſs of repetition, are attributes of ſuch pleaſures only as belong to the boundleſs genus,—to that which is perpetually varying in its quantities and motions through the body and through the ſoul,—while the pleaſures to which the like variations never happen, belong to the contrary genus, and are allied to all things wherein ſymmetry is found.

Prot. Perfectly right, O Socrates.

Soc. The pleaſures, beſide theſe aſſortments of them, are to be further diſtinguiſhed thus.

Prot. How?

Soc. We ſhould conſider whether the purity and the ſimplicity of pleaſures ſerve to diſcover what true pleaſure is: or whether the truth of pleaſures may beſt be known from their intenſeneſs, their multitude, their greatneſs and their abundance.

Prot. What is your view, Socrates, in propoſing this to be conſidered?

Soc. To omit nothing by which the nature of pleaſure, and that of knowledge, may be ſet in the cleareſt light; and not to leave it undiſcovered, whether or no ſome kinds of each of them are pure, while other kinds are impure; that thus, what is pure and ſimple in each being brought before us to be judged of, you and I, and all this company, may the more eaſily form a right judgment.

Prot. Very rightly ſaid.

Soc. Well then: all thoſe kinds of things which we commonly ſay are pure, let us conſider of in the following way: but firſt let us chooſe out ſome one among them for an inſtance to conſider of.

Prot. Which would you have us chooſe?

Soc.

Soc. Among the principal of thoſe kinds, let us, if you pleaſe, conſider the white kind of things.

Prot. By all means.

Soc. In what way, then, might we have any thing which is called white, with the moſt perfect and pure whiteneſs? whether by having the greateſt number of things which are white, and the largeſt of the kind in ſize, or by having what is white in the higheſt degree, and not tinged with the leaſt degree of any other colour?

Prot. Evidently, by having what is of the moſt ſimple and unmixed whiteneſs.

Soc. Rightly ſaid. Shall we not then determine that this pure white is the trueſt, and at the ſame time the moſt beautiful of all whites; and not that which is of the largeſt ſize, and whoſe number is the greateſt?

Prot. Moſt certainly we ſhall.

Soc. In pronouncing, then, that a little of purely white is whiter, and of a more beautiful and true whiteneſs, than a great quantity of the mixed white, we ſhall ſay what is entirely right.

Prot. Without the leaſt doubt.

Soc. Well then: I ſuppoſe we ſhall have no occaſion to produce many ſuch inſtances to prove the truth of our concluſion concerning pleaſure; the inſtance already brought ſeems ſufficient for us to perceive at once, that a little of pleaſure, pure, and free from pain, is more pleaſant, more true, and perfect, as well as more comely, than pleaſure where pain is mingled, be there ever ſo much of it, or be it ever ſo vaſt and vehement.

Prot. By all means: the inſtance you gave in whiteneſs, is an argument from analogy, ſufficient for the proof of it.

Soc. But what think you now of this? Have we not heard it ſaid concerning pleaſure, that it is a thing always in generation, always produced anew, and having no ſtability of being, cannot properly be ſaid to be at all? For ſome ingenious[1] perſons there are who endeavour to ſhow us, that ſuch

[1] In the Greek—κομψοι, *neat* and *trim*, that is, in their reaſonings and diſcourſes;—ſubtle arguers, or fine logicians;—a character which diſtinguiſhed the ſchool of Zeno the Eleatic. It will preſently be ſeen, that the perſons here ſpoken of philoſophized on the principles of the Eleatic ſect, and probably were ſome of the ſame Zeno's Athenian diſciples.—S.

is the nature of pleaſure; and we are much obliged to them for this their account of it.

PROT. Why ſo?

SOC. I ſhall recount to you the whole of their reaſoning on this point, my friend Protarchus, by putting a few queſtions to you.

PROT. Do ſo: and begin your queſtions.

SOC. Are there not in nature two very different kinds of things: this, in itſelf alone complete; that, deſirous always of the other?

PROT. How do you mean? and what things do you ſpeak of?

SOC. One of them is by nature always of high dignity and value; the other, falling far ſhort of it, and always indigent.

PROT. Expreſs yourſelf a little more clearly.

SOC. Have we not ſeen ſome of the fair ſex who excelled in beauty and in virtue? and have we not ſeen their lovers and admirers?

PROT. Often.

SOC. Analogous then to theſe two different ſorts of perſons, ſee if you cannot diſcover two different kinds of things, to one or other of which different kinds belongs every thing, commonly ſaid to have a being: the third be to the ſaviour[1].

PROT. Speak your meaning, O Socrates, in plainer terms.

SOC. I mean nothing, O Protarchus, but what is very ſimple and eaſy to be ſeen. But our preſent argument is pleaſed to ſport itſelf. However, it means no more than this,—that there is a kind of things which are always

[1] This whole ſentence in all the editions of the Greek is thus printed,—Τουτοις τοινυν εοικοτα δυοιν ουσι, δυ' αλλα ζητει, κατα παντα ὁσα λεγομεν ειναι το τριτον ἑτερῳ.—A ſentence quite unintelligible to us. Monſ. Grou very juſtly apprehends ſome error in the text. We preſume, that this ſenſible and elegant tranſlator never ſaw the emendation propoſed by Cornarius; for that, otherwiſe, he would have embraced it, and have made his verſion, as we have ours, agreeable to that emendation: which is no more than a change of the laſt word—ἑτερῳ into σωτηρι. The ſentence, thus amended, concludes with this proverbial ſaying,—*the third to the ſaviour.* It was a form of words antiently uſed at the feaſt of every victor in the Olympic games, when he made an accuſtomed libation out of the third cup or glaſs, Διι σωτηρι, *to Jupiter,* in his character of *ſaviour* in all difficulties and dangers. A ſpeech ſo well known to all the Greciaus, eaſily paſſed into a proverb: and it is alluded to as ſuch by Plato in his Charmides, in his Republic, and in his Seventh Epiſtle.—S.

for

for the ſake of ſome other; and there is alſo a kind of things for whoſe ſake always is produced whatever hath any final cauſe of its production.

PROT. I find it difficult to underſtand your meaning, after your many explanations of it.

SOC. Perhaps, young man, it will be underſtood better as we proceed in the reaſoning on this ſubject.

PROT. I make no doubt of it.

SOC. Let us now make another diviſion of things into two different kinds.

PROT. What kinds are they?

SOC. The generation [1] of all things is one kind of things; and the being of all is a different kind.

PROT. I admit your difference between being and generation.

SOC. You are perfectly in the right. Now, whether of theſe two is for the ſake of the other? Shall we ſay that generation is for the ſake of being? or ſhall we ſay that being is for the ſake of generation?

PROT. Whether or no that which is termed being, is what it is for the ſake of generation, is this your preſent queſtion?

SOC. Apparently it is.

PROT. In the name of the Gods, how can you aſk ſo ſtrange a queſtion?

SOC. My meaning in that queſtion, O Protarchus, is of ſuch a kind as this other;—whether you would chooſe to ſay that ſhip-building is for the ſake of ſhipping, rather than you would ſay that ſhipping is for the ſake of ſhip-building: and all other things of like kind, O Protarchus, I include in the queſtion which I aſk you.

PROT. But for what reaſon, O Socrates, do you not give an anſwer to it yourſelf?

SOC. I have no reaſon to refuſe that office; do you but go along with me in my anſwer.

PROT. Certainly I ſhall.

[1] *Eſſence* and *generation*, ſays Olympiodorus, are fourfold. For that which is ſenſible is generation, and the intelligible is eſſence. In a ſimilar manner, that which is ſubceleſtial is generation, and that which is celeſtial is eſſence. Further ſtill, in the third place, generation is a proceſſion to form, and form itſelf is eſſence. In the fourth place, mutation about a ſubject is generation, and the ſubject itſelf is eſſence; as, for inſtance, quality about body. But every where generation is for the ſake of eſſence: for eſſence is the cauſe of generation—T.

Soc. I ſay, then, that for the ſake of generation, it is true, that medicines are compoſed; the inſtrumental parts, prepared by nature, and all the materials of it, provided: but that every act of generation is for the ſake of ſome being; generation in every ſpecies, for the ſake of ſome being belonging to that ſpecies; and univerſally, all generation, for the ſake of univerſal being.

Prot. Moſt evidently ſo.

Soc. If pleaſure, then, be of ſuch a nature as to be generated always anew, muſt not the generating of it be always for the ſake only of ſome being?

Prot. Without doubt.

Soc. Now that, for the ſake of which is always generated whatever is generated for ſome end, muſt be in the rank of things which are good: and that which is generated for the ſake of any other thing, muſt of neceſſity, my friend, be placed in a different rank of things.

Prot. Certainly it muſt.

Soc. Shall we not be right, then, in placing pleaſure in a rank of things different from that of good; if it be true, that pleaſure has no ſtable being, but is always generated anew?

Prot. Perfectly right.

Soc. Therefore, as I ſaid in beginning this argumentation, we are much obliged to the perſons who have given us this account of pleaſure,—that the eſſence of it conſiſts in being always generated anew, but that never has it any kind of being. For it is plain, that theſe perſons would laugh at a man who aſſerted, that pleaſure and good were the ſame thing.

Prot. Certainly they would.

Soc. And theſe very perſons would certainly laugh at thoſe men, whereever they met with them, who place their chief good and end in generation.

Prot. How, and what ſort of men do you mean?

Soc. Such, as in freeing themſelves from hunger, or thirſt, or any of the uneaſineſſes from which they are freed by generation, are ſo highly delighted with the action of removing thoſe uneaſineſſes, as to declare they would not chooſe to live without ſuffering thirſt and hunger, nor without feeling all thoſe other ſenſations which may be ſaid to follow from ſuch kinds of uneaſineſs.

Prot. Such, indeed, there are, who ſeem to be of that opinion.

Soc. Would not all of us ſay that corruption was the contrary of generation?

Prot. It is impoſſible to think otherwiſe.

Soc. Whoever, then, makes ſuch a life his choice, muſt chooſe both corruption and generation, rather than that third kind of life, in which he might live with the cleareſt diſcernment of what is right and good, but without the feeling of either pain or pleaſure.

Prot. Much abſurdity, as it ſeems, O Socrates, is to be admitted by the man who holds that human good conſiſts wholly in pleaſure.

Soc. Much, indeed. For let us argue further thus.

Prot. How?

Soc. Since no good nor beauty is in bodies, nor in any other things beſide the ſoul; is it not abſurd to imagine, that in the ſoul pleaſure ſhould be the only good; and that neither fortitude, nor temperance, nor underſtanding, nor any of the other valuable attainments of the ſoul, ſhould be numbered among the good things which the ſoul enjoys? Further too, is it not highly irrational to ſuppoſe, that a man afflicted with pain, without feeling any pleaſure, ſhould be obliged to ſay that evil only, and no good, was with him at the time when he was in pain, though he were the beſt of all men? And is it not equally abſurd, on the other hand, to ſuppoſe that a man in the midſt of pleaſures muſt be, during that time, in the midſt of good; and that the more pleaſure he feels, the more good he is filled with, and is ſo much the better man?

Prot. All theſe ſuppoſitions, O Socrates, are abſurdities in the higheſt degree poſſible.

Soc. It is well. But now let us not employ ourſelves wholly in ſearching into the nature of pleaſure; as if we induſtriouſly declined the examination of intellect and ſcience; but in theſe alſo, if there be any thing putrid or unſound, let us have the courage to cut it all off, and throw it aſide; till, coming to a diſcovery of what is entirely pure and ſound therein, the diſcovery may be of uſe to us in comparing the trueſt parts of intellect and ſcience with the trueſt parts of pleaſure, and in forming our judgment concerning the ſuperiority of either from that compariſon.

Prot. Rightly ſaid.

Soc. Do we not hold, that mathematical ſcience is partly employed in

the ſervice of the mechanic arts, and partly in the liberal education and diſcipline of youth? or how think we on this ſubject?

PROT. Exactly ſo.

SOC. Now, as to the manual arts[1], let us conſider, in the firſt place, whether ſome of theſe depend not on ſcience more than others; and whether we ought not to look on thoſe of the former ſort as the more pure, and on theſe others as the more impure.

PROT. Certainly we ought.

SOC. And in each of theſe we ſhould diſtinguiſh and ſeparate the leading arts from the arts which are led and governed by them.

PROT. What arts do you call the leading arts? and why do you give that epithet to them?

SOC. I mean thus: from all the arts were a man to ſeparate and lay aſide thoſe of numbering, of meaſuring, and of weighing, what remained in every one of them, would become comparatively mean and contemptible.

PROT. Contemptible, indeed.

SOC. For room would be then left only for conjecture, and for exerciſe of the ſenſes, by experience and habitual practice; and we ſhould then make uſe of no other faculties beſide thoſe of gueſſing and aiming well, (to which, indeed, the multitude give the name of arts) increaſing the ſtrength of thoſe faculties by dint of aſſiduity and labour.

PROT. All which you have now ſaid muſt, of neceſſity, be true.

SOC. The truth of it is evident in all muſical performances throughout. For, in the firſt place, harmony is produced, and one ſound is adapted to another, not by meaſuring, but by that aiming well which ariſes from conſtant exerciſe. It is evident too in muſical performances on all wind-inſtruments: for in theſe the breath, by being well aimed as it is blown along, ſearches and attains the meaſure of every chord beaten. So that muſic has in it much of the uncertain, and but a little of the fixed and firm.

PROT. Very true.

SOC. And we ſhall find the caſe to be the ſame in the arts of medicine and agriculture, in the art of navigation alſo, and the military art.

[1] In the Greek of this paſſage it is preſumed that we ought to read χειροτεχνιαις, and not, as it is printed, χειροτεχνικαις,—and alſo to read εστι inſtead of ενι.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Moſt clearly ſo.

SOC. But in the art of building we ſhall find, as I preſume, many meaſures made uſe of, and many inſtruments employed; by which it is made to ſurpaſs in accuracy many things which are called ſciences.

PROT. How ſo?

SOC. It is ſo in ſhip-building, and houſe-building, and in many other works of carpentry. For in theſe, I think, the art uſeth the ſtraight-rule, and the ſquare, the turning-lath and the compaſſes, the plummet and the marking-line.

PROT. You are entirely right, O Socrates: it is ſo as you ſay.

SOC. The arts, therefore, as they are called, let us now diſtinguiſh into two ſorts;—thoſe which muſic is at the head of, as they are leſs accurate than ſome others; and theſe others which partake of accuracy the moſt, at the head of which is architecture.

PROT. This diſtinction is allowed of.

SOC. And let us ſet down thoſe arts for the moſt accurate which we lately ſaid were the prime or leading arts.

PROT. You mean, if I miſtake not, arithmetic, and thoſe other arts which you mentioned together with it but juſt now [1].

SOC. The very ſame. But, O Protarchus, muſt we not ſay that each of theſe arts is twofold? or how otherwiſe?

PROT. What arts do you ſpeak of?

SOC. Arithmetic, in the firſt place. Muſt we not ſay of this, that the arithmetic of the multitude is of one ſort, and that the arithmetic of thoſe who apply themſelves to philoſophy [2] is of another ſort?

PROT. What is the difference by which the one may be diſtinguiſhed from the other?

SOC. The difference between them, O Protarchus, is far from being inconſiderable. For the multitude in numbering, number by unequal ones put together; as two armies of unequal force; two oxen of unequal ſize; two things, the ſmalleſt of all,—or two, the greateſt,—being compared with others of the ſame kind. But the ſtudents in philoſophy would not under-

[1] Namely, *menſuration* and *ſtatics*.—S.

[2] Meaning the ſtudents in mathematics. For the ſtudy of the mathematical ſciences was deemed by Plato the beſt introduction to the knowledge of intelligible things.—S.

ſtand

ſtand what a man meant, who, in numbering, made any difference between ſome and other of the ones which compoſed the number.

PROT. You are perfectly right in ſaying that no inconſiderable difference lies in the different manner of ſtudying and uſing numbers; ſo as to make it probable that two different ſorts there are of arithmetic.

SOC. Well: and what of calculation in trade, and of menſuration in building? Does the latter of theſe arts not differ from mathematical geometry? nor the other from calculations made by the ſtudents in pure mathematics. Shall we ſay that they are, each of them, but one art? or ſhall we ſet down each of them for two?

PROT. For my part, I ſhould give my opinion agreeably to your diviſion of arithmetic; and ſhould ſay that each of theſe arts alſo was twofold.

SOC. You would give a right opinion. But with what deſign I brought theſe diſtinctions on the carpet do you conceive?

PROT. Perhaps I do. But I could wiſh that you yourſelf would declare what was your deſign.

SOC. Theſe diſtinctions ſeem to me to have ſhown to us, that in ſcience there is that very circumſtance attending it which we had before diſcovered to be in pleaſure; the one thus anſwering to the other. For, having found that ſome ſort of pleaſure was purer than ſome other ſort, we were inquiring whether the ſame difference was to be found with regard to ſcience; and whether one ſort of this alſo was purer than ſome other.

PROT. It is very manifeſt that your diſtinctions between the ſeveral arts were introduced for this very purpoſe.

SOC. Well then: have we not diſcovered, in what has been ſaid, that ſome arts are clearer than others, having more light within them; and that others are more involved in obſcurity and darkneſs?

PROT. Evidently ſo.

SOC. And has not the courſe of our argument led us to take notice of ſome art, bearing the ſame name with ſome other art; and firſt, to ſuppoſe them both to be, as they are commonly imagined, but one art; then, to conſider them as two different arts; to examine each with regard to its clearneſs and purity; and to inquire which of the two has in it the moſt accuracy, whether that which is cultivated by ſtudents in philoſophy, or that which is exerciſed by the multitude?

PROT.

PROT. Our argument ſeems to bring on this inquiry.

SOC. And what anſwer, O Protarchus, ſhould we make to ſuch a queſtion?

PROT. O Socrates, we are now advanced ſo far as to diſcover an amazingly wide difference between the parts of our knowledge in point of clearneſs.

SOC. It will, therefore, be the eaſier for us to anſwer to that queſtion.

PROT. Without doubt. And let us affirm, that thoſe leading arts greatly excel the others with regard to clearneſs; and that ſuch of thoſe brighter arts themſelves as are ſtudied by real ſtudents in philoſophy, diſplay, in meaſures and in numbers, their vaſt ſuperiority all other arts, with regard to accuracy and truth [1].

SOC. Granting theſe things to be what you ſay they are, let us, on the credit of what you have ſaid, boldly anſwer to thoſe perſons who are ſo formidable in argumentation, thus:

PROT. How?

SOC. That there are two ſorts of arithmetic; and that, dependant on theſe, there is a long train of arts, each of them, in like manner, twofold under one denomination.

PROT. Let us give to the perſons whom you call formidable that very anſwer, O Socrates, with a confidence of its being right.

SOC. Do we then affirm, that in theſe ſciences there is an accuracy the higheſt of all.

PROT. Certainly.

SOC. But the power of dialectic, O Protarchus, if we gave to any other ſcience the preference above her, would deny that ſuperiority.

PROT. What power is it to which we are to give that name?

SOC. Plainly that power, O Protarchus, by which the mind perceives all that accuracy and clearneſs of which we have been ſpeaking. For I am entirely of opinion, that all perſons, endued with even the ſmalleſt portion of underſtanding, muſt deem the knowledge of the real eſſence of things—the knowledge of that kind of being whoſe nature is invariable—to be by far the

[1] This whole ſentence, beginning with the words "and let us affirm," is, in Stephens's edition, very improperly given to Socrates; and conſequently the ſentence following, with equal impropriety, to Protarchus. The Baſil editions are both right; the Aldiné not clear.—S.

moſt certain and true knowledge. But you, Protarchus, to what art or ſcience would you give the diſtinction of pre-eminence?

PROT. As to me, O Socrates, I have often heard Gorgias maintaining in all places, that the art of perſuaſion has greatly the advantage over all other arts in overruling all things, and making all perſons ſubmit to it, not by conſtraint, but by a voluntary yielding; and therefore, that of all arts it is by far the moſt excellent. Now I ſhould not chooſe to contradict or oppoſe either you or him.

SOC. As much as to ſay, if I apprehend your meaning rightly, that you cannot for ſhame defert your colours.

PROT. Let your opinion of theſe matters now prevail; and the ranks of the ſeveral arts be ſettled as you would have them.

SOC. Am I now to blame for your making a miſtake?

PROT. What miſtake have I made?

SOC. The queſtion, my friend Protarchus, was not which art, or which ſcience, is ſuperior to all the reſt, with regard to greatneſs, and excellence, and uſefulneſs to us; but of which art the objects are the brighteſt, the moſt accurate, and true, though the art itſelf brought us little or no gain: this it is, which is the preſent ſubject of our inquiry. Obſerve, then, Gorgias will have no quarrel with you: for you may ſtill allow to his art the preference above all others, in point of utility and profit to mankind. But, as I ſaid before concerning white, that be there ever ſo little of it, ſo it be pure, it excels a large quantity of an impure white, with regard to the truth of whiteneſs; juſt ſo is it with the ſtudy which I have been commending; it excels all others with regard to truth itſelf. And now that we have conſidered this ſubject attentively, and diſcuſſed it ſufficiently, laying aſide all regards to the uſefulneſs of the ſciences and arts, as well as to the reputation which they bear in the world, and thoroughly ſifting them to find out the purity of intellect and wiſdom,—if there be in the ſoul any faculty of loving truth above all things, and of doing whatever ſhe does for the ſake of truth,—let us conſider whether it is right to ſay that we we have this faculty improved chiefly by dialectic, or whether we muſt ſearch for ſome other art fitter for that purpoſe, and making it more her proper buſineſs.

PROT. Well: I do conſider the point propoſed; and I imagine it no eaſy matter

matter to admit that any other ſcience or art ſeeks and embraces truth ſo much as this.

Soc. Say you this from having obſerved that many of the arts, even ſuch as profeſs a laborious inquiry after truth, are, in the firſt place, converſant only with opinions, and exerciſe only the imagination; and that methodically, and according to a ſet of rules, they then ſearch into things which are the ſubjects only of ſuch opinions[1]? and do you know, that the perſons who ſuppoſe themſelves to be inquiring into the nature of things are, all their lives, inquiſitive about nothing more than this outward world, how it was produced, what cauſeth the changes which happen therein, and how thoſe changes operate their effects? Should we acknowledge all this ſo to be, or how otherwiſe?

Prot. Juſt ſo.

Soc. Whoever of us then addicts himſelf to the ſtudy of nature in this way, employs his time and care, not about the things which always are in being, but about things which are either newly come into being, or which are to come, or which have been already, and are paſt.

Prot. Very true.

Soc. What clearneſs, therefore, what certainty, or exact truth, can we expect to find in theſe things, none of which had ever any ſtability or ſameneſs in them, nor ever will have any, nor have ſuch of them as now exiſt any, even during their exiſtence?

Prot. How can it be expected?

Soc. Concerning things in which there is not the leaſt ſtability, how can we form any ſtable notions?

Prot. I ſuppoſe it not poſſible.

Soc. Of thoſe things, then, there is neither intelligence, nor any ſort of

[1] Meaning, as we preſume, ſuch as the philoſophers of the Ionic ſect, by Ariſtotle ſtyled φυσικοι, *naturaliſts*. For we learn from D. Laertius that Archelaus, a diſciple of Anaxagoras, and the laſt profeſſor and teacher of the doctrine of thoſe philoſophers, did, in the time of Socrates, introduce into Athens their way of philoſophizing; which was none other than that ſpoken of in this paſſage. It ſeems therefore probable, that the Athenian ſcholars of Archelaus are the very perſons whoſe ſtudies are here ſhown to fall ſhort of attaining to the knowledge of truth, or the true nature of things. The ſame judgment of Socrates concerning theſe Ionic phyſiologers we find recorded by Xenophon in Memorabil. lib. i. cap. 1. ſec. 11.—S.

ſcience to be acquired; at leaſt not ſuch as contains the higheſt degree of certainty.

PROT. It is not probable that there is.

SOC. We ought, therefore, both you and I, to lay aſide the conſideration of what Gorgias or Philebus ſaid, and to eſtabliſh on a firmer baſis this truth.

PROT. What truth?

SOC. This:—Whatever is in us of ſtable, pure, and true, it has for the objects of it—either the beings which always are, and remain invariable, entirely pure and unadulterate; or [if theſe are beyond the reach of our ſight] then ſuch as are the neareſt allied to them, and are ſecond in the ranks of being: for all other things come after thoſe firſt beings; ſecond, and ſo on in order.

PROT. Perfectly right.

SOC. The nobleſt, therefore, of the names given to things of this kind, is it not perfectly right to aſſign to thoſe of this kind, which are the nobleſt?

PROT. It is reaſonable ſo to do.

SOC. Are not intellect and wiſdom the nobleſt of thoſe names?

PROT. They are.

SOC. Rightly then are theſe names in accurate ſpeech appropriated to the intelligence and contemplation of real being.

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. And the things for the excellency of which I at the firſt contended, are the very things to which we give theſe names.

PROT. Clearly are they, O Socrates.

SOC. Well now: were a man to ſay that the nature of intellect and the nature of pleaſure lay ſeverally before us, like two different ſorts of materials before ſome workman, for him to mix or join together, and from them, and in them, to compoſe his deſigned work,—would he not make a fair compariſon ſuitable to the taſk which our inquiry has engaged us in?

PROT. A very fair compariſon.

SOC. Should we not, then, in the next place, ſet about mixing them together?

PROT. Why ſhould we not?

SOC. Would it not be our beſt way to begin this work by recollecting and repeating thoſe things over again?

PROT.

PROT. What things?

SOC. Thoſe we have often mentioned before. For, I think, the proverb ſays well:—"Again and again that which is right, by repeating it, to recall into our minds."

PROT. Undoubtedly.

SOC. In the name of Jupiter, then, come on. The whole of our controverſy began, I think, with ſtating the point in queſtion, to this effect.

PROT. How?

SOC. Philebus affirms that pleaſure is the right mark ſet up by nature for all animals to aim at; that they all ought to purſue pleaſure; that the good of them all is this very thing, pleaſure; and that *good* and *pleaſant*, theſe two attributes, belong but to one ſubject, as they both have but one and the ſame nature: on the other hand, Socrates denies this to be true; and maintains, in the firſt place, that as the two names, *good* and *pleaſant*, are two different names, different alſo are the things ſo denominated; in the next place, that the nature of good differs from that of pleaſure; and that intelligence, or mind, partakes of the properties of good more than pleaſure does, and is allied nearer to its nature. Were not ſome ſuch poſitions as theſe, O Protarchus, ſeverally laid down by us?

PROT. They were.

SOC. But was not this point agreed on between us at that time, and do we not ſtill agree in it?

PROT. What point?

SOC. That the nature of good itſelf is more excellent than the nature of any other thing in this reſpect?

PROT. In what reſpect?

SOC. This: that whatever animal being hath the conſtant, entire, and full poſſeſſion of good itſelf, ſuch a being has no want of any thing beſide, having always a moſt perfect and complete ſufficiency. Is it not ſo?

PROT. It certainly is.

SOC. Have we not endeavoured to conſider ſeparately a life of pleaſure and a life of intellect, each unmixed with the other,—a life of pleaſure without intellect, and in like manner, a life of intellect without the ſmalleſt degree of pleaſure?

PROT. We have.

SOC.

Soc. Did either of thoſe lives appear to us at that time to be ſufficient for the happineſs of any man?

Prot. How was it poſſible?

Soc. But if at that time any miſtake was committed, let it be now reviſed and rectified. In order to which, let us take memory, ſcience, wiſdom, and right opinion, comprehending them all in one idea, and conſider whether any man, without having ſomething of that kind, would accept of pleaſure, were it offered to him, either in the greateſt abundance, or in the moſt exquiſite degree; whether, indeed, he would regard the having or the receiving of any thing whatever; as he would not, in that caſe, have a right thought or opinion of his having any pleaſure; neither would he know what he felt or had at preſent; nor would he remember in what condition or circumſtances he had been at any time before. In like manner concerning wiſdom, conſider, whether a man would chooſe to have it without a mixture of any pleaſure in the leaſt, rather than to have the ſame wiſdom attended with pleaſures of certain kinds; and whether a man would prefer the having of all poſſible pleaſures, without wiſdom, to the having of them accompanied with ſome portion of wiſdom.

Prot. It is impoſſible, O Socrates, for a man to make any ſuch choice as you have ſuppoſed. And there is no occaſion to repeat theſe queſtions again and again.

Soc. Not pleaſure, then, nor wiſdom, either of them alone, can be the perfect and conſummate good, eligible to all men, that which we are inquiring after.

Prot. Certainly not.

Soc. Of this good, then, we are to give a clear and full deſcription, or at leaſt ſome ſketch, that we may know where the ſecond prize of excellence, as we called it, ought to be beſtowed.

Prot. Perfectly right.

Soc. Have we not, then, taken a way by which we may find out our chief good?

Prot. What way do you mean?

Soc. As if we were in ſearch of any particular man, and were already well informed of the place of his abode, we ſhould have made a great progreſs toward finding the man himſelf.

Prot.

PROT. Without doubt.

SOC. And our reaſoning has now declared to us clearly, what it pointed to before, that, not in the unmixed life, but in the mixed, we are to ſeek for happineſs.

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. But in a proper and well-tempered mixture we may reaſonably hope to diſcover what we are in ſearch of with more certainty than we could by an ill-made compoſition.

PROT. With much more.

SOC. Let us, then, ſet about mixing and making the compoſition, firſt praying to the Gods for their aſſiſtance; whether it be Bacchus[1], or Vulcan, or ſome other of the Gods, who preſides over the mixture of theſe ingredients.

PROT. Let us, by all means, do ſo.

SOC. And now, as it were, two ciſterns, or vaſes, are ſet before us; the vaſe of pleaſure[2], as of honey; and the vaſe of intellect, cool and ſober, as of ſome hard and healthful water. Theſe, then, we are to mix together in the beſt manner we are able.

PROT. With all my heart.

SOC. Come, then: but firſt ſay, whether by mingling all pleaſure with all wiſdom we may beſt obtain our end, the having of a proper and due mixture.

[1] There are Gods, ſays Olympiodorus, that preſide over temperament; over the phyſical and mundane, Vulcan; but over the pſychical and ſupermundane, Bacchus. The mingling idiom, indeed, proceeds as far as to the laſt hyparxis. Thus, for inſtance, Vulcan being the leader of phyſical temperament, firſt produces this idiom in himſelf; afterwards, in the mundane intellect which preſides over nature; in the third place, in a ſoul of this kind, in a ſimilar manner; and laſtly, in the phyſical world according to hyparxis. In like manner, Bacchus unfolding in himſelf the principle of pſychical temperament after a divine manner, in the next place eſtabliſhes this in intellect intellectually, according to hyparxis in ſoul, and in a binding mode in the animated body. And ſtill higher than theſe, Jupiter is the principle of intellectual temperament. There are alſo other principles of temperament more partial than Bacchus and Vulcan. Plato mentions theſe two, as being about to mingle all the ſupermundane and mundane mixtures; but he omits the Jovian temperament, as being ſuperior to the things propoſed in this dialogue.—T.

[2] Pleaſure is compared to honey, ſays Olympiodorus, becauſe it poſſeſſes ſweetneſs and the ecſtatic. And hence the Pythagoric ſaying, that ſouls fall into generation through honey (διο και πυθαγορειος λογος, δια μελιτος πιπτειν εις γενεσιν τας ψυχας). But intellect is compared to water, becauſe it is ſober.—T.

PROT. Perhaps we might.

SOC. But it is dangerous to make the experiment. And I believe that I can point out a way to mix them with more ſafety.

PROT. Say what way.

SOC. Concerning pleaſures, I think, we held, that ſome more truly deſerved that name than others of them; and of arts, that ſome were more accurate and exact than others.

PROT. Undoubtedly ſo.

SOC. And that the ſciences alſo differed one from another in like manner: for that ſome kinds of ſcience have for their objects only ſuch things as ariſe into being and afterwards periſh; whereas another kind directs its view to things which are neither generated nor deſtroyed, but always are in being, always have the ſame properties, and preſerve always the ſame relations. And this kind of ſcience, with regard to the truth of it, we deemed more excellent than the other kinds.

PROT. Entirely right.

SOC. In the firſt place, therefore, mixing together the pureſt parts of pleaſure and of wiſdom, when they have been thus diſtinguiſhed from the leſs pure, if we view thoſe pureſt parts of each in combination, are they not, thus combined, ſufficient to furniſh out, and preſent us with, an ample view of that life which is deſirable? or is any thing further, any ingredient of a different kind, wanting to perfect the compoſition?

PROT. So as you propoſe, and only ſo, it ſeems to me neceſſary for us to do.

SOC. Let us, then, ſuppoſe a man to have in his mind the idea of juſtice itſelf, ſo as to know what it is in its own eſſence, and to be able to give an account of it in conſequence of that knowledge. Let us alſo ſuppoſe him to have the like knowledge of all other beings.

PROT. Be ſuch a man ſuppoſed.

SOC. Will this man now ſufficiently poſſeſs ſcience by knowing the nature of the circle, and of the divine ſphere itſelf; whilſt he is ignorant of that ſphere, and of thoſe circles with which the eyes of men are converſant? Will that knowledge of his be ſufficient for his uſe in building, and in other arts where lines and circles are to be drawn?

PROT. Ridiculous we ſhould call our condition here, O Socrates, if our knowledge were thus confined to things ideal and divine.

Soc. How do you ſay? Arts which are neither certain nor pure, uſing untrue rules, and converſant with untrue circles, are we to throw ſuch arts into the compoſition, and mix them with the other ingredients?

Prot. It is neceſſary for us; if, whenever we are any where abroad, we are deſirous of finding our way home.

Soc. Are we to add muſic too?—an art which, not long ſince we ſaid, is wanting in purity, as being full of conjecture and imitation?

Prot. Of neceſſity we muſt, as it appears to me, if the life which we are to lead ſhall ever deſerve to be called life, or be at all worth the having.

Soc. Would you, then, like a door-keeper, when he is puſhed and preſſed by a throng of people, yield to them, ſet the doors wide open, and ſuffer all the ſciences to ruſh in, the leſs pure mingling themſelves among the perfectly pure?

Prot. I ſee not, O Socrates, for my part, how any man would be hurt by receiving all the other ſciences, if he was already in poſſeſſion of the firſt and higheſt.

Soc. I may ſafely then admit them all to come pouring in, like the torrents of water in that fine poetical ſimile of Homer's [1], ruſhing down into a valley from the mountains which ſurround it.

Prot. By all means, let them be all admitted.

Soc. Let us now return to the vaſe of pleaſure. For when we thought of mixing pleaſure and knowledge together, the purer parts of pleaſure did not preſent themſelves immediately to our minds: but, from our affectionate regard to ſcience, we ſuffered all kinds of it to crowd in before any of the pleaſures.

Prot. Very true.

Soc. It is now time for us to conſult about the pleaſures; whether we ſhould let them all come thronging in, or whether we ſhould admit thoſe of the true ſort firſt.

Prot. It makes a great difference in point of ſafety, to let in, the firſt, ſuch only as are true.

Soc. Let theſe, then, be admitted. But how ſhall we proceed? Muſt we not do, as we did with the ſeveral kinds of ſcience, admit as many pleaſures alſo as are of the neceſſary ſort?

[1] Iliad, lib. iv. ver. 453.

PROT. Without doubt, the neceſſary pleaſures alſo, by all means.

SOC. But now, as we held it both ſafe and advantageous in going through life to be acquainted with every art,—if we are of the ſame opinion with regard to pleaſures,—if we hold it conducive to our good, and at the ſame time harmleſs, to enjoy every ſort of pleaſure in the courſe of our lives,—in this caſe, we are to intermix all ſorts of pleaſure with all the kinds of ſcience.

PROT. What ſay we then as to this point? and how ought we to act?

SOC. This queſtion, O Protarchus, ſhould not be put to us. But the pleaſures themſelves, and the other aſſembly alſo, that of the ſciences and arts, are to be examined, each party concerning the other, in this manner.

PROT. In what manner?

SOC. Friends, we ſhall ſay, [*addreſſing our queſtion to the pleaſures firſt*] whether we ought to call you pleaſures, or whatever is your right name, would ye chooſe to live in the ſame place with all kinds of wiſdom, or to live without wiſdom? To this interrogatory they muſt, I think, anſwer thus:

PROT. How?

SOC. That ſeeing, as was ſaid before, were wiſdom and pleaſure to be left, each of them, alone, ſingle, and deſtitute of aid, neither of them would have any virtue or power at all, nor would any advantage ariſe from either,—we deem it beſt that all the kinds of wiſdom ſhould dwell with us, one kind of wiſdom with each of us, one who is ſuitable to the peculiar nature of its companion, and is perfectly acquainted with her power and influence.

PROT. And well have ye now anſwered, we ſhall ſay to them.

SOC. After this, we are to demand of wiſdom and intellect, in the ſame manner, thus:—Have ye any occaſion for pleaſures to be mixed among you? On the other ſide, we may ſuppoſe wiſdom and intellect to interrogate us; and what ſort of pleaſures, they would perhaps ſay, is it that ye mean?

PROT. Probably they would.

SOC. And to this queſtion of theirs our anſwer would be this:—Beſide thoſe true pleaſures, we ſhould ſay, do ye further want the pleaſures of the intenſe and exquiſite kind to dwell with you? How is it poſſible, O Socrates, they would then perhaps ſay, that we ſhould want theſe? Theſe, who give a thouſand hindrances to all our proceedings; and who, by their fury and madneſs, are always creating diſturbance in the ſouls where we dwell;—theſe, who had they been there firſt, would never have ſuffered us

to

to have admittance; and who entirely ſpoil our children, there born, by letting forgetfulneſs in upon them, for want of care to guard the dwelling-place. But the other pleaſures mentioned by you, the true and the pure, you are to know that they are nearly related to us, and belong to our family: and beſide theſe, the pleaſures who are accompanied by health and ſobriety; ſuch, alſo, as are the followers of all virtue, like the train of ſome Goddeſs, every where attending her; let all of theſe come and mix amongſt us. But thoſe pleaſures who are always found in company with folly, and with all kinds of vice, it is very abſurd for a man to mingle with intellect,—if he deſires to ſee a mixture as clear, untroubled, and well-attempered as poſſible to be made;—and if he would from thence try to diſcover what the nature is of good, not only in man, but alſo in the univerſe; from which diſcovery ſome notion is to be gained, by a ſort of divination, of what the idea is of good itſelf. Shall we not ſay that intellect and ſcience, in thus anſwering, have ſpoken prudently and conſiſtently with themſelves, pleading in their own cauſe, and at the ſame time in behalf of memory and right opinion?

PROT. By all means ought we.

SOC. But in our mixture it is neceſſary to add this alſo; for without it no one thing could ever be.

PROT. What is that?

SOC. Whatever has not truth mixed with it in the compoſing of it, can never be produced into true exiſtence; or, could it be produced, it never can be laſting.

PROT. How is it poſſible that it ſhould?

SOC. Certainly no way. Now if any thing further be yet wanting to perfect our compoſition, declare it, you and Philebus. For the mixture which we have now made in ſpeculation, appears to me to have been as perfectly well compoſed as if it were ſome incorporeal world meant for the good government of an animated body.

PROT. And be aſſured, O Socrates, that to me it has had the ſame appearance.

SOC. Might we not, then, rightly ſay, that we were now arrived at the dwelling-place of the good, and were ſtanding in its veſtibules?

PROT. I think we might.

SOC. And now what ſhould we deem to be the greateſt excellence in the

compoſition, and to be alſo the chief cauſe that ſuch a mixture muſt be grateful to all? For when we ſhall have diſcerned what this is which is ſo grateful and ſo excellent, we ſhall then conſider to which of the two, to pleaſure or to intellect, it is related the moſt nearly, and familiar the moſt intimately, in the conſtitution of the univerſe.

PROT. Right: it will be of the greateſt ſervice to us in determining this point.

SOC. And there is, indeed, no difficulty in diſcovering the cauſe, why ſome mixtures are moſt valuable, and others good for nothing.

PROT. Explain your meaning.

SOC. No perſon is ignorant of this.

PROT. Of what?

SOC. That in every mixture, whatever it be, and whatever be the quantity of it[1], if meaſure pervades it not, and if thence it obtains not ſymmetry and proportion, all the ingredients muſt of neceſſity be ſpoiled, beſides the ſpoiling of the whole compoſition. For, in ſuch a caſe, no one thing is really tempered by any other thing; but a confuſed and diſorderly aſſemblage is made of various things jumbled together; which, like a concurrence of bad accidents in life, is a real misfortune to the perſons who are to uſe it.

PROT. It is very true.

SOC. The power of the good then is transferred, we find, into that province where dwells the nature of the beautiful. For every where, from meaſure and mediocrity, and from ſymmetry and proportion, ariſe beauty and virtue.

PROT. Certainly ſo.

SOC. And we ſaid before that truth alſo was an ingredient in the compoſition.

PROT. We did.

SOC. If, then, we are not able to diſcover the nature of good itſelf in one ſingle idea,—yet, taking it in three ideas together, in beauty, ſymmetry, and

[1] In all the editions of the Greek we here read—ὁπωσοῦν, *however it be made.* But this is contradictory to the meaning of the ſentence; for the meaning is this,—that "every right and good mixture muſt be made *in one certain manner only*, viz. by *meaſure.*"—We may fairly therefore preſume, that Plato wrote, not ὁπωσοῦν, but ὁποσαοῦν, (or, by eliſion, ὁποσοῦν,) with a view to the magnitude of the univerſe.—S.

truth,

truth[1], we may conceive it as one thing; and moſt juſtly attributing to it the cauſe of whatever is graceful or agreeable in the compoſition, we may moſt truly ſay, that by means of this, as being good itſelf, the whole proves to be ſuch as it is, thus agreeable, and thus graceful.

PROT. Moſt truly, indeed.

SOC. Now then, O Protarchus, any perſon may be a competent judge between pleaſure and wiſdom to decide, whether of the two is neareſt allied

[1] The one principle of all things, ſays Olympiodorus, preſides over every thing, according to that which he is. Hence, the light proceeding from him is truth, and ſubſiſts as the object of deſire to all things. On this account, too, this light is the firſt beauty, the cauſe of things beautiful, bounding every thing in its proper meaſure; and hence it is celebrated as meaſure. Again, the one principle is not a contracted comprehenſion of the three monads, beauty, ſymmetry, and truth: for it is the cauſe of all things. But that which is mixed is the contraction of all things, as the end, and not as the contraction of eſſences; ſo that the one principle may be more juſtly denominated the end of ends. Again, the three monads ſubſiſt arcanely in the firſt principle; unically, and according to one, in bound; multiformly, and as it were according to the parturition of ſeparation, in infinity; but according to the firſt ſeparation, though not perfectly divided, nor yet intellectually, in the third God, who is the cauſe of the mixed, ſo far as it is mixed. Again, *the good* is analogous to truth: for the good to every thing is to be that which it in reality is; but the juſt is analogous to ſymmetry. For this is the meaſure of that which pertains to every thing, in the ſame manner as the commenſurate. Further ſtill, Jamblichus ſays, that the three monads proceeding from *the good* adorn intellect; but it is immaniſeſt what intellect, whether that which ſubſiſts after life, or the paternal intellect which is celebrated in eſſence. Beſides, in the Orphic writings, theſe three monads become apparent in the mythological egg. The followers of Syrianus, however, make a diviſion, and ſurvey truth in the *firſt being*, as being perfectly replete with that which it is, and in no reſpect admitting in itſelf non-being. But they ſurvey beauty in *life*, as being prolific, and rejoicing in progreſſions. For, after that which is perfectly without ſeparation, life introduces a parturition, as it were, of ſeparation. And they contemplate ſymmetry in *intellect*, becauſe in this forms are firſt ſeparated and harmoniouſly coordinated. You may alſo divide them into the principles after the one principle of all things. For you may juſtly aſcribe *truth* to *bound*; *beauty* to *infinity*, through its progreſſion; and *ſymmetry* to *that which is mixed*.

Proclus, in Theol. Plat. p. 140, obſerves, "that Jamblichus appears to him to have bounded the intelligible in theſe three monads, ſymmetry, truth, and beauty; and through theſe to have unfolded the intelligible Gods in the Platonic theology." He adds, "it is alſo apparent why Socrates ſpeaks of this triad as ſubſiſting in the veſtibules of *the good*. (See p. 563). For that which is primarily being, in conſequence of its union with *the good*, participates of this triad. Hence, becauſe *the good* is the meaſure of all things, the firſt being is commenſurate. Becauſe *the good* is prior to being, the firſt being truly ſubſiſts. And becauſe the former is deſirable, the latter ſhines forth as the beautiful itſelf."—T.

to the ſupreme good, and of higher value than the other is, both to men and Gods.

PROT. What the deciſion muſt be is clear. However, it is the better way to go through the recital of it in explicit words.

SOC. Each of thoſe three, then, let us compare, ſeverally, with pleaſure, and again with intellect. For we are to ſee and determine whether of theſe two it is that each of thoſe three is moſt congenial to, and to give ſentence accordingly.

PROT. Do you ſpeak of beauty, and truth, and mediocrity?

SOC. I do. Now take, in the firſt place, O Protarchus, truth; and look at all the three together, intellect, truth, and pleaſure: and after you have conſidered them a ſufficient time, ſay whether, in your opinion, intellect, or whether pleaſure, is nearer of kin to truth.

PROT. What need is there of time to conſider of this point? for, I preſume, that very great is the difference between intellect and pleaſure in this reſpect. Of all things in the world, pleaſure is the moſt addicted to lying: and it is ſaid, that in the pleaſures of Venus, which ſeem to be the greateſt, even perjury is pardoned by the Gods; it being ſuppoſed that pleaſures, like children, have not the leaſt intellect in them to know what they ſay. But intellect is either the ſame thing with truth, or it is of all things the moſt like to it, and the trueſt.

SOC. Next, then, conſider mediocrity in the ſame manner[1]; and ſay whether you think that pleaſure poſſeſſes more of it than wiſdom, or that wiſdom poſſeſſes more of it than pleaſure.

PROT. This which you have now propoſed for a ſubject of conſideration is not leſs eaſy than the other. For there cannot, in my opinion, be found any thing more immoderate in its nature than pleaſure and extravagant joy; nor any thing which has more of meaſure in it than intellect and ſcience.

SOC. You have well ſaid. But proceed further now to the third. Do you ſay that intellect partakes of beauty more than any ſpecies of pleaſure partakes of it? and that intellect is more excellent than pleaſure in this reſpect? or that the contrary is true?

[1] Cornarius, and Stephens after him, rightly obſerve, that in the Greek of this ſentence we ought to read ὡσαυτως, and not, as it is printed, ὡς ὀυτως.—S.

PROT.

PROT. Did ever any man then, O Socrates, whether awake or dreaming, ſee or imagine wiſdom and intellect to be in any matter, or in any manner, unhandſome or unbecoming, whether in reflecting on the paſt, or in perceiving the preſent, or in looking forward to the future?

SOC. Right.

PROT. But whenever we ſee any perſon immerſed in pleaſures, in thoſe pleaſures too which are of all perhaps the greateſt,—when we behold what a ridiculous figure the man makes in the very act of enjoying them,—or view what is of all ſpectacles the moſt unſeemly, the conſequence of his enjoyment,—we ourſelves are aſhamed; and all ſuch things, as far as poſſible, we conceal, veiling them with night and darkneſs, as not being fit objects for the light to look on.

SOC. Every where then, O Protarchus, you will declare, ſpeaking yourſelf to all perſons about you, and publiſhing abroad by meſſengers, that the poſſeſſion of pleaſure is neither of ſupreme nor of ſecondary worth: but that whatevever is of all things the moſt excellent and valuable, is to be found in meaſure, in the moderate, and the ſeaſonable, and in all things[1] of that kind, whoſe nature and eſſence we ought to deem eternal.

PROT. Their ſupreme excellence appears from what has been ſaid and proved.

SOC. And that the next in value are ſymmetry and beauty, the perfect and the ſufficient, and whatever elſe is congenial to theſe.

PROT. So it ſeems.

SOC. In the third degree of excellence, if I divine aright, you would not greatly miſtake the truth if you were to place intellect and wiſdom.

PROT. Perhaps I ſhould not.

SOC. And is not the fourth rank due to thoſe things which we aſſigned to the ſoul herſelf, as her own proper goods, ſciences, and arts, and right opinions, a fourth order of goods, following next after the firſt three? ought we

[1] Monſ. Grou has obſerved, very juſtly, that the word εἰρησθαι, in the latter part of this ſentence, is an error in the text: and inſtead of it, he propoſes the word ἥρησθαι. Grynæus, the corrector of Ficinus's tranſlation of Plato, ſeems, in his rendering the Greek word in this place into Latin by the words *ſortita eſſe*, (*to have obtained an allotment of*,) either to have read εἰληχθαι in ſome manuſcript, or elſe to have thus amended the text by a happy conjecture of his own.—S.

not here to place them, if they are more nearly related to the good than they are to pleaſure?

PROT. Perhaps we ought.

SOC. Then follow, fifth in order, the pleaſures of that ſort which we deſcribed to be unmixed with pain, and denominated pure, ſuch as thoſe conſequent to ſenſation, but belonging to the ſoul herſelf when ſhe is engaged in the ſciences [1].

PROT. It may be ſo.

SOC.

With the fixth race———(ſays Orpheus)
Cloſe we the finiſh'd ſeries of our ſong [2].

Our diſquiſition, too, ſeems to be now finiſhed, and to cloſe with paſſing our ſixth ſentence. After all this, nothing remains for us to do but to affix a head, as it were, to the whole body of our inquiry.

PROT. It is fit that we ſhould.

SOC. Come, then: the third to the ſaviour. Let us commemorate him whoſe aid brought the argument to a concluſion; calling him to witneſs the truth of it.

PROT. Whom do you mean?

SOC. Philebus laid down this poſition: that the good was all and every kind of pleaſure in full abundance.

PROT. By commemorating the ſaviour, it ſeems then, Socrates, you meant that we ſhould reſume the original argument of our inquiry.

SOC. Well: but let us obſerve what followed. I, viewing with diſlike that poſition juſt now mentioned,—the tenet, not of Philebus only, but of

[1] In the Greek of this ſentence, the word επιστημας ought to be either quite expunged, or changed for the word ηδονας, or immediately preceded by the prepoſition περι. The pureſt pleaſures, thoſe of ſcience, are certainly not ſciences themſelves.—S.

[2] This verſe of Orpheus we meet with again in Plutarch's Treatiſe concerning the Delphic Inſcription Ει, and in no other antient author whom we are acquainted with. It is introduced by Plutarch no otherwiſe than as a part of the preſent paſſage in Plato, which is there quoted; and not ſo as to give us any light into the poet's own meaning in that verſe. But if we may form a probable conjecture from Plato's application of it, it was the end of a deſcription of five different ages of the world, with regard to men's manners and ways of life.—S.

thouſands

thouſands beſide in all ages,—on the other hand aſſerted, that intellect was a thing far better and more beneficial to human life than pleaſure.

PROT. That was your poſition.

SOC. But then, ſuſpecting that many other things had pretenſions to the ſame character of being the good, I engaged, if ſomething[1] ſhould appear better than both of thoſe, to combat for the ſecond prize, in behalf of intellect againſt pleaſure; that pleaſure, in her claim to ſo much as this, might be defeated.

PROT. You did engage ſo to do.

SOC. Afterwards, on trial, it was very ſufficiently proved that neither of our favourites anſwered the character of complete good.

PROT. Perfectly true.

SOC. Intellect, therefore, and pleaſure, were, both of them, quite diſmiſſed from having any thing to do in the controverſy concerning good itſelf; as each of them wanted ſelf-ſufficience, and that power which attends the ſufficient and perfect.

PROT. Very right.

SOC. But after we had diſcovered a third thing preferable to either of thoſe two, we found the nature of intellect to approach nearer to the nature of this conqueror, and to be much more familiar with this form than pleaſure.

PROT. We certainly did.

SOC. The ſixth[2] *and loweſt* place, then, according to the judgment now given as the reſult of this inquiry, belongs to the power of pleaſure *unbounded*.

PROT. So it appears.

[1] All the editions of Plato give us to read το inſtead of τι in this ſentence. Ficinus, however, tranſlates as if in the Medicean manuſcript he read τι, which undoubtedly is the true reading; and herein he is followed by all the tranſlators who came after him.—S.

[2] A very groſs error has infected all the editions and all the tranſlations of Plato in this place. For in all the editions we read πεμπτον the *fifth*, inſtead of εκτον the *ſixth*. Now the *fifth* rank was before aſſigned ſolely to the *pure* pleaſures. The *ſixth* and laſt rank, therefore, remains to *Pleaſure*, one of the three great ſubjects of this dialogue; to *pleaſure*, pretending to be the only or the chief good of man, and by Philebus avowed and contended for as ſuch; *pleaſure in general* and undiſtinguiſhed; *pleaſure at random*, from whatever quarter it comes;—in Plato's own words, vol. ii, p. 40, edit. Steph. παραπαν, οπωστουν, και εικη χαιρειν. But the very next ſentence of Socrates puts it beyond all doubt, that pleaſure of ſenſe, *ſenſual pleaſure*, is here meant.—S.

Soc. But the firſt place belongs to her, as bulls [1] would ſay, and horſes [2], and all beaſts whatever of the ſavage kind: for it appears ſo from the manner in which they purſue pleaſure. And on the credit of theſe animals, juſt as the judgment of diviners depends on the flight of birds, ſentence is pronounced by the multitude, that pleaſures have the greateſt power in making our lives happy. For the loves and joys of brute animals they deem a ſtronger evidence, and fitter to be credited, than the ſayings of men prophetically uttered in all places though inſpiration of the philoſophic muſe.

Prot. That you have ſaid what is moſt agreeable to truth, O Socrates, we are, all of us, now agreed.

Soc. Now then ye will diſmiſs me.

Prot. There is a little, O Socrates, ſtill remaining to be conſidered. For you muſt not quit the company before it breaks up: and I will put you in mind of what you have left unſaid. [3]

[1] In the Greek of this ſentence, we preſume that the word ουκ ought to be changed into ως.—S.

[2] Porphyry, in his Treatiſe περι αποχης εμψυχων, lib. iii. ſec. 1. writes thus: Σωκρατης προς τους ηδονην διαμφισβητουντας ειναι το τελος, ουδ' αν παντες, εφη, συες και τραγοι τουτω συναινοιεν, πεισθησεσθαι αν εν τωη δεσθαι το ευδαιμον ημων κεισθαι, εστ' αν νους εν τοις πασι κρατη. "To certain perſons who were diſputing on this point,—whether pleaſure was the ultimate end *of man*, Socrates ſaid that, were all the ſwine and goats in the world to join in applauding this man, (*the advocate for pleaſure*) yet he ſhould never be perſuaded that human happineſs conſiſted in being pleaſed, ſo long as mind excelled and prevailed in all things." If Porphyry in this alluded to the very emphatical paſſage in Plato now before us, he ſeems to have improved the force of it not a little; unleſs, in his copy of this dialogue, he read συες και τραγοι inſtead of βοες και ιπωοι.—S.

[3] This dialogue both begins and ends abruptly. Hence Olympiodorus aſks, why it is without a beginning and an end? And he ſolves this queſtion very properly as follows: "Shall we ſay that this is becauſe *the good* is uncircumſcribed, and has neither beginning nor end? But it may be ſaid, that on the contrary it is neceſſary *the good* ſhould have a beginning and end; a beginning of ſuch a kind, that there is not another beginning prior to it, and an end beyond which there is not any other end. Perhaps therefore, it is better to ſay with our preceptor, that the mixt life has an end, and ſuch a one as is adapted to all animals. So that the dialogue is very properly without a beginning, for the purpoſe of indicating that there is a certain good beyond that which it inveſtigates. And again, for the ſame reaſon, it is without an end: for there is alſo another end more antient than its end."

THE END OF THE PHILEBUS.

THE