THE POLITICUS:

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

A KINGDOM.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE POLITICUS.

As there is one end for which nature, or rather the author of nature, produced the parts of the human body, and another for which he formed the whole man, ſo likewiſe he directed an individual of the human ſpecies to one end, a family to another, and again a city and kingdom to another. And laſtly, that is to be conſidered as the beſt end, for the ſake of which he produced the whole human race. Let no one however think, that though there is a certain end of every partial aſſociation among mankind, yet there is none of the whole; and that though there is order in the parts of human life, yet there is confuſion in the whole; or, in ſhort, that though the parts poſſeſs union from being directed to one end, yet the whole is diſperſed and unconnected: for, if this were admitted, parts would be more honourable than the whole; though the former ſubſiſt for the ſake of the latter, and not the latter for the ſake of the former. Hence it is neceſſary that there ſhould be a certain end of the human race, and that it ſhould conſiſt in thoſe energies through which it may imitate as much as poſſible things ſupernal; by ſcience ſpeculating things natural, human and divine; by prudence properly managing human affairs; and by piety cultivating and venerating divinity. An end, therefore, of this kind requires a twofold life, conſiſting both in action and contemplation, yet ſo conſtituted as that action may ſubſiſt for the ſake of contemplation, as that which is more excellent and divine.

Plato in this dialogue demonſtrates that this end can alone be obtained by the human race, under the government of a king who poſſeſſes conſummate probity and ſcience. Hence employing a moſt accurate diviſion which is

eſſentially neceſſary to definition and ſcience, and in which Plato and his genuine diſciples excelled in a tranſcendent degree, he Homerically denominates a king the ſhepherd and curator of the human race. This king, too, he compares to a phyſician; ſince ſuch a one, by impoſing laws both on the willing and the unwilling, procures ſalutary remedies for his ſubjects. But he more frequently calls a governor and curator of this kind, a politician than a king, ſignifying by this that he will be ſo humane and mild, that among the citizens he will appear to be a fellow-citizen, and will evince that he is rather ſuperior to them in juſtice, prudence and ſcience, than in any other endowments. He likewiſe aſſerts, that the man who far ſurpaſſes all others in juſtice and prudence is born a king, though he ſhould live the life of a private individual: and it may be collected from his other dialogues as his opinion, that royal authority ſhould be given to the older and more worthy, a ſenate of whom ſhould be the colleagues of the king, forming, as it were, a certain ariſtocracy, or government of the moſt excellent men. As he proves too in this dialogue that a royal ſurpaſſes every other form of government, he likewiſe ſhows that a tyranny is the worſt kind of dominion, ſince it governs neither by law nor intellect, but by unreſtrained impulſe and arbitrary will. As the next in excellence to a royal government, he praiſes an ariſtocracy, but reprobates an oligarchy, or the government of a few: and he conſiders a popular government as deſerving praiſe in the third degree, if it governs according to law. After this he diſcuſſes the duty of a king, and ſhows that it conſiſts in providing ſuch things as are neceſſary for the human race, and eſpecially ſuch as contribute to its felicity, in prudently judging what arts are ſubſervient to this end in peace and war, in public and private conduct; and in exerciſing ſovereign authority in conjunction with the ſenate.

With reſpect to what he ſays of the motion of the ſpheres and the kingdoms of Saturn and Jupiter, the myſtic meaning of this fabulous narration will be unfolded in the notes on this dialogue.

THE

THE POLITICUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, THEODORUS, A GUEST, And SOCRATES Jun.

SOCRATES.

I AM greatly indebted to you, Theodorus, for making me acquainted with Theætetus and this gueſt.

THEO. Perhaps, Socrates, you will be indebted to me the triple of this, after theſe men have made you a politician and a philoſopher.

SOC. Be it ſo. But ſhall we ſay we have heard this of you, who are moſt ſkilful in reaſoning, and in things pertaining to geometry?

THEO. What is that, Socrates?

SOC. That we ſhould conſider each of theſe men as of equal worth, though they are more remote from each other in honour than accords with the analogy of your art.

THEO. By our God Ammon, Socrates, you have properly, juſtly, and promptly reproved me for my error in computation! But I ſhall ſpeak with you about this at ſome other time. But do not you, O gueſt, in any reſpect be weary in gratifying us, but diſcuſs for us, in order, either a politician firſt, or, if it is more agreeable to you, a philoſopher.

GUEST. We ſhall do ſo, Theodorus, as ſoon as we attempt this diſcuſſion, nor ſhall we deſiſt till we arrive at the end of it. But what ought I to do reſpecting Theætetus here?

THEO. About what?

GUEST. Shall we ſuffer him to reſt, and take in his ſtead Socrates here, as our aſſociate in the diſcuſſion? Or how do you adviſe?

THEO. As you ſay, take Socrates in his ſtead: for, both being young men, they will eaſily by reſting be able to endure every kind of labour.

SOC. And indeed, O gueſt, both of them appear to be allied to me in a certain reſpect. For you ſay that one of them (Theætetus) appears to reſemble me in the formation of his face; and the other poſſeſſes a certain alliance, through having the ſame name as myſelf. But it is requiſite that we who are allied ſhould always readily recognize this alliance by diſcourſe. With Theætetus, therefore, I yeſterday joined in diſcourſe, and to-day I have heard him anſwering this gueſt: but neither of them has yet diſcourſed with Socrates here. It is, however, proper that he ſhould be conſidered. Let him then anſwer me ſome other time, but at preſent let him anſwer you.

GUEST. Let it be ſo, Socrates. Do you hear this, Socrates junior?

SOC. JUN. I do.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, aſſent to what he ſays?

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, that you will be no impediment to our diſcuſſion; and perhaps it is requiſite that much leſs ſhould I be an impediment. But after a ſophiſt, it is neceſſary, as it appears to me, that we ſhould inveſtigate a politician. Tell me, therefore, whether this character ſhould be placed among the number of thoſe that poſſeſs a ſcientific knowledge. Or how ſhall we ſay?

SOC. JUN. That it ought.

GUEST. We muſt, therefore, make a diviſion of the ſciences, juſt as we made a diviſion in our inveſtigation of the ſophiſt.

SOC. JUN. Perhaps ſo.

GUEST. But yet it appears to me, Socrates, that we ſhould not divide in the ſame manner.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. But after another manner.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Who then can find the political path? For it is requiſite to find it, and, ſeparating it from other things, to impreſs it with one idea, and, marking the other deflections, with another ſpecies, to make our ſoul conceive that all the ſciences are comprehended in two ſpecies.

SOC. JUN. I think, O gueſt, that this is your buſineſs, and not mine.

GUEST.

GUEST. But indeed, Socrates, it is alſo requiſite that it ſhould be yours when it becomes apparent to us.

SOC. JUN. You ſpeak well.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, the arithmetic, and certain other arts allied to this, diveſted of action, and do they not afford knowledge alone?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But thoſe arts which pertain to architecture, and the whole of manual operation, poſſeſs, as it were, ſcience connate with actions, and at the ſame time give completion to bodies produced by them, which before this had not a being.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. After this manner, therefore, divide all ſciences, calling one practic, and the other gnoſtic alone.

SOC. JUN. Let there be, therefore, one whole ſcience, and two ſpecies of it.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, ſhall we conſider and denominate a politician, a king, a deſpot, and the governor of a family, as one and the ſame thing? Or ſhall we ſay there are as many arts pertaining to theſe as there are names? Or rather follow me hither.

SOC. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. To the conſideration of this. If any private perſon is able to adviſe ſufficiently a public phyſician, is it not neceſſary to call him by the name of that art which he who is adviſed profeſſes?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. And if any private perſon is able to give advice to a king, ſhall we not ſay that ſuch a one poſſeſſes that ſcience which the king himſelf ought to poſſeſs?

SOC. JUN. We ſhall.

GUEST. But is not the ſcience of a true king royal?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. And may not he who poſſeſſes this ſcience, whether he is a private man, or a ruler, be in every reſpect rightly called, according to this art, royal?

SOC. JUN. He may, juſtly.

GUEST. And are not the governor of a family and a deſpot the ſame?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what? Is it of any conſequence, with reſpect to empire, whether the city is of a ſmall or of an ample ſize?

Soc. JUN. It is of no conſequence.

GUEST. It is evident, therefore (which is the thing we were juſt now inquiring), that there is one ſcience reſpecting all theſe. But we do not think it is of any conſequence whether any one denominates this ſcience royal, or political, or œconomic.

Soc. JUN. For of what conſequence can it be?

GUEST. This too is evident, that every king is able to do but a little with his hands, and the whole of his body, towards the poſſeſſion of empire, but much by the wiſdom and ſtrength of his ſoul.

Soc. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, we ſhould ſay that a king is more allied to the gnoſtic than to the manual, and, in ſhort, to the practic ſcience?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We muſt, therefore, combine into the ſame the political ſcience and a politician, the royal ſcience and a royal man, as all theſe are one thing.

Soc. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, proceed in an orderly manner, and after this divide the gnoſtic ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Attend, then, and inform me whether we can apprehend any way of eſcape in this.

Soc. JUN. Tell me of what kind.

GUEST. Of this kind. There is a certain logiſtic art.

Soc. JUN. There is.

GUEST. And this I think entirely belongs to the gnoſtic arts.

Soc. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But the logiſtic art knows the difference in numbers. Shall we, therefore, attribute to it any further employment than that of diſtinguiſhing and judging about things known?

Soc. JUN. Why?

GUEST.

GUEST. For no architect works himſelf, but rules over workmen.

SOC. JUN. It is ſo.

GUEST. And he imparts indeed knowledge, but not manual operation.

SOC. JUN. He does.

GUEST. He may juſtly, therefore, be ſaid to participate of the gnoſtic ſcience.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But I think this belongs to the office of a judge, not to poſſeſs the end, nor to be liberated, in the ſame manner as the reckoner is liberated, but to order every manual operator that portion of work which is adapted to him, till that which they are commanded to do receives its completion.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, all ſuch things as theſe gnoſtic, and likewiſe ſuch as are conſequent to the logiſtic art? And do not theſe two genera differ from each other in judgment and mandate?

SOC. JUN. They appear to do ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, we ſhould divide the whole of the gnoſtic ſcience into two parts, denominating the one mandatory, and the other judicial, may we not ſay that we have made an elegant diviſion?

SOC. JUN. Yes, according to my opinion.

GUEST. But thoſe that do any thing in common are delighted when they accord with each other.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As far, therefore, as we accord in this particular we ſhall bid farewell to the opinions of others.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Come, then, inform me in which of theſe arts we muſt place a royal character. Muſt we place him in the judicial art, as a certain ſpectator? Or rather, ſhall we place him in the commanding art, acting as a deſpot?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly, rather in this.

GUEST. Let us again conſider whether the commanding art admits of diſtinction. For it appears to me, that as the art of a huckſter differs from his art who ſells his own goods, ſo the royal genus from the genus of public criers.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. Huckſters, firſt receiving the ſaleable works of others, afterwards ſell them again themſelves.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. In like manner, the tribe of criers, receiving the mandates of others, again imparts them to others.

Soc. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. What then? Shall we mingle the royal into the ſame with the interpretative, commanding, prophetic, and præconic [1] genus, and with many other arts allied to theſe, all which have this in common that they command? Or are you willing that, as we juſt now aſſimilated, we ſhould at preſent aſſimilate a name? ſince this genus of thoſe who command their own concerns is nearly without a name. And thus we ſhall ſo divide theſe as to place the royal genus among the number of thoſe that command their own concerns, neglecting every other particular, which any one may denominate as he pleaſes. For our method was adopted for the ſake of a ruler, and not for the ſake of the contrary.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Since, therefore, this is ſufficiently ſeparated from thoſe, and is brought by diviſion from that which is foreign to that which is domeſtic, it is neceſſary that this again ſhould be divided, if we have yet any compliant ſection in this.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And, indeed, it appears that we have. But follow me in dividing.

Soc. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. Do we not find that all ſuch as rule by command iſſue out their commands for the ſake of the generation of ſomething?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And, indeed, it is not in every reſpect difficult to give a twofold diviſion to all generated natures.

Soc. After what manner?

GUEST. Some among all of them are animated, and others are inanimate.

Soc. JUN. They are ſo.

[1] i. e. Pertaining to criers.

GUEST.

GUEST. If we wiſh to cut the commanding diviſion into theſe parts of the gnoſtic ſcience, we ſhould accordingly cut them.

SOC. JUN. According to what?

GUEST. One part of it ſhould be aſſigned to the genera of inanimate natures, and the other to the genera of ſuch as are animated. And thus the whole will receive a twofold diviſion.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. One part, therefore, we muſt omit, and reſume the other; the whole of which we muſt again divide into two parts.

SOC. JUN. But inform me which of theſe is to be reſumed.

GUEST. By all means, that which rules over animals. For it is not the province of the royal ſcience to command things inanimate, like the architectonic ſcience; but, being of a more generous nature, it always poſſeſſes its power in animals, and about things pertaining to them.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. With reſpect to the generation and nurture of animals, attention to the latter is confined to one animal, but the care belonging to the former extends in common to the whole herd.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But we do not find that the attention of the politic ſcience is of a private nature, like that of an ox-driver, or an equerry; but it is rather ſimilar to the attention paid by him who feeds horſes and oxen.

SOC. JUN. This appears to be the caſe.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, with reſpect to the nurture of animals, ſhall we denominate the nurture of a flock the common nurture of many, or a certain common nutrition?

SOC. JUN. Both may be adopted in diſcourſe.

GUEST. You have anſwered well, Socrates. And if you avoid paying ſerious attention to names, you will appear in old age to be more rich in intellectual prudence. Let us, therefore, now do as you adviſe. But do you underſtand how ſome one, by ſhowing that the nurture of a herd is twofold, will render that which is now inveſtigated in things double, to be ſought after in halves?

SOC. JUN. I endeavour to do ſo: and it appears to me that there is one kind of nurture of men, and another of brutes.

GUEST. You have divided in every reſpect promptly and valiantly. We muſt however to the utmoſt of our power be careful that we may not ſuffer this again.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. That we do not take away one ſmall part in oppoſition to many and great parts, nor yet take it away without ſpecies, but always in conjunction with ſpecies. For it is moſt beautiful to ſeparate immediately the object of inquiry from other things, if the ſeparation is rightly made; juſt as you a little before haſtily thought reſpecting diviſion, in conſequence of perceiving the diſcourſe tending to mankind. Though indeed, my friend, it is not ſafe to divide with ſubtilty: but it is more ſafe to proceed dividing through media; for thus we ſhall more readily meet with ideas. But the whole of this confers to the objects of our inveſtigation.

SOC. JUN. How do you mean, O gueſt?

GUEST. I will endeavour to ſpeak yet more clearly, on account of the benevolence of your nature, Socrates. It is impoſſible, therefore, to evince the things now propoſed in ſuch a manner that nothing ſhall be wanting: but yet we muſt endeavour to riſe a little higher in our ſpeculation, for the ſake of perſpicuity.

SOC. JUN. In what reſpect then do you ſay we have not juſt now rightly divided?

GUEST. In this reſpect, that if any one ſhould attempt to give a twofold diviſion to the human genus, he would divide juſt as many of the preſent day divide. For theſe ſeparate the Grecian genus apart from all others, as one thing; and denominate all other kinds of men, which are innumerable, unmixt, and diſcordant with each other, by one appellation, that of Barbarians; and through this one appellation, the genus itſelf appears to them to be one. But this is juſt as if ſome one, thinking that number ſhould be divided into two ſpecies, ſhould cut off ten thouſand from all numbers, as one ſpecies, and, giving one name to all the reſt, ſhould think that this genus will become ſeparate and different from the other through the appellation. He however will divide in a more beautiful manner, and more according to ſpecies, and a two-fold diviſion, who cuts number into the even and odd, and the human ſpecies into male and female; and who then ſeparates the Lydians or Phrygians, or certain other nations, from all others, when he is incapable of

of finding the genus and at the ſame time part of each of the divided members.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right. But inform me, O gueſt, how any one may more clearly know that genus and part are not the ſame, but different from each other.

GUEST. O Socrates, beſt of men, you enjoin me no trifling thing. And, indeed, we have now wandered further from our propoſed diſcourſe than is fit; and yet you order us to wander ſtill more. Now, therefore, let us again return thither, whence we have digreſſed, as it is fit we ſhould; and hereafter we will at leiſure inveſtigate the queſtion propoſed by you. However, do not by any means think that you have heard this clearly determined from me.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. That ſpecies and part are different from each other.

Soc. JUN. Why ſo?

GUEST. When any thing is a ſpecies of ſomething, it is alſo neceſſary that it ſhould be a part of the thing of which it is ſaid to be the ſpecies: but it is by no means neceſſary that a part ſhould be a ſpecies. Always conſider me, therefore, Socrates, as aſſerting this rather than that.

Soc. JUN. Be it ſo.

GUEST. But inform me after this.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. Reſpecting that whence we have digreſſed hither. For I think that we principally digreſſed in conſequence of your being aſked how the nurture of a herd ſhould be divided, and very readily anſwering that there were two kinds of animals, the one human, and the other comprehending the whole of the brutal ſpecies.

Soc. JUN. True.

GUEST. And you then appeared to me, having taken away a part, to have thought that the remainder ſhould be left as one genus of all brutes, becauſe you could call all of them by the ſame name, viz. brutes.

Soc. JUN. Theſe things were ſo.

GUEST. But this, O moſt valiant of men, is juſt as if ſome other prudent animal, as for inſtance a crane, ſhould after your manner call cranes rational, thus exalting himſelf, and conſider them as forming one genus among other

animals, but, comprehending all the reſt together with men, ſhould perhaps denominate them nothing elſe than brutes. We ſhould endeavour, therefore, to avoid every thing of this kind.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. By not dividing every genus of animals, that we may be leſs expoſed to this miſtake.

Soc. JUN. For there is no occaſion.

GUEST. We, therefore, then erred in this reſpect.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect?

GUEST. That part of the gnoſtic ſcience which is commanding was determined by us to be of that kind which is employed in the nurture of animals, viz. of gregarious animals. Was it not?

Soc. JUN. It was.

GUEST. The whole animal genus, therefore, was then divided into the tame and wild. For thoſe animals that are naturally capable of being rendered gentle are called tame; but thoſe that are not are denominated wild.

Soc. JUN. Well ſaid.

GUEST. But the ſcience which we are in ſearch of, was and is in tame animals, and is to be inveſtigated among ſuch of theſe as are gregarious. Is it not ſo?

Soc. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. We muſt not, therefore, divide as then, looking to all animals, nor muſt we divide haſtily, in order that we may rapidly comprehend the politic ſcience. For this would cauſe us to ſuffer that which the proverb ſpeaks of.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. By dividing too haſtily, we ſhall finiſh more ſlowly.

Soc. JUN. And it would very properly cauſe us to ſuffer, O gueſt.

GUEST. Be it ſo then. But let us again from the beginning endeavour to divide the common nurture of animals. For perhaps the diſcourſe itſelf being brought to a concluſion will more clearly unfold that which you deſire. But tell me this.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. What perhaps you have often heard from certain perſons. For I do not think you have met with thoſe who tame fiſh about the Nile, or the royal

royal lakes. But perhaps you have been a ſpectator of the taming of theſe in fountains.

Soc. JUN. I have been a ſpectator of this, and I have heard of the former from many.

GUEST. You have likewiſe heard and believe that geeſe and cranes are fed by certain perſons, though you have never wandered about the Theſſalian plains.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. I have aſked you all theſe queſtions, becauſe the nurture of herds of animals is partly aquatic and partly terreſtrial.

Soc. JUN. It is ſo.

GUEST. Does it not, therefore, appear to you, as well as to me, that the ſcience reſpecting the common nurture of animals ſhould receive a twofold diviſion, and that one part ſhould be denominated that which nouriſhes in moiſture, and the other that which nouriſhes in dryneſs?

Soc. JUN. It does appear to me.

GUEST. But we do not in the ſame manner inquire to which of theſe arts the royal ſcience belongs. For it is evident to every one.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For every one can divide the nurture of herds in dryneſs.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. Into the volant and gradient.

Soc. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. That the political ſcience, however, is to be inveſtigated among gradient animals, is, as I may ſay, obvious to the moſt ſtupid. Or do you not think it is?

Soc. JUN. I do.

GUEST. But it is requiſite that, dividing the art of feeding animals, like an even number, we ſhould ſhow that it is twofold.

Soc. JUN. This is evident.

GUEST. Moreover, the part to which our diſcourſe impels us appears to extend itſelf in two certain paths; the one being ſhort, in conſequence of ſeparating a ſmall from a large part; but the other long, from preſerving that precept which we mentioned before, that we ought to divide through

media, as this is the moſt ample diviſion. It is permitted us, therefore, to proceed in either of theſe paths, as is moſt agreeable to us.

Soc. JUN. Is it then impoſſible to proceed in both?

GUEST. Not in both at once, O wonderful youth! But it is evident that it is poſſible to proceed in them ſeparately.

Soc. JUN. I will chooſe, therefore, to proceed in each apart from the other.

GUEST. It is eaſy ſo to do, ſince what remains is but ſhort. In the beginning, indeed, and middle of our journey we ſhould have found it difficult to comply with this mandate. But now, ſince it appears to be beſt, let us firſt proceed in the longer road. For, as we have but recently engaged in this affair, we ſhall more eaſily journey through it. But look to the diviſion.

Soc. JUN. Say what it is.

GUEST. The pedeſtrian genus of ſuch tame animals as are gregarious muſt be divided by us according to nature.

Soc. JUN. Why?

GUEST. Becauſe they muſt be divided into ſuch as are without horns, and into ſuch as are horned.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Dividing then the art of feeding pedeſtrian animals, deſcribe the condition of each part. For, if you ſhould be willing to name them, you would be involved in difficulties more than is becoming.

Soc. JUN. How then is it proper to ſpeak of them?

GUEST. Thus. Since the ſcience of feeding animals receives a twofold diviſion, one member of it conſiſts in the horned part of the flock, but the other in that part which is without horns.

Soc. JUN. Let theſe things be ſo ſaid: for they are ſufficiently ſhown to be ſo.

GUEST. Again, therefore, it will appear to us, that a king feeds a certain herd of mutilated hornleſs animals.

Soc. JUN. For how is it poſſible this ſhould not be evident?

GUEST. Breaking this, therefore, in pieces, we will endeavour to exhibit that which is tranſacted by a king.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, are you willing we ſhould divide this herd into what is called the fiſſured and the ſolid hoof? Or ſhall we divide it into common and private generation? For you underſtand me.

Soc. JUN. What kind of generation do you mean?

GUEST. That of horſes and aſſes, which naturally generate from each other.

Soc. JUN. They do.

GUEST. But the remaining ſpecies, belonging to the one herd of tame animals, do not promiſcuouſly mingle with each other, but thoſe only of the ſame kind copulate together.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But whether does the political ſcience appear to take care of the common, or of the private generation of animals?

Soc. JUN. It is evident that it takes care of the unmingled generation of animals.

GUEST. It is evident, then, as it ſeems, that we ſhould give a twofold diviſion to this, as we did to the preceding particulars.

Soc. JUN. It is indeed neceſſary.

GUEST. But we have already nearly ſeparated into minute parts every tame and gregarious animal, except two genera. For it is not fit to rank the genus of dogs among gregarious cattle.

Soc. JUN. It is not. But how ſhall we divide theſe two?

GUEST. After that manner, which it is juſt you and Theætetus ſhould adopt in diſtributing, ſince you have touched on geometry.

Soc. JUN. What manner is that?

GUEST. By the diameter, and again by the diameter of the diameter.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Is the condition of the human genus in any other way naturally adapted to progreſſion than as a diameter, in power a biped?

Soc. JUN. In no other way.

GUEST. But again, the condition of the remaining genus is, according to the power of our power, a diameter, ſince it naturally conſiſts of twice two feet.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly. And now I nearly underſtand what you wiſh to evince.

GUEST. But beſides theſe things, do we perceive, Socrates, a circumſtance worthy of laughter, which happened to us in making the former diviſion?

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. The human genus, mingled and concurring with a genus the moſt generous and tractable of all others.

Soc. JUN. I perceive it, and likewiſe that it is a very abſurd circumſtance.

GUEST. Is it not fit that the ſloweſt things ſhould arrive laſt of all?

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. But we do not perceive this, that a king appears ſtill more ridiculous when running together with the herd, and performing his courſe in conjunction with him who is exerciſed in the beſt manner with reſpect to a tractable life.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. For now, Socrates, that is more apparent which was ſaid by us in our inveſtigation of a ſophiſt.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. That, in ſuch a method of diſcourſe as this, he neither pays more attention to what is venerable than what is not, nor does he prefer the ſmall to the great, but always accompliſhes that which is moſt true.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. After this, that you may not accuſe me, as you have inquired what is the ſhorter way to the definition of a king, I will, in the firſt place, conſider this.

Soc. JUN. By all means, do ſo.

GUEST. But I ſay that a gradient animal ought to have been divided by us above into the biped and quadruped genus; and perceiving that man then alone remained in conjunction with the volant genus, the biped herd ſhould again have been divided into the winged and without wings. But this diviſion being made, and being evinced by that art which is the nurſe of men, a political and royal character ſhould be placed over it, like a charioteer, and the reins of the city ſhould be given to him, in conſequence of this ſcience being adapted to him.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. You have anſwered me beautifully, and as if you had been diſcharging a debt; and you have added a digreſſion, by way of intereſt, and as the completion of your diſcourſe.

GUEST. Come, then, let us connect, by recurring from the beginning to the end, the diſcourſe concerning the name of the politic art.

Soc. JUN. By all means.

GUEST. One part, therefore, of the gnoſtic ſcience was aſſerted by us in the beginning to be of a commanding nature; and we ſaid that the part of this ſcience which commands from itſelf was aſſimilated to this. Again, we aſſerted that the nurture of animals was a part of the ſelf-commanding ſcience, and that this was not the ſmalleſt part. Likewiſe, that the nurture of herds was a ſpecies of the nurture of animals; and that the art which is nutritive of animals without horns, eſpecially belongs to the art of feeding pedeſtrian animals. Again, it is neceſſary to connect not leſs than the triple of this part, if any one is deſirous of comprehending it in one name, viz. the ſcience of an unmingled genus of feeding. But a ſection from this, which alone remains, and which feeds men, as ranking among bipeds, is the part which we are now exploring, and which we denominate royal, and at the ſame time political.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Do you therefore think, Socrates, that we have really done well, as you ſay?

Soc. JUN. In what?

GUEST. I mean that the thing propoſed by us has been in every reſpect and ſufficiently diſcuſſed. Or has our inveſtigation been particularly deficient in this, that it has given, indeed, a deſcription of the thing, but ſuch a one as is not perfectly finiſhed?

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly.

Soc. JUN. Do ſo.

GUEST. Since, therefore, it has appeared that there are many paſtoral arts, the politic ſcience is one of theſe, and is the curator of one certain herd.

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. Our diſcourſe defined this to be neither the nurſe of horſes, nor of any other brutes, but to be the common nutritive ſcience of men.

Soc. JUN. It did ſo.

GUEST. But let us contemplate the difference of all ſhepherds and kings.

Soc. JUN. What is the difference?

GUEST. If any one poſſeſſing the name of another art ſhould aſſert and vindicate to himſelf the nutrition in common of the human herd, what ſhould we ſay?

Soc. JUN. How is this?

GUEST. Juſt as if all merchants, huſbandmen, and cooks, and beſides theſe the profeſſors of gymnaſtic, and the genus of phyſicians, ſhould verbally oppoſe the ſhepherds of the human race, whom we have called politicians, and ſhould aſſert that the care of nurturing men belonged to them, and that they were not only ſhepherds of the herds of men, but even of rulers themſelves.

Soc. JUN. And would not their aſſertion be right?

GUEST. Perhaps ſo. And let us alſo conſider this. For we know that no one would contend with a herdſman about things of this kind; ſince he is, doubtleſs, the nurſe, the phyſician, and as it were brideman of a herd, and is alone ſkilled in the obſtetric art reſpecting parturition and offspring. No one, beſides, is better calculated, by ſuch ſport and muſic as the nature of cattle is capable of receiving, of conſoling, and by alluring arts mitigating, with inſtruments, or the mere mouth, the herd committed to his care. And the ſame may be ſaid of other ſhepherds. Or may it not?

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. How, then, will our diſcourſe reſpecting a king appear to be right and entire, ſince we aſſert that he alone is the ſhepherd and nurſe of the human herd, when at the ſame time ten thouſand others contend for the ſame office?

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Did we not, therefore, a little before very properly fear, when we ſuſpected leſt we ſhould only introduce a certain royal figure, and ſhould not perfectly define a political character, unleſs we comprehended thoſe that are connected with this character, and who profeſs themſelves to be equally ſhepherds; and, ſeparating a king from them, alone exhibited him pure?

Soc. JUN. Our fear, indeed, was moſt right.

GUEST. This therefore, Socrates, muſt be done by us, unleſs we intend to diſgrace our diſcourſe at the end.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. But this muſt by no means take place.

GUEST. Again, therefore, we muſt proceed in another way from another beginning.

Soc. JUN. In what way?

GUEST. By nearly inſerting a jeſt. For it is requiſite to employ a copious part of a long fable[1], and to act in the ſame manner with what remains of our

[1] The ſubſtance of this fable is beautifully explained by Proclus, in his fifth book on the Theology of Plato, as follows:

"This univerſe is very properly ſaid to have twofold lives, periods and convolutions; one of theſe being Saturnian, and the other Jovian. According to the former of theſe periods, too, every thing good ſprings ſpontaneouſly, and every animated nature poſſeſſes a blameleſs and unwearied life; but the latter is the ſource of material error, and of an abundantly mutable nature. For, as there is a twofold life in the world, the one unapparent and more intellectual, but the other more natural and apparent, and the one being bounded by providence, but the other proceeding in a diſorderly manner according to fate,—hence this latter, which is multiform, and perfected through nature, is ſuſpended from the Jovian order; but the former, which is more ſimple, is intellectual and unapparent, and is ſuſpended from that of Saturn. This the Elean gueſt clearly indicates, by calling one of the circulations Jovian, and the other Saturnian. Though Jupiter alſo is the cauſe of the unapparent life of the univerſe, is the ſupplier of intellect, and the leader of intellectual perfection, yet he leads upwards all things to the kingdom of Saturn, and, being a leader, together with his father gives ſubſiſtence to the whole mundane intellect. Each of theſe periods, indeed, viz. the apparent and unapparent, participates of both theſe Gods; but the one is more Saturnian, and the other is in ſubjection to the kingdom of Jupiter. That the mighty Saturn, therefore, is allotted the other kingdom of the Gods prior to him, the Elean gueſt clearly evinces in what he ſays prior to the fable, viz. that we have heard from many of the kingdom which Saturn obtained; ſo that, according to this wiſe man alſo, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence, as his father Heaven contains the middle centres of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the intellectual orders, and ſupplies the whole of intellectual energy, firſt to the Gods; in the ſecond place, to the genera ſuperior to man; and in the laſt place, to partial ſouls ſuch as ours, when they are able to extend themſelves to the Saturnian place of ſurvey For this univerſe, and all the mundane Gods, perpetually poſſeſs this twofold life, and imitate the Saturnian intellection through unapparent and intellectual energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter through providential attention to ſecondary concerns; and, in ſhort, through the apparent fabrication of things. But partial ſouls at one time energize intellectually, and conſecrate themſelves to Saturn, and at another time according to the characteriſtic of Jupiter, and with unreſtrained energy provide for ſubordinate natures. When they revolve, however, analogouſly to theſe deities, they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and adorn ſenſibles, and live both theſe lives in the ſame manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For their periods are twofold, one intellectual and the other providential. Their paradigms alſo are twofold: of the one the Saturnian

our diſcuſſion, as we did above, viz. always to take away a part from a part, till we arrive at the ſummit of our inquiry. Is it not proper to act in this manner?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Give me then, after the manner of boys, all your attention to the fable: for you are not very much removed from puerile years.

Soc. JUN. Only relate it.

Saturnian intellect, and of the other the Jovian;—ſince even the mighty Jupiter himſelf has a twofold energy; by intellect, indeed, adhering to intelligibles, but by demiurgic fabrication adorning ſenſibles.

"Since, therefore, the revolutions are twofold, not only in wholes but likewiſe in partial ſouls, in the Saturnian period, ſays the Elean gueſt, the generation of men is not from each other, as in apparent men, nor, as the firſt man with us is alone earth-born, ſo, in partial ſouls, the one firſt ſoul is earth-born; but this is the caſe with all of them. For they are led upwards from laſt and earthly bodies, and they receive an unapparent, deſerting a ſenſible, life. But neither do they verge to old age, and change from younger to older; but on the contrary they become more vigorous, and proceed intellectually in a path contrary to generation, and reſolve as it were that variety of life, which in deſcending they made a compoſite. Hence, likewiſe, all the ſymbols pertaining to youth are preſent with thoſe ſouls when they paſs into ſuch a condition of being; for they lay aſide every thing which adheres to them from generation. And when they are diſtributed about Saturn, and live the life which is there, he ſays fruits are produced in abundance from the trees, and many other things ſpring ſpontaneouſly from the earth. The inhabitants alſo are naked and without beds, and for the moſt part are fed, dwelling in the open air: for they poſſeſs an indiſſoluble temperament of the ſeaſons. The graſs likewiſe ſpringing abundantly from the earth ſupplies them with ſoft couches. Theſe and ſuch like goods, ſouls derive from this mighty deity, according to the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled with vivific good, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes, but do not extend to themſelves, from partial energies, perfection and beatitude. For doxaſtic nutriment poſſeſſes diviſible and material apprehenſions, but that which is intellectual, ſuch as are pure, indiviſible and ſpontaneous; which the ſpontaneous here obſcurely ſignifies. The fruits alſo imparted from the earth ſignify the perfection of the prolific intellect of the Gods, and which illuminates ſouls with a ſufficiency from themſelves. For, through an unenvying abundance of goods, they are alſo able to impart to ſecondary natures felicity in a convenient meaſure. Neither, therefore, are they inveſted with garments, as when they proceed into generation, nor do they abound with additions of life, but are themſelves pure, by themſelves, from all compoſition and variety; and exciting their own intellect, they are extended by their intellectual father to theſe divine benefits. They likewiſe participate of total goods, being guarded by the intellectual Gods; and receiving from them the meaſures of a happy life, they paſs the whole of their exiſtence with facility. And laſtly, eſtabliſhing a ſleepleſs and undefiled life in the generative powers of intelligibles, and being filled with intellectual fruits, and nouriſhed with immaterial and divine forms, they are ſaid to live the life which belongs to the government of Saturn."

GUEST.

GUEST. There were then, and ſtill will be, many memorials of antient affairs; and among others, there is one prodigious relation reſpecting the contention of Atreus and Thyeſtes. For you have heard and remember what is then ſaid to have happened.

SOC. JUN. Perhaps you ſpeak of the prodigy reſpecting the golden ram.

GUEST. By no means: but reſpecting the mutation of the riſing and ſetting of the ſun, and the other ſtars. For whence they now riſe they did then ſet: and their riſing was from a contrary place. Divinity, therefore, then giving a teſtimony to Atreus, changed the heavens into the preſent figure.

SOC. JUN. This alſo is reported.

GUEST. We have likewiſe heard from many reſpecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder.

SOC. JUN. We have from very many.

GUEST. And were not thoſe antient men born from the earth, and not generated from each other?

SOC. JUN. This alſo is one of the things which are ſaid to have happened formerly.

GUEST. All theſe things, therefore, proceed from the ſame circumſtance, and ten thouſand others beſides theſe, and which are ſtill more wonderful. But, through length of time, ſome of them have become extinct, and others are related in a diſperſed manner, ſeparate from each other. But that circumſtance which is the cauſe of this taking place has not been mentioned by any one. It muſt, however, now be related: for the relation will contribute to the demonſtration of the nature of a king.

SOC. JUN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully. Speak, therefore, and do not omit any thing.

GUEST. Hear, then. Divinity himſelf ſometimes conducts this univerſe in its progreſſion, and convolves it: but at another time he remits the reins of his government, when the periods of the univerſe have received a convenient meaſure of time. But the world is again ſpontaneouſly led round to things contrary, ſince it is an animal, and is allotted wiſdom from him who cooperated with it from the firſt in harmonizing all its parts with the whole. This progreſſion, however, to things contrary is naturally implanted in it through the following cauſe.

SOC. JUN. Through what cauſe?

GUEST. To ſubſiſt always according to the ſame, and in a ſimilar manner, and to be the ſame, alone belongs to the moſt divine of all things: but the nature of body is not of this order. But that which we call heaven and the world, receives many and bleſſed gifts from its producing cauſe. However, as it participates of body, it cannot be entirely void of mutation: nevertheleſs, as far as it is able, it is moved in the ſame, and according to the ſame, with one lation. Hence it is allotted a circular motion, becauſe there is the ſmalleſt mutation of its motion. But nearly nothing is able to revolve itſelf, except that which is the leader of all things that are moved. And it is not lawful that this ſhould at one time move in one way, and at another time in a different way. From all this, therefore, it muſt be ſaid, that the world neither always revolves itſelf, nor that the whole of it is always convolved by Divinity with twofold and contrary convolutions: nor, again, that two certain Gods convolve it, whoſe deciſions are contrary to each other. But that muſt be aſſerted which we juſt now ſaid, and which alone remains, that at one time it is conducted by another divine cauſe, receiving again an externally acquired life, and a renewed immortality from the demiurgus; but that at another time, when he remits the reins of government, it proceeds by itſelf, and, being thus left for a time, performs many myriads of retrograde revolutions, becauſe it is moſt great, and moſt equally balanced, and accompliſhes its progreſſions with the ſmalleſt foot.

SOC. JUN. All that you have ſaid appears to be very probable.

GUEST. From what has been ſaid, therefore, we may now, by a reaſoning proceſs, apprehend that circumſtance which we ſaid was the cauſe of all wonderful things. For it is this very thing.

SOC. JUN. What?

GUEST. That the circular motion of the univerſe is at one time accompliſhed as at preſent, and at another time in a contrary manner.

SOC. JUN. But how is this the cauſe of all wonderful things?

GUEST. It is requiſite to think that this mutation is the greateſt and moſt perfect of all the celeſtial converſions.

SOC. JUN. It is likely.

GUEST. It is proper, therefore, to think that the greateſt mutations then happen to us who are the inhabitants of the world.

SOC. JUN. And this alſo is likely.

GUEST. But do we not know that the nature of animals ſuſtains with difficulty great, numerous, and all-various mutations?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Hence, the greateſt corruptions of other animals then neceſſarily take place, and very few of the human race remain. And to theſe many other wonderful and novel circumſtances at the ſame time happen; but this is the greateſt, and follows that revolution of the univerſe in which a converſion is effected contrary to the preſent.

SOC. JUN. What circumſtance do you mean?

GUEST. That which takes place the firſt of all, when, in whatever age a mortal animal is conſtituted, he is no longer ſeen advancing to old age, but is again changed to the contrary, and naturally becomes, as it were, younger and more delicate. The white hairs, too, of thoſe more advanced in years then became black [1], and the cheeks of thoſe that had beards became ſmooth; and thus each was reſtored to the paſt flower of his age. The bodies, likewiſe, of ſuch as were in the bloom of youth, becoming ſmoother and ſmaller every day and night, again returned to the nature of a child recently born: and ſuch were aſſimilated to this nature, both in ſoul and body. And at length their bodies, rapidly waſting away, periſhed. But the dead bodies of thoſe who at that time died through violence were in like manner immanifeſtly, and in a few days, corrupted.

SOC. JUN. But what was then, O gueſt, the generation of animals, and after what manner were they produced from each other?

GUEST. It is evident, Socrates, that at that time there was no generation of one thing from another. But, as it is ſaid that there was once an earth-born race, this race was at that period reſtored back again from the earth. This information, too, was delivered to us by thoſe our firſt progenitors, who lived immediately after the cloſe of the laſt revolution. For they were public witneſſes of the truth of our aſſertions, which at preſent are diſbelieved, though improperly, by the multitude. For I think this particular ought to be attended to, as conſequent to a part of the narration. For, if old men tended to the nature of boys, it follows, that ſuch as were dead, but laid in

[1] Plato, in what he here aſſerts of the Saturnian age, wonderfully accords with Orpheus, who, as we are informed by Proclus in Plat. Theol. lib. v. myſtically ſays, "that the hairs of the face of Saturn are always black, and never become hoary."

the earth, muſt be again reſtored from thence, revive again, and follow that revolution of the univerſe, in which generation is convolved in a contrary order; and that the earth-born race, which according to this reaſon is neceſſarily produced, ſhould thus be denominated and defined, viz. ſuch of them as Divinity has transferred into another deſtiny.

Soc. JUN. This very much follows from what has been ſaid above. But with reſpect to the life which you ſay was under the power of Saturn, did it ſubſiſt in thoſe revolutions, or in theſe? For it is evident that the mutation of the ſtars and the ſun happens in both theſe revolutions.

GUEST. You follow the diſcourſe well. But, in anſwer to your queſtion reſpecting all things being produced ſpontaneouſly for mankind, this by no means is the caſe in the preſent, but happened in the former revolution. For then Divinity was firſt the ruler and curator of the whole circulation; juſt as now the ſeveral parts of the world are locally diſtributed by ruling Gods. Divine dæmons, too, were allotted, after the manner of ſhepherds, animals according to genera and herds; each being ſufficient for all things pertaining to the ſeveral particulars over which he preſided. So that there was nothing ruſtic, no mutual rapine, no war, nor ſedition of any kind; and ten thouſand other things took place, which are the conſequences of ſuch a period. But what is ſaid reſpecting the ſpontaneous life of theſe men is aſſerted becauſe Divinity himſelf fed them, and was their curator; juſt as men who are of a more divine, are the ſhepherds of brutes, who are of a baſer, nature. In conſequence, too, of men being fed by Divinity, there were no polities, nor poſſeſſions of women and children. For all theſe were reſtored to life from the earth, and without having any recollection of former events. But all ſuch things as theſe were abſent. The inhabitants, too, had fruits in abundance from oaks, and many other trees, which did not grow through the aſſiſtance of agriculture, but were ſpontaneouſly given by the earth. And for the moſt part they were naked, ſlept without coverlids, and were fed in the open air. For the temperament of the ſeaſons was innoxious to them. They had ſoft beds, too, from graſs, which germinated in unenvying abundance from the earth. And thus, Socrates, you have heard what was the life of men under the reign of Saturn: but you yourſelf have ſeen what the condition of the preſent life is, which is ſaid to be under Jupiter. But are you able, and likewiſe willing, to judge which of theſe is the more happy?

Soc.

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that I ſhould after a manner judge for you?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, thoſe that were nurtured by Saturn in ſo much leiſure, and with the power not only of converſing with men, but with brutes, uſed all the above-mentioned particulars for the purpoſe of philoſophy, aſſociating with brutes and with each other, and inquiring of every nature which had a perceptive power of its own, in what reſpect it differed from others as to the common poſſeſſion of prudence; from all this it may be eaſily inferred, that the men of thoſe times were incomparably more happy than thoſe that exiſt at preſent. But if, being abundantly filled with meats and drinks, their diſcourſes with each other, and with brutes, were ſuch as at preſent they are related to have been, from this alſo, in my opinion, their ſuperior felicity may be very eaſily inferred. At the ſame time, however, we ſhall diſmiſs theſe particulars till ſome ſufficient judge of them ſhall ariſe, who will unfold to us whether the men of that period were inclined to ſciences and diſcourſe. But let us now relate on what account we introduced the fable, that we may after this bring to a concluſion what remains. For, after the time of all theſe was conſummated, and it was requiſite that a mutation ſhould take place, and beſides this, the whole terreſtrial genus being conſumed, as all the generations of every ſoul had received their completion, and as many ſeeds having fallen on the earth as were deſtined to each ſoul,—then the governor of the univerſe, laying aſide as it were the handle of his rudder, departed to that place of ſurvey whence he contemplates himſelf. But then fate and connate deſire again convolved the world. All thoſe Gods, therefore, who govern locally, in conjunction with the greateſt dæmon, knowing what had now happened, again deprived the parts of the world of their providential care. But the world becoming inverted, conflicting with itſelf, and being agitated by an impulſe contrary to its beginning and end, and likewiſe making an abundant concuſſion in itſelf, produced again another corruption of all-various animals. After theſe things, however, and the expiration of a ſufficient length of time, the tumult, confuſion, and concuſſions ceaſed, and the world, becoming tranquil and adorned, again proceeded in its uſual courſe, poſſeſſing a providential care and dominion, both over itſelf and

the natures which it contains; remembering, to the utmoſt of its power, the inſtructions of the demiurgus and father[1]. At the beginning, therefore, it accompliſhed this more perfectly, but at the end more remiſsly. But the cauſe of this is the corporeal form of the temperature, and which was nurſed together with an antient nature. For it was a participant of much diſorder before it arrived at the preſent ornament. For, from its compoſing artificer, indeed, it poſſeſſes every good; but, from its former habit, all that atrocity and injuſtice which ſubſiſt within the heavens. And theſe the world both poſſeſſes from that former habit, and inſerts in animated natures. The world, therefore, when nouriſhing the animals which it contains, in conjunction with the governor, brings forth ſmall evils, and mighty goods: but when it is ſeparated from him, during the neareſt time of its departure, it conducts all things beautifully. At a more diſtant period, however, and from oblivion being generated in it, the property of its former diſſonance rules with greater force. And at the laſt period of time it becomes defloreſcent; and producing ſmall goods, but mingling much of the temperament of things contrary to good, it arrives at the danger of both itſelf, and the natures which it contains, being diſſolved. Hence that God who adorned the world, then perceiving the difficulties under which it labours, and anxious leſt, being thus tempeſtuouſly agitated, it ſhould be diſſolved by the tumult, and be plunged into the infinite ſea of diſſimilitude, again reſumes the helm, and adorns and corrects whatever is diſeaſed and diſſolved through the inordinate motion of the former period, and renders the world immortal and unconſcious of age. This, therefore, is the end of the whole narration. But this is ſufficient to ſhow the nature of a king to ſuch as attend to what has been already ſaid. For, the world being again converted to the preſent path of generation, the progreſſion of its age again ſtopped, and it imparted novel things, the very contraries to what it then imparted. For animals proximate to death, on account of their ſmallneſs, are increaſed. But bodies recently born from the earth, hoary, again dying, deſcend into the earth; and all other things are tranſmuted, imitating and following the condition of the univerſe. The imitation, likewiſe, of motion, generation, and nutriment, follows all things from neceſſity. For it is no longer poſſible for an animal

[1] i. e. Jupiter. See the Timæus.

to

to be produced in the earth, through other things mutually compoſing it; but, as the world was deſtined to be the abſolute ruler of its own progreſſion, after the ſame manner its parts alſo were deſtined by a ſimilar guidance to ſpring forth, generate, and nouriſh, as far as they are able. But we have now arrived at that for the ſake of which the whole of our diſcourſe was undertaken. For, with reſpect to other animals, many particulars, and of a prolix nature, might be diſcuſſed; ſuch as, from what things they are ſeverally compoſed, and through what cauſes they were changed: but the particulars reſpecting men are ſhorter, and more to our purpoſe. For, mankind being deſtitute of the guardian care of the dæmon whoſe poſſeſſion we are, and who is the ſhepherd of our race, and as many animals who are naturally cruel became tranſported with rage, hence men, now imbecil, and without a guard, were torn in pieces by ſuch animals. And beſides this, men in thoſe firſt times were unſkilful, and had no knowledge of the arts, becauſe the earth ſpontaneouſly afforded them nutriment: but they did not know how to procure it, becauſe they were not compelled by any previous neceſſity. From all theſe cauſes they were involved in the greateſt difficulties. Hence, thoſe gifts which are ſaid to have been formerly imparted to us by the Gods were imparted with neceſſary inſtruction and erudition: fire, indeed, from Prometheus [1], but the arts from Vulcan and Minerva. Again, ſeeds and plants were imparted by other divinities; and, in ſhort, all ſuch things as are the ſupport of human life. For men, as we have ſaid, were not left deſtitute of the guardian care of the Gods; and it became requiſite that they alſo ſhould pay attention to the concerns of life, in the ſame manner as the whole world; in the imitating and following which, through all the revolutions of time, we live and are born in a different manner at different periods. And let this be the end of the fable. But we ſhall make it uſeful to diſcover how far we have erred in the above definition of a royal and political character.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect, and how far, do you ſay we have erred?

GUEST. Partly leſs, and in a more generous manner, and partly in a greater degree, and more abundantly.

Soc. JUN. How?

[1] Prometheus is the inſpective guardian of the deſcent of rational ſouls; and the fire which he imparted to mortals is the rational ſoul itſelf, becauſe this like fire naturally tends upwards, or, in other words, aſpires after incorporeal natures.

GUEST.

GUEST. Becauſe, while we were aſked reſpecting a king and politician belonging to the preſent circulation and generation, we adduced a ſhepherd of a herd of men belonging to the contrary period; and in conſequence of this ſhepherd being a God, and not a man, we tranſgreſſed abundantly: but again, becauſe we evinced that this ſhepherd was the governor of the whole city, but yet did not ſay after what manner, in this reſpect we aſſerted what is true, but were deficient as to the whole and the perſpicuous; and on this account we erred leſs in this latter caſe than in the former.

SOC. JUN. True.

GUEST. We ought, therefore, as it ſeems, to think that we ſhall then have perfectly deſcribed a political character when we have defined the mode of governing a city.

SOC. JUN. Beautifully ſaid.

GUEST. On this account we related that fable, not only that thoſe might be pointed out who oppoſe the royal character we are now inveſtigating with reſpect to the nurture of a herd, but that we might more clearly perceive him who alone ought to be called a paſtor, ſince after the manner of a ſhepherd and herdſman he takes care of the nurture of the human race.

SOC. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But I think, Socrates, that this figure of a divine ſhepherd is ſtill greater than that which belongs to a king; and that the politicians of the preſent day are naturally much more ſimilar to ſubjects than governors, and in a manner more allied to theſe participate of diſcipline and nurture.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But we muſt not inquire whether they have been more or leſs ſo, and whether they are naturally ſo or not.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. Again, therefore, let us thus reſume our inquiry. We ſaid, then, that there was a ſelf-commanding art reſpecting animals, which took care of them, not privately, but in common; and this art we then directly called the herd-nouriſhing art. Do you recollect?

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. In this, therefore, we erred. For we have not by any means comprehended in a definition the political character, nor given it a name; but its name as yet flies from us.

SOC.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. To nouriſh the ſeveral herds of animals belongs to all other ſhepherds; but we have not given a fit name to the political character, which requires the application of ſomething common.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak the truth, if this common ſomething can be obtained.

GUEST. But is it not poſſible to apply healing, as that which is common to all things, without either defining nutriment, or any other thing? and to introduce another certain art, either pertaining to the nurture of herds, or therapeutic, or adapted to take care of ſomething; and thus to comprehend the political character together with others, ſince reaſon ſignifies that this ought to be done?

Soc. JUN. Right. But after this, in what manner muſt the diviſion be made?

GUEST. As before we divided the herd-nouriſhing art into the gradient and winged tribes, and into the horned and without horns, in the ſame manner we ſhould divide the art pertaining to the care of herds, which will thus be ſimilarly comprehended in our diſcourſe, together with the kingdom of Saturn.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo. But go on with your inquiries.

GUEST. If, then, the name of the art pertaining to the care of herds had been thus adopted, no one would have oppoſed us, as if there were no careful attention whatever; juſt as then it was juſtly contended, that there is no art in us which deſerves the appellation of nutritive; and that, if there were any ſuch art, it belongs to many things prior to, and preferable to, any thing pertaining to kings.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But no other art endeavours to accompliſh this more, and in a milder manner, as if it paid a careful attention to the whole of human communion, than the royal art.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But after theſe things, Socrates, do you perceive how very much we have erred about the end?

Soc. JUN. What kind of error have we committed?

GUEST. We have erred in this, that though we have conceived that there

is a certain nutritive art of a biped herd, yet we ought not immediately to have called it royal and politic, as if entirely complete.

Soc. JUN. Why not?

GUEST. In the firſt place, as we have ſaid, the name ought to be accommodated more to attentive care than to nutriment: and in the next place, this attentive care ought to be divided. For it will receive no ſmall ſections.

Soc. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. The ſections will be a divine ſhepherd, and a human curator.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. And again, it is neceſſary to give a twofold diſtribution to human care.

Soc. JUN. What are the two parts?

GUEST. The violent and the voluntary.

Soc. JUN. What then?

GUEST. And erring in this, with greater ineptitude than is becoming, we conſidered a king and a tyrant as the ſame, though they are moſt diſſimilar both in themſelves and in their mode of government.

Soc. JUN. True.

GUEST. Now, therefore, again correcting ourſelves (as I have already ſaid), we ſhall divide human care into the violent and the voluntary.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And the violent we ſhall call tyrannic: but the voluntary, and the attention paid to the herds of voluntary biped animals, we ſhall denominate politic. We ſhall therefore evince, that he who poſſeſſes this art and care is truly a king and a politician.

Soc. JUN. And thus the demonſtration, O gueſt, reſpecting political affairs will, as it appears, be perfect.

GUEST. It will be well for us, Socrates, if this is the caſe. But it is requiſite that theſe things ſhould not only be apparent to you, but likewiſe to me, in common with you. But at preſent a king appears to me not to poſſeſs as yet a perfect figure: but juſt as ſtatuaries, who by haſtening their work ſometimes unſeaſonably, and adding more and larger things than are fit, finiſh it more ſlowly; ſo we at preſent have not only rapidly and magnificently evinced that we erred in the former part of our diſcuſſion, in conſequence of thinking that great paradigms ſhould be employed about a king, but

but we reviled the wonderful bulk of the fable, and were compelled to uſe a greater part of it than was proper. On this account, we have made a more prolix demonſtration, and have not entirely finiſhed the fable. But, indeed, our diſcourſe, like an animal, appears to have its exterior delineation ſufficiently perfect, but is not yet perſpicuous, through paint, and the mixture of colours. But it is more becoming to exhibit every animal by words and diſcourſe, to ſuch as are able to follow the diſquiſition, than by painting, and the whole of manual operation; but other things are to be exhibited through the operations of the hand.

Soc. JUN. This, indeed, is rightly ſaid: but ſhow me why you ſay you have not yet ſpoken ſufficiently.

GUEST. It is difficult, O divine youth, to exhibit great things perſpicuouſly, without examples. For each of us appears to know all things as in a dream[1], and again to be ignorant of all things according to a wakeful perception.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay this?

GUEST. We appear at preſent to have moved very abſurdly the paſſion reſpecting ſcience which is in us.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect?

GUEST. The example, O bleſſed youth, which I have adduced will again require an example.

Soc. JUN. Why? Tell me, and do not in any reſpect be remiſs on my account.

GUEST. I will, ſince you are prepared to follow me. For we know what boys do as ſoon as they have acquired a knowledge of their letters.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. They ſufficiently perceive each of the elements in the ſhorteſt and eaſieſt ſyllables, and are able to ſpeak the truth concerning them.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, being again dubious about theſe in other ſyllables, they are deceived in opinion and diſcourſe.

[1] The ſoul poſſeſſes a twofold knowledge, one indiſtinct, but the other diſtinct, ſcientific, and without ambiguity. For we eſſentially contain the reaſons of things, and breathe, as it were, the knowledge of them; but we do not always poſſeſs them in energy.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. May they not, therefore, thus be eaſily, and in the moſt beautiful manner, led to things which they do not yet know?

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. By leading them firſt to thoſe ſyllables in which they have had right opinions reſpecting theſe very ſame things; but, when we have thus led them, to place before them things which they do not yet know; and, by comparing them together, to ſhow them that there is the ſame ſimilitude and nature in both the complications, till the things conceived by true opinion are preſented to the view compared with all the unknown particulars. But theſe being preſented to the view, and examples of them produced, it will cauſe them to denominate that which is different in all the elements of every ſyllable as different from other things; but that which is the ſame, as always the ſame, according to things the ſame with itſelf.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. This, therefore, we ſufficiently comprehend, viz. that the generation of a paradigm then takes place, when that which is the ſame in another divulſed particular being rightly conceived by opinion, and accommodated to each, produces one true opinion of both.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Shall we therefore wonder, if our ſoul, ſuffering the ſame thing naturally about the elements of all things, at one time is eſtabliſhed in certain particulars by truth itſelf about each individual thing, and at another time fluctuates in other particulars, about all things? And that when, in certain commixtions, it thinks rightly, it ſhould again be ignorant of theſe very ſame things, when it is transferred to long and difficult ſyllables of things?

Soc. JUN. There is nothing wonderful in this.

GUEST. For how, my friend, can any one, beginning from falſe opinion, arrive at any, even the ſmalleſt part of truth, and thus acquire wiſdom?

Soc. JUN. Nearly no one.

GUEST. If, therefore, theſe things naturally ſubſiſt in this manner, you and I ſhall not in any reſpect err, if we firſt of all endeavour to perceive the nature of the whole paradigm in another ſmall and partial paradigm; and after this, betaking ourſelves to the paradigm of a king, which is the greateſt

of

of all paradigms, and deriving it from leſſer things, endeavour again, through a paradigm, to know by art the remedy of political affairs, that we may be partakers of wakeful perceptions inſtead of a dream.

Soc. JUN. Perfectly right.

GUEST. Again, therefore, let us reſume the former part of our diſcourſe, viz. that ſince an innumerable multitude, together with the royal genus, doubt reſpecting the government of a city, it is requiſite to ſeparate all theſe from the royal genus, and to leave it by itſelf. And for this purpoſe we ſaid it was requiſite that we ſhould have a certain paradigm.

Soc. JUN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. But what paradigm can any one adduce which both contains political concerns, and is the ſmalleſt poſſible, ſo that he may ſufficiently find the object of his inveſtigation? Are you willing, by Jupiter, unleſs we have ſomething elſe at hand, that we chooſe the weaving art? Not the whole, indeed, if it is agreeable to you: for, perhaps, the weaving of wool will be ſufficient. For it may happen that this part being choſen may teſtify that which we wiſh to evince.

Soc. JUN. For why ſhould it not?

GUEST. Shall we therefore now, with reſpect to this part of the weaving art, act in the ſame manner as we did above, viz. divide every particular by cutting the parts of parts? and, paſſing over all things in the ſhorteſt manner poſſible, return to that which is uſeful to our preſent purpoſe?

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. My anſwer to you ſhall be an explanation of the thing.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak moſt excellently.

GUEST. Of all the things which we fabricate and poſſeſs, ſome are for the ſake of doing ſomething, and others are auxiliaries againſt any inconvenience we may ſuffer. And of auxiliaries, ſome are alexipharmic [1], as well divine as human; but others are ſubſervient to defence. And of things ſubſervient to defence, ſome conſiſt of warlike apparatus, and others are incloſures. And of incloſures, ſome are veils, and others are defences againſt heat and cold. But of defences, ſome are coverings, and others are apparel. And of apparel, one part is an under veil, and another a ſurrounding cover-

[1] i. e. Remedies of evils.

ing.

ing. And of ſurrounding coverings, ſome are ſimple, and others compoſite. But of the compoſite, ſome are perforated, but others are connected together without perforation. And of thoſe that are without perforation, ſome are compoſed from the nerves of things growing out of the earth, but others are hairy. And of the hairy, ſome are conglutinated by water and earth, but others are themſelves connected together with themſelves. To theſe auxiliaries and coverings, which are wrought from the ſame things being bound together, we give the name of garments. But we call that art which is eſpecially converſant with garments, veſtific, from the thing itſelf, in the ſame manner as above we called the art reſpecting a city politic. We likewiſe ſay that the weaving art, ſo far as for the moſt part it weaves garments, differs in nothing but the name from the veſtific art; juſt in the ſame manner as we formerly obſerved that a royal differed only nominally from a political character.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. But after this we ſhould thus reaſon: that ſome one may, perhaps, think it has been ſufficiently ſhown that the weaving art is converſant with garments, but may not be able to perceive, that though it is not yet diſtinguiſhed from things which cooperate near together, it is ſeparated from many other things of a kindred nature.

Soc. JUN. Tell me what things of a kindred nature.

GUEST. You do not underſtand what has been ſaid, as it ſeems. It appears, therefore, that we ſhould return from the end to the beginning. For, if you underſtand propinquity, we have now ſeparated this from the weaving art, by diſtributing the compoſition of coverings into things put under, and things ſurrounding us.

Soc. JUN. I underſtand you.

GUEST. We have likewiſe ſeparated every kind of fabrication from thread and broom, and all ſuch plantal productions as we juſt now called nerves. We alſo defined the compreſſive art, and the compoſition which employs perforation and ſewing, which for the moſt part pertains to the currier's art.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We alſo ſeparated the fabrication of ſimple coverings from ſkins, and of ſuch coverings as are employed in building, and in the whole of the tectonic, and in all other arts which are employed in ſtopping the effluxions of

of water. Alſo ſuch arts as procure reſtraints in joining, and violent actions, and which are employed about the conſtruction of doors, and diſtribute the parts of the cementing art. We have likewiſe divided the armour-making art, which is a ſection of the great and all-various power effective of defence. We alſo defined, in the very beginning, the whole art of cooking, which is converſant with alexipharmics; and we left a certain art, which appears to be that we are in purſuit of, viz. which defends againſt cold, produces woollen veſtments, and is called the art of weaving.

Soc. JUN. It ſeems ſo.

GUEST. But we have not yet, O boy, perfectly diſcuſſed this matter. For he who is firſt engaged in the making of garments appears to act in a manner directly contrary to the weaver.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. For the work of the weaver is a certain knitting together.

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. But the work of him who firſt engages in the making of garments conſiſts in diſſolving things joined together.

Soc. JUN. What kind of work is this?

GUEST. The work of the art of carding wool. Or ſhall we dare to call the art of carding wool the weaving art, and a wool-carder a weaver?

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. But if any one ſhould call the art effective of the thread and woof in a loom the weaving art, he would aſſert a paradox, and give it a falſe name.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But whether ſhall we ſay that the whole attention and care of the fuller and the mender contribute nothing to the making of garments? Or ſhall we alſo call theſe weaving arts?

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. But all theſe contend with the power of the weaving art, reſpecting the care and the making of garments; attributing, indeed, to it the greateſt part, but likewiſe aſſigning to themſelves great portions of the ſame art.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Beſides theſe, it further appears requiſite, that the arts effective of

the inſtruments through which the weaver accompliſhes his work, ſhould be conſidered as concauſes of every work accompliſhed by weaving.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, will our diſcourſe about the weaving art, a part of which we have choſen, be ſufficiently defined, if we aſſert that it is the moſt beautiful and the greateſt of all the arts which are employed about woollen garments? Or ſhall we thus, indeed, ſpeak ſomething of the truth, but yet neither clearly nor perfectly till we have ſeparated all theſe arts from it?

Soc. JUN. This will be the caſe.

GUEST. Muſt we not, therefore, in the next place act in this manner, that our diſcourſe may proceed in an orderly ſeries?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. In the firſt place, therefore, let us conſider two arts which ſubſiſt about all things.

Soc. JUN. What are they?

GUEST. One is the concauſe of generation, and the other is the cauſe itſelf.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. Such arts as do not fabricate the thing itſelf, but prepare inſtruments for the fabricators, without which inſtruments the propoſed work cannot be effected,—theſe are concauſes: but thoſe which fabricate the thing itſelf are cauſes.

Soc. JUN. This diſtinction is reaſonable.

GUEST. In the next place, thoſe arts which produce the diſtaff, and the ſhuttle, and ſuch other inſtruments as contribute to the making of garments,—all theſe I call concauſes: but thoſe which pay attention to and fabricate garments I call cauſes.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. But, of cauſes, it will be proper eſpecially to collect that which pertains to the waſhing of garments, and that which is ſkilled in mending, and all the therapeutic care about theſe, ſince the coſmetic art is abundant, and to denominate the whole the fuller's art.

Soc. JUN. It will ſo.

GUEST. But there is one art comprehending that part which cards wool

and ſpins, and likewiſe every thing pertaining to the making of garments, and which is called by all men the wool-working art.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. The art of carding wool, and the half of that art which uſes the ſhuttle, and that art which ſeparates from each other things joined together, —all theſe, in ſhort, form a part of the wool-working art, of which there are two great parts, one collective, and the other ſeparative.

Soc. JUN. There are ſo.

GUEST. The art of carding wool, therefore, and all thoſe other arts which we juſt now mentioned, belong to the ſeparative part. For that art which divides in wool and thread, after one manner with the ſhuttle, and after another with the hands, has all the names which we have juſt now mentioned.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Again, we muſt take a part of the collective part, and of the wool-working art contained in it; but we muſt paſs by all ſuch things of a ſeparating nature as we happen to find there, and biſect the wool-working art, together with the collective and ſeparative ſection.

Soc. JUN. Let us divide them.

GUEST. It will be proper for you, therefore, Socrates, to divide the collective, together with the wool-working part, if we wiſh to apprehend ſufficiently the propoſed weaving art.

Soc. JUN. It will be requiſite.

GUEST. It will indeed: and we ſay, therefore, that one part of it is ſtreptic, or converſant with rolling, and the other ſymplectic, or complicative.

Soc. JUN. Do I then underſtand you? For you appear to me to ſay that the elaboration of the thread is ſtreptic.

GUEST. Not the elaboration of this only, but likewiſe of the woof. Or can we find any generation of it which is not ſtreptic?

Soc. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Define alſo each of theſe: for perhaps you will find the definition ſeaſonable.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect?

GUEST. In this. We ſay that the work of the wool-carder, when it is drawn out into length and breadth, is a certain fracture.

Soc. JUN. We do.

GUEST. This, when it is turned by the diſtaff, and becomes a ſolid thread, is called ſtamen: but they ſay that the art which directs this is ſtemonic, or converſant with ſtuff to be woven.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But ſuch things as receive a looſe contortion, and by the implication of the thread with the attraction of the poliſh acquire a meaſured ſoftneſs,—of theſe we call what is ſpun the woof, but the art itſelf which preſides over theſe, woof-ſpinning.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. And now that part of the weaving art which we propoſed is obvious to every one. For, with reſpect to a part of the collective art in the working of wool, when it accompliſhes that which is woven by a fit knitting together of the woof and the thread, then the whole of the thing woven is called a woollen garment, but the art preſiding over this, textorian.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. Be it ſo. But why then did we not immediately anſwer, that the plectic art is that which weaves together the woof and the thread, inſtead of proceeding in a circle, and defining many things in vain?

Soc. JUN. It does not appear to me, O gueſt, that we have ſaid any thing in vain.

GUEST. This is not at all wonderful. But perhaps, O bleſſed youth, it will be ſeen that you will often hereafter fall into this diſeaſe. Nor is it wonderful. But hear a certain diſcourſe, which is proper to be delivered reſpecting all ſuch particulars as theſe.

Soc. JUN. Only relate it.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, in the firſt place, behold the whole of exceſs and deficiency, that we may praiſe and blame according to reaſon whatever is ſaid with more prolixity or brevity than is becoming in diſputations of this kind.

Soc. JUN. It will be proper ſo to do.

GUEST. But I think we ſhall do right by diſcourſing about theſe things.

Soc. JUN. About what things?

GUEST. About prolixity and brevity, and the whole of exceſs and deficiency. For the art of meaſuring is converſant with all theſe.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. We will divide it, therefore, into two parts. For it is requiſite to that after which we are haſtening.

Soc. JUN. Inform me how this diviſion is to be made.

GUEST. Thus. One part according to the communion of magnitude and parvitude with each other; but the other part according to the neceſſary eſſence of generation.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. Does it not appear to you to be natural, that the greater ought to be called greater than nothing elſe than the leſſer? and again, that the leſſer ſhould not be leſſer than any thing than the greater?

Soc. JUN. To me it does.

GUEST. But what? Muſt we not ſay that what ſurpaſſes the nature of mediocrity, and is ſurpaſſed by it, whether in words or actions, is that by which eſpecially good and bad men differ from each other?

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Theſe twofold eſſences, therefore, and judgments of the great and the ſmall muſt be eſtabliſhed; but not, as we juſt now ſaid, with reference to each other only. But, as we now ſay, they are rather partly to be referred to each other, and partly to mediocrity. Are we however willing to learn on what account this is requiſite?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If ſome one refers the nature of the greater to nothing elſe than the nature of the leſſer, he will not refer it to mediocrity. Or will he?

Soc. JUN. He will not.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, divide the arts themſelves, and all their works, according to this reaſoning? And ſhall we not entirely take away the political ſcience which we are now inveſtigating, and that which is called the weaving art? For all ſuch things as theſe guard againſt that which is more or leſs than mediocrity, not as if it had no ſubſiſtence, but as a thing of a difficult nature in actions. And after this manner preſerving mediocrity, they effect every thing beautiful and good.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. If, therefore, we take away the politic ſcience, will not our inveſtigation after this of the royal ſcience be dubious?

Soc. JUN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, as in our inveſtigation of a ſophiſt, we compelled non-being to be, after diſcourſe about it fled from us, ſo now ſhall we compel the more and the leſs to become meaſured, not only with reference to each other, but likewiſe to the generation of mediocrity? For no one can indubitably become a politician, or knowing in any thing elſe pertaining to actions, unleſs he aſſents to this.

Soc. JUN. We ought, therefore, eſpecially to do this now.

GUEST. This, Socrates, is a ſtill greater work than that; though, as we may remember, that was very prolix. But a thing of this kind may be ſuppoſed reſpecting them, and very juſtly.

Soc. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. That there is occaſion for what we are now ſpeaking of, in order to evince what is accurate reſpecting this thing. Further ſtill, with reſpect to the preſent particulars, it appears to me to have been ſhown ſufficiently, that this diſcourſe will afford us magnificent aſſiſtance, as leading us to think that all arts are to be ſimilarly meaſured according to the more and the leſs, not only among themſelves, but likewiſe with reference to the generation of mediocrity. For, this having a ſubſiſtence, they alſo are: and, theſe ſubſiſting, this alſo is. And either of theſe being taken away, neither of them will ſubſiſt.

Soc. JUN. This indeed is right. But what follows?

GUEST. We ſhould evidently divide the art of meaſuring (as we have ſaid) into two parts; placing as one of its parts all thoſe arts which meaſure number, length, breadth, depth, and velocity, with reference to the contrary; but placing as its other part, ſuch arts as regard the moderate and the becoming, the ſeaſonable and the fit, and all ſuch as fly from the extremes to the middle.

Soc. JUN. Each of theſe ſections is great, and they differ much from each other.

GUEST. That, Socrates, which is ſometimes aſſerted by many of thoſe elegant men, who think they aſſert ſomething wiſe, when they ſay that the art of meaſuring is converſant with all generated natures, is now aſſerted by us. For all artificial things after a certain manner participate of meaſure; but, in conſequence of not being accuſtomed to divide according to ſpecies, theſe

theſe men immediately collect into the ſame theſe things which ſo widely differ from each other, and conſider them as ſimilar. And, again, they do the very contrary to this: for things which are different they do not divide according to parts, though it is requiſite that, when any one firſt perceives the communion of many things, he ſhould not deſiſt till he perceives all the differences in it which are placed in ſpecies: and again, when he perceives all-various diſſimilitudes in multitudes, he cannot deſiſt from this difficult perception, till, having incloſed all ſuch things as are allied in one ſimilitude, he comprehends them in the eſſence of a certain genus. And thus much may ſuffice reſpecting theſe particulars, and concerning defect and exceſs. This only muſt be carefully obſerved, that two genera of meaſures about theſe particulars have been invented, and that we ſhould remember what they are.

Soc. JUN. We will remember.

GUEST. But, after this diſcuſſion, let us aſſume another reſpecting the objects of our inveſtigation, and the whole purport of this diſcourſe.

Soc. JUN. What is it?

GUEST. If any one ſhould aſk us reſpecting the cuſtom of thoſe that learn their letters, when they are aſked from what letters a word is compoſed, ſhall we ſay that the inquiry is then made for the ſake of one word only, or that they may become more ſkilful in every thing pertaining to grammar?

Soc. JUN. Evidently that they may become more ſkilful in the whole of grammar.

GUEST. But what again? Is our inquiry reſpecting a politician undertaken by us more for the ſake of the politician, than that we may become more ſkilful in every diſcuſſion?

Soc. JUN. This alſo is evident, that it is undertaken on this latter account.

GUEST. No one indeed endued with intellect would be willing to inveſtigate the art of weaving, for its own ſake alone: but I think moſt men are ignorant, that there are certain ſenſible ſimilitudes of things which are naturally capable of being eaſily learnt, and that there is no difficulty in making theſe manifeſt, when any one wiſhes to point them out to ſome one inquiring a reaſon reſpecting them, not in conjunction with things, but with facility,

facility, without aſſigning a reaſon. But of things the greateſt and the moſt honourable, there is not any image clearly fabricated for men, which being exhibited by him who wiſhes to fill the ſoul of the inquirer, can, by being harmonized to ſome one of the ſenſes, ſufficiently fill the ſoul. Hence it is requiſite to meditate how we may be able to give and receive a reaſon for every thing. For incorporeal natures, as they are the moſt beautiful and the greateſt of all things, can alone be clearly pointed out by reaſon, but by nothing elſe. And all we have ſaid at preſent is aſſerted for the ſake of theſe things. But the conſideration of every particular is more eaſily effected in ſmall things than in ſuch as are great.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, remember on what account all theſe things have been ſaid by us?

Soc. JUN. On what account?

GUEST. Principally on account of the difficulty in which we were involved, through the prolix diſcourſe about the weaving art, and the revolution of the univerſe. We likewiſe conſidered the diſcourſe of the ſophiſt about the eſſence of non-being, as full of prolixity. And on all theſe accounts we terrified ourſelves, fearing leſt we ſhould ſpeak ſuperfluouſly in conjunction with prolixity. Conſider, therefore, all theſe things as ſaid by us, in order that we may not ſuffer any thing of this kind again.

Soc. JUN. Be it ſo. Only diſcuſs what remains.

GUEST. I ſay, therefore, it is requiſite that both you and I ſhould be mindful of what we have now ſaid, as often as brevity or prolixity of diſcourſe is blamed, not judging the prolixities by one another, but according to that part of the meaſuring art, which we ſaid above ought to be remembered with a view to the becoming.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. But yet all things are not referred to this. For we do not require in order to obtain pleaſure a prolixity which harmonizes with nothing, unleſs as a certain appendix. Nor is it proper to make the eaſy and rapid diſcovery of the object of our inveſtigation our principal intention; but this ought to be conſidered by us as a ſecondary thing. But we ſhould by far moſt eſpecially, and in the firſt place, honour the method which is able to divide according to ſpecies. We ſhould likewiſe by no means be indignant with

with a diſcourſe, however extended, which renders the hearer more inventive; and the ſame muſt be ſaid of a diſcourſe however ſhort. Further ſtill, it becomes him who blames long diſcourſes in diſquiſitions ſuch as theſe, and who does not admit circular periods, not to condemn them altogether rapidly, and immediately, but to ſhow firſt that we ſhall be more fit for diſcuſſion, and more capable of diſcovering things by reaſon, by ſhorter diſcourſes: but we ſhould neither pay any attention to, nor even ſeem to hear any other praiſe or blame. And thus much may ſuffice for theſe things, if it alſo ſeems ſo to you. Let us, therefore, again return to the political character, introducing the before-mentioned paradigm of the weaving art.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak well: and let us do as you ſay.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, the office of a king to be ſeparated from that of many ſhepherds, or rather from that of all thoſe who have the charge of herds?

Soc. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But we ſay that the conſideration of cauſes and concauſes reſpecting a city remains, which are firſt to be divided from each other.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. You know, therefore, that it is difficult to biſect theſe. But the cauſe of this will, I think, in the courſe of our inquiry be not leſs apparent.

Soc. JUN. It will be proper, therefore, ſo to do.

GUEST. Let us, then, divide them into parts, like victims, ſince we cannot biſect them: for it is always requiſite to cut into the neareſt number poſſible.

Soc. JUN. How, therefore, ſhall we do at preſent?

GUEST. Juſt as we did above: for we placed all ſuch inſtruments as are ſubſervient to weaving, as concauſes.

Soc. JUN. We did.

GUEST. The ſame thing, therefore, muſt be done by us now, and it is ſtill more neceſſary than it was then. For ſuch things as fabricate in a city either a ſmall or a large inſtrument are all of them to be conſidered as concauſes; ſince without theſe a city could never ſubſiſt, nor yet the politic ſcience. But yet again we do not eſtabliſh any one of theſe as the buſineſs of the royal ſcience.

Soc. JUN. We do not.

GUEST. We likewiſe attempt to accompliſh a difficult thing, in ſeparating this genus from others. For he who ſays that it is an inſtrument of ſome particular

particular being, appears to ſpeak probably: but at the ſame time we muſt ſay that this is different from the poſſeſſions belonging to a city.

Soc. JUN. In what reſpect?

GUEST. Becauſe it has not this power. For cauſes do not adhere to generation as an inſtrument, but on account of the ſafety of that which is fabricated.

Soc. JUN. What kind of thing do you mean?

GUEST. An all-various ſpecies produced from things dry and moiſt, fiery and without fire, and which we call by one appellation, a veſſel, though it is an abundant ſpecies: but I think this does not at all belong to the ſcience we are inveſtigating.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly not.

GUEST. But the third ſpecies, or that of poſſeſſions, appears to be multiform, conſiſting of the terreſtrial and aquatic, the much-wandering and the nerratic, the honourable and the ignoble; and it has one name, becauſe the whole of it ſubſiſts for the ſake of a certain ſitting, as it always becomes a ſeat to ſomething.

Soc. JUN. What kind of thing is it?

GUEST. It is that which is called a vehicle, a thing which is not entirely the work of the politic ſcience, but rather of the tectonic, ceramic[1], and calcotypic[2].

Soc. JUN. I underſtand you.

GUEST. Muſt we then mention a fourth ſpecies of theſe, in which moſt of the things formerly ſpoken of by us are contained? viz. every kind of garment, many arms, walls, all incloſures, conſiſting either of earth or ſtone, and ten thouſand other things. And ſince all theſe are conſtructed for the ſake of defence, the whole may moſt juſtly be called a fortification; and, for the moſt part, may more properly be conſidered as much more the work of the architect and weaver than of the politician.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Are we, therefore, willing to rank in the fifth place the arts of adorning, painting, and muſic, together with ſuch arts as uſe theſe; from which certain imitations are deviſed for the ſake of procuring us pleaſure, and which may be juſtly comprehended in one name?

[1] i. e. Pertaining to the potter's art. [2] i. e. Pertaining to the brazier's art.

Soc. JUN. In what name?

GUEST. They may be denominated ſportive.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. This one name, therefore, accords with all theſe: for no one of them does any thing ſeriouſly, but all their operations are for the ſake of ſport.

Soc. JUN. This alſo I nearly underſtand.

GUEST. But ought we not to place as a ſixth all-various ſpecies, and, which is the offspring of many other arts, that art which prepares bodies for all the above-mentioned particulars?

Soc. JUN. Of what art are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. That art which digs gold and ſilver, and other metals, out of the bowels of the earth; likewiſe that which cuts down trees, that which conſtructs ſomething by ſhaving off the hair, the knitting art, that which cuts off the barks of trees, and the ſkins of animals, and all ſuch arts as are converſant with things of this kind. Alſo, ſuch arts as procure cork, books, and bonds, fabricating compoſite ſpecies from genera which are not compoſite. The whole of this we call the firſt-born poſſeſſion of mankind, ſimple, and by no means the work of the royal ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. The poſſeſſion of nutriment, and ſuch things as when mingled with the body can, by their parts, adminiſter to its wants, muſt be ranked in the ſeventh place. And the whole of this muſt be denominated by us nutriment, unleſs we have any thing better to adopt inſtead of it. However, we may place the whole of this under agriculture, hunting, gymnaſtic, medicine, and cooking, and attribute it to theſe more properly than to the politic ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Nearly, therefore, all poſſeſſions, except thoſe of tame animals, may I think be found in theſe ſeven genera. But conſider: for it was moſt juſt that the ſpecies which we called firſt-born ſhould be introduced firſt; and after this, inſtrument, veſſel, vehicle, fortification, that which is ſportive, and cattle. But if any thing of no great conſequence is latent, which may be accommodated to ſome one of theſe, we omit it; ſuch as the idea of coin, of ſeals, and of every thing impreſſed or carved. For theſe things are

not very much allied to the genus; but ſome accord with it, for the purpoſe of ornament, others as ſubſervient to inſtruments, violently, indeed, but at the ſame time they may be drawn to this end. But the nurture of herds which we before diſtributed, ſeems to comprehend the whole poſſeſſion of tame animals, ſlaves being excepted.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. The genus of ſlaves, and of all ſervants, remains, in which I propheſy, that thoſe who contend with a king reſpecting the thing woven will become apparent, in the ſame manner as above, thoſe that knit, and thoſe that comb wool, and ſuch others as were then mentioned by us, contended with the weavers. But all the others who were called by us concauſes, together with the works juſt now mentioned, are ſet aſide, and are ſeparated from royal and political action.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. Let us then, approaching nearer, conſider the reſt, that we may more firmly perceive them.

Soc. JUN. It is, therefore, requiſite to do ſo.

GUEST. We ſhall find, then, that the greateſt ſervants, ſo far as we can ſee in this affair, are engaged in a purſuit, and poſſeſs a property the very contrary to what we have expected.

Soc. JUN. What are theſe?

GUEST. Men acquired by purchaſe; whom, beyond all controverſy, we ought to call ſlaves, and of whom we ſhould aſſert, that they by no means vindicate to themſelves the royal art.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what ſhall we ſay of thoſe free-born men who voluntarily engage in the ſervile employments mentioned by us above, viz. who tranſmit the works of huſbandry, and of the other arts, to each other, and who are engaged in mutual traffic, domeſtic or foreign, whether they change money for other things, or like for like, (whom we denominate money-changers, pilots, and huckſters,) ſhall we ſay that theſe will contend for any part of the politic ſcience?

Soc. JUN. Perhaps merchants will.

GUEST. But yet we never find that thoſe mercenaries who readily offer their ſervices to every one vindicate to themſelves the royal ſcience.

Soc. JUN. For how can they?

GUEST. What then ſhall we ſay of thoſe that act in this ſervile capacity every where?

Soc. JUN. Of whom are you ſpeaking? and of what kind of ſervile offices?

GUEST. I ſpeak of the tribe of criers, and of thoſe who become wiſe reſpecting letters[1], and often act in the capacity of ſervants, together with certain other perſons who are very ſkilful in the labours pertaining to government. What again ſhall we ſay of theſe?

Soc. JUN. That which you juſt now ſaid, that they are ſervants, but no rulers in cities.

GUEST. I do not think, therefore, I was looking at a dream, when I ſaid that many on this account would be ſeen ſtrenuouſly contending for the royal ſcience, though it may appear to be very abſurd to ſeek after theſe in any ſervile portion.

Soc. JUN. Very much ſo, indeed.

GUEST. Let us, beſides, approach ſtill nearer to thoſe whom we have not yet examined. But theſe are ſuch as poſſeſs a certain portion of miniſtrant ſcience about divination. For they are conſidered as interpreting to men things proceeding from the Gods.

Soc. JUN. They are.

GUEST. The genus too of prieſts, as eſtabliſhed by law, knows in what manner we ſhould offer gifts, through ſacrifices, to the Gods, ſo as to render the divinities propitious to us; and likewiſe, after what manner we ſhould requeſt of them, by prayer, the poſſeſſion of good things. But both theſe are parts of the miniſtrant art.

Soc. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. Now, therefore, we appear to me to touch, as it were, upon a certain veſtige of the object of our ſearch. For the figure of prieſts and prophets is very replete with prudence, and receives a venerable opinion through the magnitude of the undertakings. Hence, among the Egyptians, a king is not allowed to govern without the ſacerdotal ſcience; ſo that, if any one belonging to another genus of men uſurps the kindg›m, he is afterwards

[1] Viz. grammarians.

 compelled

compelled to be initiated in their myſteries, that he may be ſkilled in the ſacerdotal ſcience. Further ſtill, in many places belonging to the Greeks, we ſhall find that the greateſt ſacrifices of this kind are under the direction of the greateſt magiſtrates; and the truth of what I aſſert is particularly evinced among you. For, when a king is elected, they ſay that the moſt venerable of all the antient ſacrifices, and ſuch as are moſt peculiar to the country, are to be conſigned to the care of the new king.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. We ſhould, therefore, conſider theſe kings choſen by lot, together with the prieſts, their ſervants, and a certain other numerous crowd, which juſt now became manifeſt to us, apart from our former aſſertions.

Soc. JUN. Of whom are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. Of certain very wonderful perſons.

Soc. JUN. Why ſo?

GUEST. As I was juſt now ſpeculating, the genus of them appeared to me to be all-various. For many men reſemble lions and centaurs, and other things of this kind; and very many are ſimilar to ſatyrs, and to imbecil and multiform wild beaſts. They likewiſe rapidly change their ideas and their power into each other. And indeed, Socrates, I appear to myſelf to have juſt now perceived theſe men for the firſt time.

Soc. JUN. Speak: for you ſeem to behold ſomething unuſual.

GUEST. I do: for the unuſual or wonderful happens to all men from ignorance. And I myſelf juſt now ſuffered the very ſame thing: for I was ſuddenly involved in doubt on perceiving the choir of civil concerns.

Soc. JUN. What choir?

GUEST. The greateſt enchanter of all ſophiſts, and the moſt ſkilled in this art, who muſt be ſeparated from truly political and royal characters, though this is difficult in the extreme, if we intend to ſee clearly the object of our inveſtigation.

Soc. JUN. We muſt by no means omit to do this.

GUEST. We muſt not, indeed, according to my opinion: but tell me this.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. Is not a monarchy one of our political governments?

Soc. JUN. It is.

GUEST. And after a monarchy I think an oligarchy may be placed.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But is not the third ſcheme of a polity the government of the multitude, and which is called a democracy?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. May not theſe three become after a manner five, ſince they produce two other names from themſelves?

Soc. JUN. What are theſe two?

GUEST. Thoſe who now look to the violent and the voluntary, to poverty and riches, law and the tranſgreſſion of law, which take place in theſe governments, and who give a twofold diviſion to each of the two, and call monarchy by two names, as affording two ſpecies, viz. tyrannic and royal.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But they denominate a city which is governed by a few an ariſtocracy and an oligarchy.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But no one is ever accuſtomed to change the name of a democracy, whether the people govern the rich violently, or with their conſent, and whether they accurately defend the laws or not.

Soc. JUN. True.

GUEST. What then? Shall we think that any one of theſe polities is right, thus bounded by theſe definitions, viz. by one, and a few, and a many, by riches and poverty, by the violent and the voluntary, by written laws, and the privation of laws?

Soc. JUN. What ſhould hinder?

GUEST. Conſider more attentively, following me hither.

Soc. JUN. Whither?

GUEST. Shall we abide by that which was aſſerted by us at firſt, or ſhall we diſſent from it?

Soc. JUN. Of what aſſertion are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. I think we ſaid that a royal government was one of the ſciences.

Soc. JUN. We did.

GUEST. Yet we did not conſider it as any one ſcience indiſcriminately; but we ſelected it from the other ſciences, as ſomething judicial and preſiding.

Soc. JUN. We did.

GUEST. And of the preſiding ſcience, dividing one part, as belonging to inanimate

animate works, and the other as belonging to animals, we have proceeded thus far, not forgetting that we were ſcientifically employed; but we have not yet been able to determine with ſufficient accuracy what this ſcience is.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, underſtand this, that the definition muſt not be made by the few, nor by the many, nor yet by the voluntary or involuntary, nor by poverty or riches, but according to a certain ſcience, if we follow what has been formerly delivered?

Soc. JUN. But, indeed, it is impoſſible that this ſhould not be done.

GUEST. From neceſſity, therefore, we muſt now conſider in which of theſe the ſcience reſpecting the government of men happens to ſubſiſt; this government being nearly the greateſt of all others, and the moſt difficult to obtain. For it is requiſite to inſpect it, that we may perceive what are the things which muſt be taken away from a prudent king, and who thoſe are that pretend to be, and perſuade the multitude that they are, politicians, but who are by no means ſo.

Soc. JUN. Our former reaſoning evinces that it is requiſite to act in this manner.

GUEST. Does it then appear to you that the multitude in a city is able to acquire this ſcience?

Soc. JUN. How can they?

GUEST. In a city, therefore, conſiſting of a thouſand men, is it poſſible that a hundred or five hundred of the inhabitants can ſufficiently acquire this ſcience?

Soc. JUN. If this were the caſe, it would be the moſt eaſy of all arts. For we know that among a thouſand men there cannot be found ſo great a number of thoſe that excel the other Greeks in the game of cheſs, much leſs can there be found as many kings. But, according to our former reaſoning, it is requiſite to call him royal who poſſeſſes the royal ſcience, whether he governs or not.

GUEST. You very properly remind me: but I think it follows from this, that a right government, when it ſubſiſts rightly, ought to be inveſtigated about one perſon, or two, or altogether about a few.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And, as we now think, thoſe that govern according to a certain art

art are to be conſidered as political and regal characters, whether they govern the willing or the refractory, whether according to or without written laws, and whether they are rich or poor. For we call thoſe who heal the maladies of the body, no leſs phyſicians, whether they cure by cutting, or burning, or any other painful application, the voluntary or the refractory; and whether from writings or without writings; and whether they are poor or rich. In all theſe caſes we ſay that they are no leſs phyſicians, ſo long as they proceed according to art, in purging or ſome other way attenuating the body, or in cauſing it to increaſe; and ſo long as, alone regarding the good of the body, they reſtore it from a worſe to a better habit, and preſerve it when thus reſtored. After this manner alone, as I think, we muſt ſay that the definition of the medicinal or any other government is rightly made.

Soc. JUN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. It is neceſſary, therefore, as it ſeems, that that polity alone muſt in the higheſt degree be rightly eſtabliſhed, in which the governors are found to be truly, and not in appearance only, ſcientific; whether they govern according to laws, or without laws; whether they rule over the obedient, or the refractory; and whether they are rich or poor. For no one of theſe is of any conſequence with reſpect to rectitude of government.

Soc. JUN. Beautifully ſaid.

GUEST. Nor yet is it of any conſequence, whether they purge the city with a view to its good, by putting to death or baniſhing certain perſons; or whether they ſend out colonies, like a ſwarm of bees, and thus diminiſh the people; or whether, introducing certain foreigners, they make citizens of them, and thus increaſe the city. For, ſo long as, employing ſcience and juſtice, they cauſe the city, to the utmoſt of their power, to paſs from a worſe to a better condition, and preſerve it in this ſtate,—ſo far, and according to ſuch definitions, we ſay that a polity is alone rightly eſtabliſhed; but that ſuch others, as we have mentioned, are neither genuinely nor truly polities. We muſt likewiſe willingly ſay that ſuch polities as imitate this are conſonant to reaſon, and tend to things more beautiful, but that ſuch as do not, tend to deformity by an imitation of things evil.

Soc. JUN. Other things indeed, O gueſt, appear to have been diſcuſſed ſufficiently: but it is not eaſy to admit your aſſertion, that it is requiſite to govern without laws.

GUEST.

GUEST. You have got before me a little, Socrates, by your queſtion. For I was going to aſk you, whether you admit all theſe things, or whether you find any difficulty in any thing that has been ſaid. It is however evident, that we now wiſh to inquire concerning the rectitude of thoſe that govern without laws.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. After a certain manner it is evident that legiſlation pertains to the royal ſcience: but it is beſt, not for the laws to prevail, but a man who is royal in conjunction with prudence. Do you know why?

SOC. JUN. Inform me.

GUEST. Becauſe law cannot, by comprehending that which is moſt excellent, and at the ſame time moſt accurately juſt, for all men, always enjoin that which is beſt. For the diſſimilitudes of men and actions, and the unceaſing reſtleſſneſs, as I may ſay, of human affairs, do not permit any art whatever to be exhibited reſpecting all things, and through every time. Shall we admit theſe aſſertions?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we ſee that law nearly endeavours to accompliſh this very thing, like a certain arrogant and ignorant man, who does not ſuffer any thing to be done contrary to his own orders, nor any one to aſk whether it would not be better to make ſome new regulation, contrary to what he has ordained.

SOC. JUN. True. For the law does as you ſay.

GUEST. But it is impoſſible that a thing which is ſimple ſhould prevail in things which are never at any time ſimple.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. The cauſe, therefore, muſt be found out why it is neceſſary to eſtabliſh laws, ſince law does not poſſeſs the greateſt rectitude.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Are there not, therefore, among us, as alſo in other cities, certain exerciſes of men collected together, whether belonging to the courſe, or to any thing elſe which is undertaken for the ſake of contention?

SOC. JUN. There are very many ſuch exerciſes.

GUEST. Come then, let us again recall to our memory the mandates of thoſe who preſide over gymnaſtic exerciſes according to art.

Soc.

Soc. JUN. What are their mandates?

GUEST. They do not think that a ſubtle diviſion ſhould be made, according to each individual, ſo as to enjoin that which is adapted to the body of each; but that attention ſhould be paid to what is more common, and which is advantageous for the moſt part, and to a many.

Soc. JUN. Excellent.

GUEST. Hence at preſent aſſigning equal labours to collected bodies of men, they at the ſame time impel them to begin the conteſt together, and to reſt from the race, from wreſtling, and from all the labours of the body, at one and the ſame time.

Soc. JUN. They do ſo.

GUEST. We, therefore, think that the legiſlator who preſides over the herds of men, and enjoins them what is juſt reſpecting their compacts with each other, cannot, while he gives laws to them collectively, accurately aſſign what is fit to each individual.

Soc. JUN. This is likely to be the caſe.

GUEST. But I think that in a leſs ſubtle way he will eſtabliſh laws for the multitude, and for the moſt part, both written and unwritten, and ſuch as are agreeable to the manners of the country.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Right indeed. For how, Socrates, can any one attend ſufficiently to individuals through the whole of life, and accurately enjoin what is adapted to each? For, though he who poſſeſſes the royal ſcience could, I think, do this, he would ſcarcely preſcribe for himſelf thoſe impediments which are called laws.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo, O gueſt, from what has been now ſaid.

GUEST. Rather, O moſt excellent youth, from what will be ſaid.

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. This. For we thus ſay to ourſelves: If a phyſician, or maſter of gymnaſtic, intending to travel, and to be abſent from thoſe under his care for a long time, ſhould think that thoſe who are exerciſed, or thoſe who are ſick, would not remember his precepts, he will wiſh to write commentaries for them. Or how ſhall we ſay?

Soc. JUN. That he will wiſh to do ſo.

GUEST. But what? If the phyſician ſhould return ſooner than he thought,

will he venture to order them certain other things beſides thoſe contained in his writings, if any thing better ſhould occur for the ſick, through winds, or any thing elſe, which is wont to take place through Jupiter, contrary to expectation? Will he think that he ought ſtrenuouſly to perſevere in his former injunctions, neither himſelf ordering any thing elſe, nor the ſick man daring to do any thing different from his written preſcriptions; theſe being medicinal and ſalubrious, but things of a different nature, noxious, and contrary to art? Or rather, every thing of this kind happening about all things according to ſcience and true art, will not his edicts become the moſt ridiculous of all others?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But ſhall not he who writes things juſt and unjuſt, beautiful and baſe, good and evil, and who eſtabliſhes unwritten laws for the herds of mankind, who live in cities according to written laws,—ſhall not he, I ſay, who has written laws according to art, or any other who reſembles him, be permitted on his return to enjoin things different from theſe? Or, rather, would not this interdiction appear in reality to be no leſs ridiculous than the former?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you know, therefore, what the multitude ſay reſpecting a thing of this kind?

Soc. JUN. I do not at preſent remember.

GUEST. But it is very ſpecious. For they ſay, if any one has found out laws better than thoſe that are already eſtabliſhed, and can perſuade his citizens that they are better, he ſhould eſtabliſh them; otherwiſe not.

Soc. JUN. Do they not, therefore, ſay rightly?

GUEST. Perhaps ſo. But if ſome one ſhould introduce that which is beſt, not by perſuaſion, but by force, what name muſt be given to this violence? Or, rather, firſt anſwer me reſpecting the former particulars.

Soc. JUN. Of what particulars are you ſpeaking?

GUEST. If any one who is properly ſkilled in the medical art ſhould not perſuade but compel a boy, or a man, or a woman, to do that which is better, but at the ſame time contrary to written preſcriptions, what will be the name of this violence? Ought it not to be called rather any thing than a tranſgreſſion of art, or a noxious error? And ſhould we not ſay that

every thing will happen to the compelled perſon, rather than any thing noxious and contrary to art from the compelling phyſicians?

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak moſt true.

GUEST. But what is that error to be called which is contrary to the political art? Muſt it not be denominated baſe, evil, and unjuſt?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. But come, will not he be the moſt ridiculous of all men, who ſhould blame the violence of thoſe that force men to act more juſtly, better, and more beautifully than before, contrary to written precepts, and the laws of their country? And ought not every thing rather to be aſſerted of thoſe that are thus compelled, than that they ſuffer things baſe, unjuſt, and evil?

Soc. JUN. Your aſſertion is moſt true.

GUEST. But if he who compels is rich, will his compulſions be juſt,—but, if he is poor, unjuſt? Or ſhall we not rather ſay, that he who effects what is advantageous, whether he perſuades or does not perſuade, whether he is rich or poor, and whether he acts according or contrary to written injunctions, will act conformably to the moſt true definition of the right government of a city? For a wiſe and good man will always govern in this manner, always attending to the advantage of his ſubjects, in the ſame manner as a pilot is watchful for the ſafety of the ſhip and the ſailors. And as the pilot preſerves the ſailors, not by written mandates but by exhibiting to them laws according to art, after the ſame manner an upright polity will be produced by thoſe who are thus able to govern, by exhibiting a ſtrength of art better than the laws. And, in ſhort, prudent governors never err in any part of their conduct, as long as they obſerve this one thing, viz. by always diſtributing that which is moſt juſt to the citizens, in conjunction with intellect and art, to preſerve them, and, from being worſe, render them better to the utmoſt of their power.

Soc. JUN. Theſe aſſertions cannot be contradicted.

GUEST. Nor yet thoſe.

Soc. JUN. What aſſertions do you mean?

GUEST. That no multitude whatever can receive that ſcience, by which a city is governed according to intellect, but that an upright polity muſt be inveſtigated about a ſmall number, and a few, and one perſon; and that other polities are to be conſidered as imitations, as we obſerved a little before,

ſome reſembling this in a more beautiful, and others in a more deformed manner.

Soc. JUN. How do you ſay this? For I do not underſtand what you juſt now ſaid reſpecting imitations.

GUEST. He would not act badly, who, after introducing a diſcourſe of this kind, ſhould deſiſt before he had ſhown the error which is at preſent committed.

Soc. JUN. What error do you mean?

GUEST. It is requiſite to inveſtigate a thing of that kind, which is not altogether uſual, nor yet eaſy to perceive; but at the ſame time we muſt endeavour to apprehend it. For, ſince an upright polity is that alone of which we have ſpoken, do you not know that other polities ought to be preſerved, while they uſe the inſtitutions of this, and do that which we juſt now praiſed, though it is not moſt right?

Soc. JUN. What is that?

GUEST. That no citizen ſhall dare to act in any reſpect contrary to the laws, and that he who dares to do ſo ſhall be puniſhed with death, and ſhall ſuffer all extreme puniſhments. This is moſt right and beautiful in the ſecond place; for that which was juſt now mentioned muſt be ranked in the firſt place. But we ſhould unfold the manner in which that which we call ſecondary ſubſiſts. Or ſhould we not?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But let us again return to images, to which it is always neceſſary to aſſimilate royal governors.

Soc. JUN. What kind of images?

GUEST. The generous pilot, and, as Homer ſays, the phyſician, who is of equal worth with many others. Let us conſider the affair by deviſing a certain figure in theſe things.

Soc. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. Such a one, as if we all conceived that we ſuffered the moſt dire things from theſe perſons. For ſuch of us as they wiſh to ſave, they do ſave; and ſuch as they wiſh to injure, they injure by cutting and burning; at the ſame time ordering money to be given them as a reward for this, not ſpending any thing themſelves on the ſick, but they and their familiars making uſe of others. And laſtly, receiving money either from the kindred or

from certain enemies of the ſick man, they cauſe him to die. Pilots too effect ten thouſand other things of this kind. For they deſignedly leave men by themſelves in certain receſſes, and, committing an error in navigation, hurl them into the ſea, and injure them in other reſpects. In conſequence of conſidering theſe things, let us ſuppoſe that we conſult how we may deprive theſe arts of their independent authority, ſo that they may no longer poſſeſs abſolute power, either over ſlaves or the free-born. Hence, we aſſemble together for this purpoſe, and convene either all the people, or the rich only. In this aſſembly, obſcure individuals and mechanics give their opinion reſpecting the ſhip and diſeaſes; viz. after what manner medicines, and medical inſtruments, ſhould be employed about the diſeaſed; and likewiſe ſhips and nautical inſtruments in navigation, in the dangers to which ſhips are ſubject, through the winds, the ſea, and pirates, and when there is occaſion to fight with long ſhips againſt others of the like kind. Let us likewiſe ſuppoſe that the opinions, either of certain phyſicians and pilots, or of other private perſons, given in this aſſembly, are inſcribed in triangular tables and pillars, and that certain unwritten cuſtoms of the country are eſtabliſhed, according to which in all future times navigation is to be conducted, and remedies for the ſick adminiſtered.

Soc. JUN. You have ſpoken of very abſurd things.

GUEST. Let us likewiſe ſuppoſe that yearly governors of the multitude are eſtabliſhed, whether choſen by lot from the rich, or from all the people; and let them govern both ſhips and the diſeaſed, according to thoſe written inſtitutions.

Soc. JUN. Theſe things appear ſtill more difficult.

GUEST. Let us likewiſe ſee what is conſequent to theſe things. For when the year of each governor is expired, it will be neceſſary that courts of juſtice ſhould be eſtabliſhed, which are compoſed either of choſen rich men, or from all the people, for the purpoſe of calling the governors to account, and reproving them when requiſite. Let every one likewiſe who is willing be permitted to accuſe the governors, as neither governing the ſhips, during the year, according to the written injunctions, nor according to the antient manners of their anceſtors. And let the ſame things be permitted to take place reſpecting thoſe that cure the diſeaſed. But let thoſe that

that are convicted be punished in whatever manner the judges shall think fit.

Soc. JUN. He, therefore, who voluntarily governs these men will most justly suffer from them, and receive whatever punishment they please.

GUEST. Further still, it will be requisite that a law should be established for all these, that if any one introduces a mode of piloting different from the written institutions, or shall be found investigating the salubrious, and the truth of the medicinal art, contrary to the writings, about winds, heat and cold, or devising any thing whatever, about affairs of this kind;—in the first place, he shall neither be called a pilot nor a physician, but a certain boastful and garrulous sophist; and, in the next place, he shall be brought before a court of justice, by any person who is willing, as one who corrupts other young men, and persuades them that every one should be permitted to pilot ships, and cure the diseased, not according to the laws, but according to his own will. And if any one shall be found persuading either young or old men, contrary to the laws, and the written mandates, he shall be punished in the extreme. For nothing ought to be wiser than the laws. Besides, no one should be ignorant of the medicinal and the salubrious, nor of nautical affairs. For every one who is willing is permitted to learn the written mandates, and the customs of his country. If these particulars, Socrates, should take place about these sciences, viz. about military concerns, the whole of hunting, and painting, imitation, and architecture, the formation of instruments of every kind, agriculture, botany; or, again, about the care pertaining to horses, and herds of cattle of every kind, prophecy, the whole of servile offices, the game of chess, the whole of arithmetic in its simple state, whether it is conversant with planes or depths, or swiftness and slowness;—if these particulars, I say, should take place about these sciences, so as to cause them to be effected according to the written mandates, and not according to art, what shall we say?

Soc. JUN. It is evident that all arts must be entirely subverted, without ever being restored, in consequence of the law which forbids investigation. So that life, which is at present difficult, would then be perfectly intolerable.

GUEST. But what will you say to this? If we should compel each of the above-mentioned particulars to take place according to written injunctions, and

and ſhould appoint as the guardian of theſe writings a man either choſen by ſuffrage, or chance, but who paying no attention to them, either for the ſake of a certain gain, or private pleaſure, ſhould endeavour, though ignorant of every thing, to act contrary to theſe mandates; would not this be a greater evil than the former?

Soc. JUN. It moſt truly would.

GUEST. For he who ſhould dare to act contrary to thoſe laws which have been eſtabliſhed from long experience by thoſe who, conſulting how to gratify the people, have perſuaded them to adopt them, will commit an error of a very extended nature, and ſubvert every action in a much greater degree than written mandates are capable of effecting.

Soc. JUN. How is it poſſible he ſhould not?

GUEST. Hence, as it is ſaid, there is a ſecond navigation for thoſe that eſtabliſh laws and written mandates reſpecting any thing whatever, viz. that neither one perſon, nor the multitude, ſhould ever be ſuffered to do any thing at any time contrary to them.

Soc. JUN. Right.

GUEST. Will not theſe writings, therefore, be certain imitations of truth, compoſed by intelligent men, in the greateſt perfection of which they are capable?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But, if we remember, we have ſaid, that a man truly knowing in political concerns will do many things from art, without paying any attention to written mandates, when any thing occurs to him better than what he has left behind him in writing.

Soc. JUN. We did ſay ſo.

GUEST. And if any thing better than what is eſtabliſhed by law ſhould occur either to an individual, or to the people at large, will they not in this caſe, to the utmoſt of their power, act in the ſame manner as the true politician?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, they ſhould act in this manner, without poſſeſſing ſcience, they would attempt to imitate that which is true, but the whole of their imitation would be vicious; but if their conduct is the effect of art, this is no longer an imitation, but is a thing itſelf moſt true.

Soc. JUN. It is ſo in every reſpect.

GUEST.

GUEST. It was likewiſe acknowledged by us above, that the multitude is incapable of receiving any art whatever.

SOC. JUN. It was.

GUEST. If, therefore, there is a certain royal art, the multitude of the rich, and the whole of the people, can never receive this politic ſcience.

SOC. JUN. For how can they?

GUEST. It is requiſite then (as it ſeems) that ſuch-like polities, if they intend to imitate as much as poſſible that true polity which is governed according to art by one man, muſt never do any thing contrary to their written laws, and the cuſtoms of their country.

SOC. JUN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully.

GUEST. When, therefore, the rich imitate this polity, we then denominate ſuch a polity an ariſtocracy: but when they pay no attention to the laws, an oligarchy.

SOC. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. And again, when one man governs according to the laws, imitating him who is endued with ſcience, then we call ſuch a one a king, not diſtinguiſhing by name him who governs with ſcience from the monarch who governs with opinion according to the laws.

SOC. JUN. We appear to do ſo.

GUEST. If, therefore, one man governs, who truly poſſeſſes a ſcientific knowledge of government, he is entirely called by this name a king, and by no other: for this alone, of the five names of the polities juſt now mentioned, belongs to him.

SOC. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. But when one man governs neither according to the laws, nor according to the cuſtoms of the country, but at the ſame time pretends that he poſſeſſes a ſcientific knowledge, and that it is beſt to act in this manner, contrary to the written mandates, though a certain intemperate deſire and ignorance are the leaders of this imitation, muſt not a man of this kind be called a tyrant?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Thus, then, we ſay, a tyrant, a king, an oligarchy, an ariſtocracy, and a democracy, will be produced; mankind indignantly bearing the authority of a monarch, and not believing that any man will ever be found worthy

worthy of ſuch a government, ſo as to be both willing and able to govern with virtue and ſcience, and properly diſtribute to all men things juſt and holy. They are likewiſe fearful, that one man endued with abſolute power will injure, oppreſs, and ſlay whomſoever he pleaſes: though, if ſuch a character ſhould ariſe, as we have mentioned, he would be beloved, and his adminiſtration, on account of its accurate rectitude, would alone render a polity happy.

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But now, ſince no ſuch king is to be found in cities, who, as if produced in a ſwarm of bees, excels from the very beginning both in body and ſoul, it is requiſite, as it ſeems, that men aſſembling together ſhould compoſe written inſtitutions, treading in the footſteps of the moſt true polity.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. And ſhall we wonder, Socrates, that in ſuch-like polities thoſe evils ſhould take place which we behold at preſent, and which will ſubſiſt in future, when they reſt on the foundation of written mandates and long eſtabliſhed cuſtoms, and not on the firm baſis of ſcience? Or ought we not rather to admire how ſtrong a thing a city naturally is? For, though cities have ſubſiſted for an immenſe length of time in this condition, yet ſome of them have continued ſtable, and have not been ſubverted; at the ſame time many of them, like veſſels merged in the ſea, have periſhed, do periſh, and will periſh, through the depravity of the pilots and ſailors, who are involved in the *greateſt* ignorance reſpecting the greateſt concerns; for though they know nothing about political affairs, yet they think their knowledge of the political ſcience is the moſt clear of all ſcientific knowledge.

SOC. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. As, therefore, all theſe erroneous polities are full of difficulties, we ſhould conſider in which it is the leaſt difficult and burthenſome to live; for, though this is ſuperfluous with reſpect to our preſent inquiry, yet, perhaps, univerſally we all of us do all things for the ſake of this.

SOC. JUN. It is impoſſible it ſhould not be requiſite to conſider this.

GUEST. Of three things, therefore, they ſay that one is remarkably difficult, and at the ſame time eaſy.

SOC. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. No otherwiſe than as I ſaid before, that there are three polities, a monarchy, the government of a few, and the government of a many, which three polities were at firſt mentioned by us in a confuſed manner.

SOC. JUN. There were.

GUEST. Biſecting, therefore, each of theſe, we ſhall produce ſix, ſeparating from theſe the upright polity, as a ſeventh.

SOC. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. We muſt diſtribute monarchy into the royal and the tyrannic; but the polity which is not compoſed from a multitude, into an ariſtocracy and oligarchy, which form an illuſtrious diviſion. Again, we formerly conſidered the polity which is compoſed from a multitude as ſimple, and called it a democracy, but we muſt now eſtabliſh this as twofold.

SOC. JUN. How ſo? And after what manner do we make this diviſion?

GUEST. Not at all different from the others, though the name of this is now twofold. But to govern according to the laws, and to tranſgreſs the laws, is common both to this and the other polities.

SOC. JUN. It is ſo.

GUEST. Then, indeed, when we were inveſtigating an upright polity, this ſection was of no uſe, as we have ſhown above: but ſince we have ſeparated it from the others, and have conſidered the others as neceſſary, in theſe we divide each according to the legal, and the tranſgreſſion of law.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo from what has now been ſaid.

GUEST. A monarchy, therefore, when conjoined with good written inſtitutions, which we call laws, is the beſt of all the ſix polities; but when ſubſiſting without law is grievous, and moſt burthenſome to live under.

SOC. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But the polity which is compoſed of not many, ought to be conſidered by us as a medium, in the ſame manner as a few is a medium between one and many. But again, we ſhould conſider the polity which is compoſed of many as in all things imbecil, and as incapable, when compared with the others, of accompliſhing either any great good or great evil; in conſequence of authority in this polity being divided according to ſmall parts among many. Hence, this is the worſt of all theſe legal polities, but the beſt of all ſuch as are illegal. And where all are intemperate, it is beſt to live in a democracy; but where all are temperate, this polity is the worſt

to

to live in. The firſt and beſt condition of life is in the firſt polity, the ſeventh being excepted. For this muſt be ſeparated from all the other polities, in the ſame manner as divinity from men.

Soc. JUN. Theſe things appear thus to ſubſiſt and happen; and that muſt be done which you mention.

GUEST. Ought not, therefore, the governors of all theſe polities (the governor of the ſcientific polity being excepted) to be withdrawn, as not being truly political but ſeditious characters; and as preſiding over the greateſt images, and being ſuch themſelves? And as they are the greateſt imitators and enchanters, are they not the greateſt ſophiſts of ſophiſts?

Soc. JUN. This appellation ſeems to pertain, with the greateſt rectitude, to thoſe that are called politicians.

GUEST. Be it ſo. This, indeed, is as a drama for us; juſt as we lately ſaid that we ſaw a certain Centauric and Satyric Bacchic choir, which was to be ſeparated from the politic art, and now this has ſcarcely been ſeparated by us.

Soc. JUN. So it appears.

GUEST. But another thing ſtill more difficult than this remains, which is more allied to the royal genus, and which at the ſame time it is more difficult to underſtand. And we appear to me to be affected in a manner ſimilar to thoſe that purify gold.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. Thoſe workmen firſt of all ſeparate earth, ſtones, and many other things; but, after this, ſuch things as are allied to gold remain, which are honourable, and alone to be ſeparated by fire,—I mean braſs and ſilver, and ſometimes diamonds. Theſe being with difficulty ſeparated by fuſion, ſcarcely ſuffer us to ſee that which is called perfectly pure gold.

Soc. JUN. So it is ſaid reſpecting theſe things.

GUEST. After the ſame manner, we alſo appear now to have ſeparated from the politic ſcience things different, and ſuch as are foreign and not friendly, and to have left ſuch as are honourable and allied to it. But among the number of theſe, the military and judicial arts, and that rhetoric which communicates with the royal ſcience, perſuading men to act juſtly, and which, together with that ſcience, governs the affairs of cities, may be ranked. Theſe if ſome one ſhould after a certain manner ſeparate with facility, he will ſhow naked and alone by himſelf that character which we are inveſtigating.

Soc. JUN. It is evident that we ſhould endeavour to do this.

GUEST. For the ſake of an experiment, therefore, it will be evident: but we ſhould endeavour to render it apparent through muſic. Inform me, therefore.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. Have we any diſcipline of muſic, and univerſally of the ſciences, concerning manual operations?

Soc. JUN. We have.

GUEST. But what? Shall we ſay that any one among theſe is a certain ſcience which teaches us what we ought to learn reſpecting theſe things, and what we ought not? Or how ſhall we ſay?

Soc. JUN. We muſt ſay that there is.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, confeſs that this is different from the others?

Soc. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. But whether muſt we ſay that no one of them rules over the other? or that the others rule over this? or that this, as a guardian, ought to rule over all the others?

Soc. JUN. That this ſcience ought to rule over the others, which teaches us, whether it is requiſite to learn any one of them, or not.

GUEST. You aſſert, therefore, that it ought to rule over both the teacher and the learner.

Soc. JUN. Very much ſo.

GUEST. And do you likewiſe aſſert, that the ſcience which judges whether it is requiſite to perſuade or not, ſhould rule over him who is able to perſuade?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. To what ſcience, therefore, ſhall we attribute that which perſuades the multitude and the crowd, through mythology, but not through doctrine?

Soc. JUN. I think it is evident that this is to be attributed to the rhetoric ſcience.

GUEST. But again, to what ſcience ſhall we attribute the power of judging, whether we ſhould act towards certain perſons through perſuaſion, or through a certain violence; or, univerſally, whether we ought ever to employ either perſuaſion or violence?

Soc.

Soc. JUN. To that which rules over the arts of perſuaſion and diſcourſe.

GUEST. But this, as I think, will not be any other than the power of the politician.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak moſt beautifully.

GUEST. Thus, therefore, the rhetoric appears to have been very rapidly ſeparated from the politic ſcience, as being another ſpecies, but ſubſervient to this ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Certainly.

GUEST. But again, what muſt we conceive reſpecting this power?

Soc. JUN. What power?

GUEST. That by which we war upon thoſe againſt whom we have declared war. Whether ſhall we ſay that this is endued with, or deprived of, art?

Soc. JUN. How can we conceive that power to be deprived of art which the commanding art and all warlike actions employ?

GUEST. But ſhall we conſider that power which is able to conſult ſcientifically, whether it is proper to engage in war, or make peace, as different from this, or the ſame with it?

Soc. JUN. From what has been before eſtabliſhed, it neceſſarily follows that it muſt be different.

GUEST. Muſt not, therefore, the military ſcience have dominion over the warrior, if we in a ſimilar manner follow what has been before advanced?

Soc. JUN. It muſt.

GUEST. What ſcience then ſhall we endeavour to evince as the deſpot of the whole of the military art, which is thus ſkilful and mighty, except the truly royal ſcience?

Soc. JUN. No other whatever.

GUEST. We muſt not, therefore, conſider the ſcience of military commanders as the ſame with the political, to which it is ſubſervient.

Soc. JUN. It is not proper we ſhould.

GUEST. But come, let us contemplate the power of judges who judge rightly.

Soc. JUN. By all means.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, capable of doing more than merely judging what is juſt or unjuſt, reſpecting ſuch compacts as are legal, and which have

been eſtabliſhed by royal authority; employing for this purpoſe its own proper virtue, ſo as never to wiſh to diſſolve mutual accuſations, either through the influence of certain gifts, or fear, or pity, or hatred, or love, contrary to the order of the legiſlator?

Soc. JUN. It will never wiſh to act in this manner; but that which you have mentioned is nearly the employment of this power.

GUEST. We find, therefore, that the ſtrength of judges is not royal, but is the guardian of the laws, and ſubſervient to the royal ſcience.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. This alſo muſt be obſerved, that no one of the abovementioned ſciences will appear to be the politic ſcience to him who perceives all of them. For the province of the truly royal ſcience is not to act itſelf, but to rule over thoſe that are able to act, ſince it knows the dominion and impulſe of thoſe that are the greateſt in the city, reſpecting what is opportune and the contrary: but it is the province of the other ſciences to do as they are ordered.

Soc. Right.

GUEST. Hence, ſince the ſciences which we have juſt now diſcuſſed neither rule over each other nor themſelves, but each is converſant with a certain proper employment of its own, they are juſtly denominated according to the peculiarity of their actions.

Soc. JUN. It appears ſo.

GUEST. But rightly comprehending by a common appellation the power of that ſcience which rules over all theſe, and takes care of the laws, and of every thing in the city, we may moſt juſtly, as it ſeems, call it the politic ſcience.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, diſcuſs this ſcience at preſent, according to the paradigm of the weaving art, ſince all the genera pertaining to a city have become manifeſt to us?

Soc. JUN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. We muſt therefore, as it ſeems, relate what the royal connection is, after what manner it weaves together, and what kind of web it produces for us.

Soc. JUN. It is evident.

GUEST.

GUEST. It is, indeed, a thing difficult to be evinced; but, as it appears, it is neceſſary it ſhould be unfolded.

SOC. JUN. It muſt, by all means.

GUEST. For, that a part of virtue differs from the ſpecies of virtue, may be eaſily proved from the opinion of the multitude, in oppoſition to the contentious.

SOC. JUN. I do not underſtand you.

GUEST. But again, thus conſider. For I think that you conſider fortitude as one part of virtue.

SOC. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. And likewiſe, that temperance is different from fortitude, but that the former is a part of the ſame thing as the latter.

SOC. JUN. Yes.

GUEST. We muſt dare to unfold a certain wonderful diſcourſe reſpecting theſe things.

SOC. JUN. Of what kind?

GUEST. That after a certain manner they are in many things very adverſe and contrary to each other.

SOC. JUN. How do you ſay?

GUEST. My aſſertion is by no means uſual. For all the parts of virtue are ſaid to be friendly to each other.

SOC. JUN. It is ſo ſaid.

GUEST. Let us conſider, therefore, with the greateſt attention, whether this is ſo ſimple, or differs more than any thing from theſe, in things of a kindred nature.

SOC. JUN. Inform me how we are to conſider.

GUEST. In all ſuch things as we call beautiful it is proper to inveſtigate, and refer them to two ſpecies contrary to each other.

SOC. JUN. You ſpeak moſt clearly.

GUEST. Have you ever then either praiſed yourſelf, or heard ſome other perſon praiſing ſharpneſs and ſwiftneſs, either in bodies or ſouls, or the motion of voice, or in ſuch imitations of theſe as muſical and graphical imitations exhibit?

SOC. JUN. Undoubtedly I have.

GUEST.

GUEST. Do you likewiſe remember after what manner praiſe is beſtowed in each of theſe?

SOC. JUN. By no means.

GUEST. Shall we, therefore, be able to point out to you my conceptions of this in words?

SOC. JUN. What ſhould hinder?

GUEST. You ſeem to think a thing of this kind eaſy. Let us conſider it, therefore, in ſubcontrary genera. For often, and in many actions, when we admire the ſwiftneſs, vehemence, and acuteneſs of thought, body, or voice, we praiſe them, and at the ſame time employ one of the appellations of fortitude.

SOC. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. In the firſt place, we ſay it is acute and ſtrenuous, ſwift and virile, and in a ſimilar manner vehement: and, univerſally, we praiſe all theſe natures, by applying this name to them in common.

SOC. JUN. We do.

GUEST. But what? Do we not often praiſe in many actions the ſpecies of quiet generation?

SOC. JUN. And very much ſo.

GUEST. Do we not, therefore, in praiſing theſe, aſſert things contrary to what we did in praiſing thoſe?

SOC. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. We ſay that each of theſe is quiet and temperate, and we admire theſe when they take place about cogitation; but about actions, we admire the ſlow and the ſoft, about voice, the ſmooth and the grave, all rhythmical motion, and the whole of the muſe which employs ſlowneſs opportunely; and to all theſe we give the appellation of the moderate, and not of fortitude.

SOC. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. But when both theſe take place unſeaſonably, we then blame each of them, and call them by contrary names.

SOC. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. When they appear to be unſeaſonably acute, ſwift, and hard, we then call them inſolent and inſane; but when they are unſeaſonably grave, ſlow,

ſlow, and ſoft, we call them timid and ſlothful. And we nearly find that theſe, and the nature of fortitude and temperance, are for the moſt part contrary to each other, as being hoſtile and ſeditious forms, and which are never mingled together in actions about things of this kind. We ſhall likewiſe find by inveſtigation, that thoſe who poſſeſs theſe in their ſouls, are diſcordant with each other.

Soc. JUN. Where do you ſay?

GUEST. In all thoſe particulars which we have juſt now mentioned, and, it is probable, in many others. For, I think, praiſing ſome things as their own property, on account of their alliance to both, but blaming others as things foreign, they become very adverſe to each other in many things.

Soc. JUN. They appear to do ſo.

GUEST. This difference, therefore, is the ſport of theſe ſpecies. But a diſeaſe the moſt baneful of all others happens to cities about things of the greateſt conſequence.

Soc. JUN. About what things?

GUEST. About the whole apparatus of living, as it is likely it ſhould. For thoſe who are remarkably modeſt are always prepared to live a quiet life, attending privately to their own concerns, and being after a certain manner diſpoſed to aſſociate peaceably both with their fellow citizens and foreigners. Through this love, however, which is more unſeaſonable than is fit, when they do that which they wiſh to accompliſh, they become ſecretly enervated, and render young men ſimilarly affected. Hence, they are always ſubject to injuries; and in a ſhort time themſelves, their children, and the whole city, often by ſlow degrees, from being free become ſlaves.

Soc. JUN. You ſpeak of a ſevere and dire paſſion.

GUEST. But thoſe that verge more to fortitude, do they not incite the cities to which they belong to war, through a more vehement deſire of a life of this kind than is becoming, and thus rendering many nations and potentates hoſtile to their country, either entirely ſubvert it, or bring it in ſubjection to the enemy?

Soc. JUN. They do.

GUEST. How is it poſſible, therefore, we ſhould not ſay, that in theſe things both genera are in the greateſt degree adverſe to each other?

Soc. JUN. It is impoſſible we ſhould ſay otherwiſe.

GUEST. Have we not, therefore, found that which we were conſidering in the beginning, that certain parts of virtue, which are not ſmall naturally, differ from each other, and that they likewiſe cauſe thoſe that poſſeſs them to do the ſame?

Soc. JUN. It appears we have.

GUEST. Let us again too conſider this.

Soc. JUN. What?

GUEST. Whether there is any thing belonging to ſynthetic ſciences which has any one of its works, though it ſhould be the vileſt, compoſed from things evil and at the ſame time uſeful? Or ſhall we ſay, that every ſcience always rejects things evil to the utmoſt of its power, and receives ſuch as are apt and uſeful? and that from theſe, which are both ſimilar and diſſimilar, collected into one, it fabricates one certain power and idea?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The truly political ſcience, therefore, according to nature, will never be willing that a city ſhould be compoſed from good and bad men; but it is very evident that it will firſt of all examine every thing by diſcipline, and, after the examination, will commit this employment to ſuch as are able to inſtruct others, and at the ſame time be ſubſervient to others, itſelf commanding and preſiding: juſt in the ſame manner as the weaving art preſides over the wool-combers, and others that prepare the materials for weaving, and gives ſuch orders to the preparatory workmen as it thinks will beſt contribute to the work it has in view.

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. The royal ſcience appears to me to do the very ſame, permitting thoſe that inſtruct and educate others according to law, alone to exerciſe and teach that which being effected according to its temperature will produce worthy manners. But it puniſhes with death, exile, and the greateſt diſgrace, thoſe that are unable to participate of fortitude, temperance, and ſuch other things as tend to virtue, but through a depraved nature are violently impelled to impiety, inſolence and injuſtice.

Soc. JUN. This is ſaid to be the caſe.

GUEST. But thoſe that are rolled like cylinders in ignorance and an abject ſpirit, it ſubjugates to ſervile employments.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. It preſerves and defends, therefore, ſuch as are naturally qualified for acquiring the generous and the noble, when properly diſciplined, and who through art can be mingled with each other. And ſuch among theſe as verge more to fortitude, it conſiders as reſembling ſtrong thread in the loom on account of their ſolid manners; but ſuch as verge more to modeſty, as ſimilar to fat and ſoft matter; and, that we may uſe an image from the weaving art, as reſembling ſaffron-coloured thread. And ſuch as tend contrary to theſe, it endeavours to bind together and connect after the following manner.

Soc. JUN. After what manner?

GUEST. In the firſt place, according to the allied, it harmonizes together the eternal part of their ſoul with a divine bond. But after that which is divine it harmonizes together their vivific part with human bonds.

Soc. JUN. How again is this?

GUEST. When true opinion becomes ſtably inherent in the ſoul reſpecting things beautiful, juſt and good, and the contraries to theſe, we ſay that the divine in the dæmoniacal genus is produced.

Soc. JUN. It is proper it ſhould.

GUEST. Do we, therefore, know that a politician and a good legiſlator ought alone to be able, with the Muſe of the royal ſcience, to effect this in thoſe that are properly diſciplined, and whom we have juſt now mentioned?

Soc. JUN. It is fit this ſhould be the caſe.

GUEST. But he, Socrates, who cannot accompliſh a thing of this kind, muſt by no means be called by the names which we are now inveſtigating.

Soc. JUN. Moſt right.

GUEST. What then? Muſt not a brave ſoul, when it receives truth of this kind, become mild, and thus be willing in the higheſt degree to partake of things juſt? But when it does not receive it, muſt it not be conſidered as verging more to a certain ſavage nature?

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what? Will not a ſoul of a modeſt nature, when receiving theſe opinions, become truly temperate and moderate in a polity? But when

it does not partake of the things we are ſpeaking of, will it not be moſt diſgracefully branded with ſtupidity?

Soc. JUN. Entirely ſo.

GUEST. Muſt we not ſay, that this connection and binding together of the evil with each other, and of the good with the evil, can never become ſtable, and that no ſcience will ever ſeriouſly attempt to accompliſh this with ſuch as theſe?

Soc. JUN. For how can it?

GUEST. But in thoſe alone who are endued with worthy manners from the firſt, and who are educated according to nature, this bond is naturally implanted through the laws. In theſe, too, this art is a remedy; and, as we ſaid before, the natural virtue of the parts is the more divine bond of things diſſimilar, and tending to contraries.

Soc. JUN. Moſt true.

GUEST. Since this divine bond exiſts, there is ſcarcely any difficulty in either underſtanding the other bonds which are human, or in bringing them to perfection when underſtood.

Soc. JUN. How ſo? And what are theſe bonds?

GUEST. The communions of alliances and children, and thoſe reſpecting private locations and marriages. For many reſpecting theſe things are not properly bound together for the purpoſe of begetting children.

Soc. JUN. Why?

GUEST. Is it worth while to relate how anxiouſly they purſue riches and power in theſe things?

Soc. JUN. It is not.

GUEST. But it will be more juſt to ſpeak of thoſe who make the human race the object of their care, and to conſider if they do any thing improperly.

Soc. JUN. It will.

GUEST. They do not indeed at all act from right reaſon, but purſue preſent pleaſure; and in conſequence of being delighted with thoſe ſimilar to themſelves, and of not loving thoſe that are diſſimilar, they attribute the greateſt part to moleſtation.

Soc. JUN. How ſo?

GUEST. Thoſe that are modeſt ſeek after their own manners, and as much

much as poſſible marry thoſe that are endued with them, and likewiſe marry their own offspring to ſuch as reſemble themſelves. The genus about fortitude acts in the ſame manner, purſuing its own nature; when at the ſame time it is requiſite that both genera ſhould act in a manner entirely contrary.

Soc. JUN. How, and on what account?

GUEST. Becauſe this is the natural condition of fortitude, that when it has been unmingled for many generations with a temperate nature, it is florid with ſtrength in the beginning, but in the end becomes entirely efflo-reſcent with inſanity.

Soc. JUN. It is likely.

GUEST. Again, a ſoul very full of ſhame, and void of audacious fortitude, when it has ſubſiſted in this manner for many generations, naturally becomes unſeaſonably ſluggiſh, and at laſt perfectly mutilated.

Soc. JUN. And this alſo is likely to happen.

GUEST. We have ſaid that there is no difficulty in binding men with theſe bonds, if both genera have one opinion reſpecting things beautiful and good. For this is the one and entire work of royal weaving, viz. never to ſuffer temperate manners to ſubſiſt apart from ſuch as are valiant, but, weaving together both theſe, from according opinions, honor, diſhonor, and glory, to collect from theſe a web ſmooth, and, as it is ſaid, well woven, and always to commit in common the authority of governors in cities to theſe.

Soc. JUN. How?

GUEST. Where it happens that one governor is ſufficient, a preſident ſhould be choſen who poſſeſſes both theſe; but where more than one is neceſſary, parts of theſe muſt be mingled together. For the manners of temperate governors are very cautious, juſt, and ſalutary; but they require acrimony, and a certain acute and practical temerity.

Soc. JUN. Theſe things alſo appear ſo to me.

GUEST. Again, fortitude with reſpect to juſtice and caution is more indigent than thoſe other virtues; but it excels them in actions. But it is impoſſible that all things pertaining to cities, both of a private and public nature, ſhould ſubſiſt beautifully, unleſs both theſe are preſent.

Soc. JUN. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We muſt ſay then that this end of the web of politic action is then

then rightly woven, when the royal art, connecting the manners of brave and temperate men by concord and friendſhip, collects together their life in common, producing the moſt magnificent and excellent of all webs;—and beſides this, when, embracing in common all others in the city, both ſlaves and free-born, it holds them together by this texture, and governs and preſides over the city in ſuch a manner that nothing may in any reſpect be wanting which is requiſite to its felicity.

Soc. JUN. You have finiſhed, O gueſt, your deſcription of the royal and political character moſt beautifully.

THE END OF THE POLITICUS.

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